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Abstract 
 
 
 
The business environment is perceived as becoming ever more turbulent.  New strategic 
management theories point to a more organic and emergent strategy formation process, 
emphasising the paradox of control and questioning management’s role within the 
strategy domain.  This research investigates the theoretical and empirical relationships 
between strategy formation, management’s role and the business environment within 
different organisations and at different times.  Sixteen cases, representing insights of the 
strategy formation process in a large high technology company, are presented based on 
action research conducted over a nineteen month period.  A theoretical framework, 
named the Strategy Formation Matrix, is developed to investigate the relationship 
between the strategy formation type and the management role.  The model is validated 
and researched theoretically against the strategy literature and empirically in a multiple 
case study with six diversified companies.  The framework is later extended to 
incorporate the business environment and these relationships are investigated based on a 
sample of seventeen diversified companies, who represent different industrial sectors 
and vary in size from small to medium to large.  This research has developed new 
frameworks and models to describe the relationships between the business environment, 
the strategy formation process, management’s role and the size of organisation.  In 
addition, it adds to existing models and challenges existing theories that link increased 
turbulence with a more emergent strategy formation process and a static business 
environment with a more intended strategy formation process.   
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Glossary 
Business unit - is the level in the organisation at which the responsibility for the 
formulation of a multifunctional strategy for a single industry or product-market 
arena is determined (Segev, 1995). 
Case Study - Development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single ‘case’, or of 
a small number of related ‘cases’ (Robson, 1993). 
Corporations - are a multi-industry or multi-product-market unit, that is, multi-unit 
business concerns.  Corporations do not compete directly in the market place; 
they do it through their business units (Segev, 1995). 
Corporate venturing - is the funding of new internal ventures that, while distinct from a 
company’s core business, and granted some autonomy, remain legally part of the 
company (Chesbrough, 2002). 
Experiments - Measuring the effect of manipulating one variable on another variable 
(Robson, 1993). 
Exploration - includes things captured by the terms such as search, variation, risk 
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery and innovation. 
Exploitation - includes such things as refinement, choice, efficiency, selection, 
implementation and execution (based on March, 1991 and Benner and Tushman, 
2003). 
Purposive sampling – is a survey method, where the principle of selection is the 
researcher’s judgement.  A sample is built up which enables the researcher to 
satisfy his specific needs in the project (Robson, 1993). 
Robust - capable of performing well in a variety of possible future environments 
(Beinhocker, 1997). 
Synergy - the ability of two or more units or companies to generate greater value 
working together than they could working apart (Campbell and Luchs, 1998 and 
Goold and Campbell, 1998). 
 xxiii
 Survey - Collection of information in standardised form from groups of people (Robson, 
1993). 
 
 
 xxiv
  
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
This Chapter outlines the background to the research and explains the focus of the 
thesis, detailing the relevance of the research to the current body of literature.  The 
research aim and objectives are outlined, along with the research approach taken and 
the overall research deliverables.  Finally the structure of the thesis will be presented. 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Companies have witnessed growing business turbulence in the last decades in general 
and the last years in particular.  Foust et. al. (2003) described 2002 as an episode of 
Survivor, where companies endured the grim reality of a technology and telecom 
implosion, combined with a sour economy, stagnant stock market, regulatory 
crackdown and fraudulent bookkeeping.  Various hazards such as war, terrorist attacks 
and epidemic diseases also contributed to business uncertainty, requiring companies to 
respond quickly and in a flexible way.  A CEO of an airline company recently criticised 
the benefit of market research and described how within several hours after a major 
security incident the stock holders (board of directors, management and union) of his 
company, in an intuitive analysis of the impact, decided on an employee cut back of 
30%. 
The author’s academic education, consisting of first and second degrees in economics 
led him, at first, to regard organisation strategy formation as a rather rational decision 
making process for maximising profit within a set of economic constraints.  However 
his ten years of experience, as a manager and a consultant, gradually shifted this 
perception of the real world to one that sees the business world as complex, 
unpredictable, organic, and consisting of a strategy formation process that can be both 
planned and emergent (Christensen and Raynor, 2003).  For example, one rainy winter 
afternoon the author as a consultant met a sales and marketing senior executive to 
review the future five year business plan of the company.  When politely inquiring as to 
why he seemed so exhausted, the manager described his dreadful day  
 1
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where the CEO had rebuked him for not meeting short term financial targets, an 
installed system in a major customer site had crashed, he found that Research and 
Development were developing products outside the formal roadmap, the financial 
department had not transferred the budget needed to penetrate a new segment, business 
development had asked him to fly immediately to meet a new contact, while his wife 
had just reminded him to come home early to celebrate his son’s birthday.  Two years 
later it can be said that, surprisingly, the company met and even exceeded its long-term 
sales goals.  However the source of revenue differed completely from the original plan.  
It resulted from a new alliance, from a product that was regarded to be at the end of its 
life cycle, and from an unexpected turn around in one of the geographical segments. 
The role of management has shifted in the last decade from its traditional definition of 
central planner and controller.  Palmisano, CEO of IBM, regards the revolution he is 
leading as the end of the imperial CEO at IBM.  He claims creativity in any large 
organisation does not come from the individual, the celebrity CEO, but rather starts 
where the action is – either in the laboratory, or in R&D sites, at a customer place, or in 
manufacturing (Ante, 2003). Former CEO of General Electric Co., Jack Welch, hailed 
as one of the great business leaders of the past half century, when asked to assess his 
record stated: “The biggest change we made, without question, was the move to a 
boundaryless company.  We got rid of the corner offices, the bureaucracy, the ‘not 
invented here’ syndrome. Instead we got every mind in the game…” (Garten, 2001).  
Azim Premji, who transformed an Indian cooking oil company into a global IT 
company, is known as a patient listener, who asks a lot of questions, and is eager to help 
out.  His management characteristic is described by his managers as “both hands-on and 
hands-off” (Kripalini and Einhorn, 2003). 
The bubbling and emergent nature of strategy as well as the hands-on and hands-off 
dilemma, preoccupied the author frequently over the last few years.  This research in 
many ways is a personal quest to understand better the theoretical and empirical 
relations between strategy formation, management role and the business environment 
within different organisations and at different times.  
1.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions  
1.2.1 Research Aim 
The overall aim of the research was to provide an understanding, at a practitioner and 
theoretical level, of the blend of emergent and intended strategy formation processes 
that take place in organisations and the relationships that management and the business 
environment play within this process.  
1.2.2 Research Objectives 
Having defined the aim of the research, a literature review of the strategy management 
field was conducted to help the researcher better understand the context of the research 
and to develop clear research objectives to focus the research.  These are: 
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Objective 1:  
To contextualise the different types of strategy theory that exist with relation to the 
strategy formation process. 
Objective 2:  
To investigate the relationships between the strategy formation process, the 
management role within this process, the organisation type and the business 
environment that the organisation operates in.   
Objective 3:  
To develop a model to describe and explain the relationships between the strategy 
formation process, the management role within this process, the organisation type and 
the business environment that the organisation operates in.   
This led to the development of four research questions to help focus the research study.  
These are: 
1. What is the blend between intended and emergent strategy formation processes? 
2. What are the constraints that stop intended strategy from being realised? 
3. What role does the business environment play within the strategy formation 
process? 
4. What role does management play within the strategy formation process? 
1.3 The Research Approach 
Two main sources served for the research data collection.  The first is HiCo (a name 
granted for anonymous obligation), a half billion dollar, global telecom vendor where 
the author has worked as a part time business consultant for the past six years, working 
with various management levels.  HiCo served as a good platform to conduct an action 
research study.  The RODEO (Robust Development of Organisations) consortium, a 
European funded research (IST-2001-35329) grounded in complexity theory, set on 
achieving organisational adaptiveness and robustness in turbulent environments was the 
second source.  The project duration of thirty months, launched in April 2002, allowed 
the investigation to take place in a large number of diversified companies, some 
participating directly as consortium members and others as participants in several 
project activities.  
A literature review was conducted to focus the research and help define the research 
objectives.  A longitudinal action research study was conducted in one company (HiCo), 
which used multiple methods of data collection (interviews, workshops and 
observation) to understand the strategy formation process.  In parallel, case studies were 
conducted, using workshop and interview techniques, in six companies to explore the 
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relationships between different organisations and their business environment and the 
impact this has on management role and the strategy formation process.  To collect 
more data and to validate the author’s findings, a survey was also conducted with these 
seven companies as well as with ten additional companies.  This hybrid research 
strategy using multiple methods was used to conduct both an exploratory and 
descriptive study of the strategy formation process in organisations of differing sizes 
and from different industrial sectors and business environments. 
1.4 Deliverables 
This thesis presents three deliverables: 
• Theory development and validation - Mintzberg’s (1987) strategy model was 
populated and validated through literature and the action research study in HiCo.   
• Model development – the author developed the Strategy Formation Matrix based on 
literature and data.  The model was expanded to include a representation of the 
business environment based on an existing model and then tested using data from 
seventeen organisations.   
• A contribution to knowledge based on the development of a new concept and model 
for the theory of strategy formation and the role of management in more turbulent 
business environments.  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured into eight further Chapters which are described below: 
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
The literature review Chapter describes the context of the research in relation to the 
relevant fields of literature and identifies the novelty of the work through its 
contribution to this existing body of knowledge.  The literature reviewed focuses on the 
field of strategy management where the author chose to review, in detail, three 
frameworks from the literature.  This is followed by a more focussed review on the key 
issues identified in the research objectives.  This is a review of the strategy formation 
process, the role that management play within that process and the influence of the 
business environment within the strategy process.  The literature section concludes by 
identifying the gap in existing knowledge, that the review has highlighted, and the 
subsequent research objectives for the study that this presents.  
Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
This Chapter outlines the different research approaches available for a social inquiry.  
The research methodology used in this study is then described.  A hybrid research 
strategy was chosen for the study using a case study and survey approach, where 
multiple sources of data were used.  The research was both exploratory and descriptive 
in nature and involved both applied and action research.  Data collection involved the 
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gathering of qualitative data in the form of interviews, workshops, literature review, 
observation, company publications and questionnaires.   
Chapter 4: Strategy Formation in HiCo 
This Chapter describes the action research phase of the research, which involved 
populating and validating Mintzberg’s (1987) model on strategy formation using data 
from the real world.  The author used sixteen examples from HiCo, gathered through an 
action research approach, to investigate and gain a deeper understanding of the 
organisation type, environment, constraints and management role in the strategy 
formation process.  The chapter concludes with the strengths and limitations of the 
research approach. 
Chapter 5: Strategy Formation Matrix 
This Chapter presents the theoretical investigation of the Strategy Formation Matrix and 
describes the development and design of the model.  The aim is to offer a model 
representing the blend of intended and emergent strategy formation process on one side 
and the type of management role on the other.  The literature surrounding the different 
perspectives on strategy formation is then presented and mapped onto the four quadrants 
of the Matrix.   
Chapter 6: Organisations and Strategy Formation 
This Chapter present the investigation of the strategy formation process in six 
organisations in relation to the Strategy Formation Matrix.  The investigation used 
multiple-case studies to conduct an empirical inquiry to investigate the strategy 
formation process in different companies within their real-life contexts.  Companies 
projected their perceived positions onto the Strategy Formation Matrix which is 
presented and investigated in this Chapter, validating the model as a basis for further 
expansion. 
Chapter 7: Business Environment and Strategy Formation 
This Chapter outlines the Strategy Formation Matrix in relation to the business 
environment.  It presents the Business Environment Matrix, developed by the author, 
and investigates the position of the 17 researched companies in relation to the two 
Matrices.  The Chapter outlines these investigations based on companies’ projection by 
quadrant and companies’ projection by size.  The Chapter concludes by outlining the 
limitations and strengths of the research methods adopted. 
Chapter 8: Discussion  
In this chapter the findings of the model development and validation phases are 
discussed and expanded upon.  Useful insights on substantive literatures and current 
thinking within the field of strategy management are used to enhance this discussion. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions  
This Chapter presents the conclusions of the study.  It shows that the research aims and 
objectives were met and reflects upon the research process undertaken.  The 
contribution to knowledge made by this study is shown and areas for future research are 
identified.   
1.6 Summary 
This Chapter has introduced the thesis to the reader and helped identify the focus of the 
thesis and the background to the research.  The Chapter also outlined the aims and 
objectives of the research and offered the reader an overview of the structure of the 
thesis. 
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2 Literature Review 
The purpose of the literature review is to describe the context of the research in relation 
to the relevant fields of literature and to identify the novelty of the work through its 
contribution to this existing body of knowledge.   
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The research study is focussed on the strategy formation process within an 
organisational context and the relationship of the business environment and 
management to that process (Figure 2-1).   
 
 
Figure  2-1: Focus of literature review 
An extensive literature review was conducted to understand the field of strategy 
management in greater detail.  There is an abundance of literature available within the 
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field of strategy management which has led to an array of perspectives on the subject 
and the publication of overlapping and competing conceptual models (Hart, 1992).  The 
author has therefore chosen to focus on the framework and theories offered by 
Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999), Stacey (2000) and Mintzberg et. al. (1998).  This 
helps to establish a common understanding of the field, from a holistic perspective, and 
gives the author a language to discuss the strategy literature within the context of the 
whole thesis.  Included also in the descriptions of these frameworks are theories offered 
by additional strategy management authors.  
The literature section begins by outlining the three models offered by the above authors 
on the field of strategic management to gain an overview of the field.  The author then 
focuses on the three key elements of the research, described in Figure 2-1, offering a 
review of the strategy formation process, the role that management play within that 
process and the influence of the business environment within the strategy process.  The 
literature section concludes by identifying the gap in existing knowledge, that the 
review has highlighted, and the subsequent research objectives for the study that this 
presents.  
2.2 Strategy Definition 
What is strategy? Today, we must concede, it is probably the business world’s most 
used and abused word.  We have strategies for everything: from advertising to logistics 
to human resources to custodian engineering.  This is a shame, for the concept is both 
profound and useful (Stern and Stalk, 1998).  Although academics have studied strategy 
extensively for about four decades and managers, as well as consultants, frequently use 
the word, there are various definitions of the term Strategy.  The Oxford Dictionary 
(Fowler and Fowler, 1984) defines strategy as a “plan of action or policy in business”.  
Chandler (1962) describes strategy as “the determination of the basic goals and 
objectives of an enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and allocation of 
resources necessary for carrying out these goals”.  Andrews (1971) defines strategy as 
the match between what a company can do (organisational strengths and weakness) 
within the universe of what it might do (environmental opportunities and threats).  Other 
key researchers in strategic management, such as Porter (1996), define strategy as “the 
creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of activities”.  
Kaplan and Norton (2004) define strategy as the way an organisation describes how it 
intends to create value for its shareholders, customers, and citizens. 
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Figure  2-2: The different dimensions of strategy (Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1995) 
One approach to explain the availability of different definitions is through the Greek 
origin of the term strategy: strategia – the art of war.  In a business environment several 
dimensions may be associated with this term (Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1995).  Figure 2-
2 summarises these dimensions and gives examples.  The existence of several 
dimensions is an indication of why so many tools and frameworks exist for strategy.  
The variety of so many conceptual frameworks and tools in the area of strategy 
development cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive but must be seen as mutually 
supportive.  It follows that those definitions which take a holistic approach to strategy 
capture the meaning better than those which take an isolated view (Feurer and 
Chaharbaghi, 1995). 
Mintzberg et al. (1987) claims that there is no easy definition and instead argue that 
strategy requires a number of definitions, five in particular.  
Strategy as a plan (intended) – a direction, a guide or course of action into the future, a 
path to get from here to there. 
Strategy as a pattern (realised) – consistency or behaviour over time.  Intentions that are 
fully realised can be called deliberate strategies.  Those that are not realised at all can be 
called unrealised strategies.  A third case, this is called emergent strategy, where a 
realised pattern was not expressly intended. 
Strategy as a position – namely locating of particular products in particular markets. 
Strategy as a perspective - namely an organisation’s fundamental way of doing things.  
Changing position within perspective may be easy; changing perspective, even while 
trying to maintain position, is not.  
Strategy as a ploy – that is a specific “manoeuvre” intended to outwit an opponent or 
competitor. 
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In recent years some new, radical and challenging concepts and definitions have 
emerged such as Stacey (2000) who looks at strategic management as “the process of 
actively participating in the conversations around important emerging issues”.  Wood 
(1999) describes strategy as the process by which an organisation generates, develops, 
and maintains a robust business design capable of both exploiting its current distinctive 
capabilities (its fitness function) on or near its current fitness peak and exploring its 
strategic landscape and business ecosystem for entrepreneurial opportunities beyond the 
lifecycle of its current business design (its sustainability function) away from its current 
peak. 
2.3 Strategic Management Field 
Strategic Management Literature is vast and, since 1980, has been growing at an 
astonishing rate.  However there are several different tendencies regarding its origin.  
Some regard Sun Tzu’s book, The Art of War, on military strategy from the fourth 
century B.C. as the first origin (Mintzberg et al., 1998).  Feurer and Chaharbaghi (1995) 
claim strategic management as an academic discipline evolved mainly from the 
beginning of the second half of the 20th century.  Examples include Taylor’s work on 
efficiency, the rapid growth of forecasting and measurement techniques during the 
1930s and the development of organisational structures and the transformation from 
production to demand-driven organisations after the Second World War.  
Others perceive Newman’s (1951) book, as the first to demonstrate the nature and 
importance of strategy.  In the early 1960s, Andrews, Christiansen and Ansoff laid the 
foundations for strategic planning by demonstrating the need to match business 
opportunities with organisational resources and illustrating the usefulness of strategic 
plans (Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1995 and Mintzberg et al., 1998).  
In the course of the last four decades, strategic management has evolved in various 
directions, particularly in response to the ever-increasing complexity of companies’ 
internal configuration and changing environment.  Hart (1992) claims there are an array 
of perspectives on the subject and the publication of overlapping and competing 
conceptual models.  Mintzberg and Lampel (2001) warn not to adopt a pseudoscientific 
theory of change while investigating the field of strategy management evolution. 
“It may be that the development of strategic management is at odds with the assumed 
development in evolutionary biology. This presumes a succession of species, with one 
often replacing another --the zebra and the horse, for example, descending from some 
extinct animal. The schools of strategy represent a line of descent through the history of 
the field, but this may not be a descent by replacement.” (Mintzberg and Lampel, 2001, 
pg 28) 
Several scholars researched and categorised strategic management into schools and 
streams.  Three sources, (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff, 1999, Stacey, 2000 and Mintzberg 
et. al., 1998) are presented and have been chosen for their well established and 
complimenting position in strategic management research as well as their relevance to 
the research needs.  The three different sources are further elaborated in Chapter 5. 
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2.3.1 Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999) - Three Core Logics 
Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999) present the logical foundations shaping three 
prominent streams of strategic management thought: Capability Logic, Guerrilla Logic 
and Complexity Logic.  The logical foundations shaping the three prominent streams of 
strategic management thought are summarised and then compared and contrasted.  The 
intent is to determine whether these research streams are restatements of a single core 
logic using different terms to describe the same phenomena and relationships, or 
whether they provide alternate, and potentially competing, explanations for effective 
strategic action.  
Capability Logic reflects the general premise that one firm will out-perform another if it 
has a superior ability to develop, use and protect elemental, platform competencies and 
resources.  A firm can be viewed, for example, as a blend of resources that enable 
certain capabilities, options, and accomplishments.  Some of the main principles of 
Capability Logic include: superior resources and accomplishments lead to sustained 
competitive advantage, complementary interdependence promotes superior 
accomplishment, selectivity fosters internal interdependence and facilitates adequate 
nurturance of core assets and competencies, protection from imitation or appropriation 
is essential to sustain a desirable competitive position and evolutionary equilibrium is a 
feasible and desirable state.  Prahalad and Hamel (1990) depict core competencies as the 
foundation for creating the future.  The emphasis is on internal capabilities that enable a 
firm to create and exploit external opportunities and develop sustained advantages when 
used with insight and adroitness. 
A second core logic shaping strategic management thinking is captured in research on 
hyper competition and high-velocity firms.  Guerrilla Logic contends that one firm will 
outperform another if it is more adept at rapidly and repeatedly disrupting the current 
situation to create an unprecedented and unconventional basis for competing.  Some of 
the main principles of Guerrilla Logic include: all competitive advantages are transitory, 
disequilibrium should be initiated deliberately in a frequent and unpredictable way in 
order to create a series of temporary advantages, and agility relies on the anticipation 
and augmentation of unexpected, emergent patterns.  Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999) 
claim that unlike resource-based views, high velocity thinking is not built upon existing 
strengths, but instead repeatedly disrupts current conditions, including a firm’s own 
established position, to reshape relationships and realities.  
Lengnick-Hall and Wolff’s (1999) third stream, Complexity Logic, is based on an 
emerging focus in strategic thinking that is derived from research on business 
ecosystems and chaos theory.  These perspectives argue that strategic success is a 
function of a firm’s talent for thriving in dynamic nonlinear systems that rely on 
network feedback and emergent relationships.  Some of the main principles of 
Complexity Logic include: a healthy community ecosystem is prerequisite for survival, 
social systems are non-linear and deterministic so that natural consequences determine 
sustained patterns of strategic outcomes, influence is achieved by understanding and 
manipulating the underlying forces and attractors that create order in the ecosystem, and 
transformation is relentless.  Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999) argue effective strategies 
therefore require a blend of competition and cooperation.  Paradoxical relationships, 
positive and negative feedback, and dynamic tension embedded between various actors 
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and processes, as well as between a firm and its context, are fundamental elements of 
complexity logic.  
2.3.2 Stacey (2000) - Strategic Management Theories 
Stacey (2000) reviews strategic management and organisational dynamics by analysing 
two groups of categories.  The first group he refers to as the orthodox category where he 
distinguishes between the theory of strategic choice, the theory of learning and the 
theory of open systems.  The second group that is reviewed by Stacey (2000) is referred 
to as the radical category.  In the radical category, a distinction is made by Stacey 
(2000) between the theories that are perceived to start out with radical promises but end 
up with orthodox conclusions (Complex Adaptive Systems) and theories that hold out 
the promise of radical conclusions (Complex Responsive Processes). 
Strategic Choice theory prescribes a procedure involving the formulation of long-term 
strategies and their implementation.  One of the main pillars of strategic choice is 
cybernetic systems concepts.  The prescription given for strategy formulation and 
implementation depend, to a great extent, on the ability of managers to forecast. 
However some versions of the theory incorporate dealing with uncertainty as well.  The 
primary focus of strategic choice theory is on intention and control.  It prescribes a role 
for managers in terms of making choices and staying in control as individuals.  It 
emphasises the installation of large numbers of negative feedback control systems 
relating to information, actions and behaviour.  It depicts leadership as the function of 
directing, inspiring and choosing the shape, position and strategic direction of whole 
organisations (Stacey, 2000). 
According to the Learning Organisation theory, organisations are systems driven by 
both positive and negative feedback loops.  The interactions between such loops tend to 
produce unexpected and often counterintuitive outcomes.  Organisations learn when 
people in cohesive teams trust each other enough to expose the assumptions they are 
making to the scrutiny of others and then together change shared assumptions which 
block change.  Perfect control is not possible but it is possible to identify and leverage 
points where control might be exerted.  Stacey (2000) claims control and primacy of the 
individual are central to both Strategic Choice theory and Learning Organisation 
theory. 
Stacey’s (2000) Open System theory is based on the concept that organisms, as well as 
human organisations and societies, are open systems.  They are systems because they 
consist of a number of component subsystems that are interrelated and interdependent 
on each other.  They are open because they are connected to the environment, or super-
systems, of which they are a part.  As the environment becomes more complex and as 
organisations grow in size, companies differentiate into functions.  Open System theory 
pays attention to both macro and micro levels and it envisages both orderly and 
disorderly dynamics.  The former is equated with successful adaptation to the 
environment and the latter as an obstacle to this process. 
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory, the first of the radical theories presented by 
Stacey (2000), models interaction between agents that comprise a system.  Several key 
insights yielded by agent-based modelling of systems are mentioned.  The dynamic at 
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the edge of chaos, for example, is understood to be a dynamic of paradox between 
stability and instability, which is a requirement for the emergence of novelty.  Diversity, 
unpredictability and self-organisation are other major insights.  Some authors (for 
example, Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Hamel, 2000; Olson and Eoyang, 2001; 
Mitleton-Kelly, 2003 and Wood, 1999) claim change has to come about through 
someone standing outside the system altering parameters, creating conditions, so the 
whole system can move to the edge of chaos.  However, Stacey (2000) criticises this 
approach claiming some theorists emphasise the predictability aspects of the systems 
and see their modelling work as a route for increasing the ability of humans to control 
the complex world.  Stacey (2000) considers this approach as an analogy of the manager 
as the programmer of the simulation and regards it as old recipes in new vocabulary. 
Stacey (2000) adopts a more radical perspective to strategy formation based on 
complexity that he names Complex Responsive Process (CRP).  Intention emerges in 
the self-organising process of ordinary conversation between people.  Change occurs in 
novel ways through the presence of sufficient diversity in organising themes.  This is 
expressed in free-flowing conversation in which shadow themes test the boundaries of 
the legitimate.  Managers cannot think of themselves in terms of organisational 
designers but rather as active participants in a complex process.  The perspective of 
complex responsive process focuses attention more on what people are doing in the 
present than what they are imagining about the future (Stacey, 2000). 
2.3.3 Mintzberg et. al. (1998) - Ten Schools of Strategy 
Mintzberg et. al. (1998) offer a critical, penetrating look at the contributions and 
limitations of ten dominant schools of strategic thought.  Mintzberg et. al. (1998) create 
a comprehensive and illuminating tour through the fields of strategic management, 
shaping each of the ten different approaches into a coherent school of strategy 
formation.  
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Table  2-1: The ten schools of strategy (Mintzberg et. al., 1998) 
School Description Intended 
Message 
Realised 
Message 
Groupings 
The Design School Strategy formation as 
a process of 
conception 
Fit Think 
The Planning School Strategy formation as 
a formal process 
Formalize Programme 
The Positioning 
School 
Strategy formation as 
an analytical process 
Analyse Calculate 
Prescriptive – more 
concerned with how 
strategies should be 
formulated 
The Entrepreneurial 
School 
Strategy formation as 
a visionary process 
Envision Centralise 
The Cognitive School Strategy formation as 
a mental process  
Frame Worry or 
imagine 
The Learning School Strategy formation as 
an emergent process  
Learn Play 
The Power School Strategy formation as 
a process of 
negotiation  
Grab Hoard 
The Cultural School Strategy formation as 
a collective process 
Coalesce Perpetuate 
The Environmental 
School 
Strategy formation as 
a reactive process 
Cope Capitulate 
Descriptive – 
consider specific 
aspects of the 
strategy formation 
process.  Concerned 
less with prescribing 
ideal strategic 
behaviour than with 
describing how 
strategies do, in fact 
get made. 
The Configuration 
School 
Strategy formation as 
a process of 
transformation 
Integrative, 
transform 
Lump, 
revolutionise 
Integrative – cluster 
various elements of 
the other schools into 
distinct stages or 
episodes.  Stable 
states and 
transformation. 
Table 2-1 presents the schools and some of their characteristics.  The Design, Planning 
and the Positioning Schools are grouped as prescriptive since their main concern is how 
strategies should be formulated.  The Entrepreneurial, Cognitive, Learning, Power, 
Cultural and the Environmental Schools are grouped as descriptive due to the fact that 
they are concerned less with prescribing ideal strategic behaviour than with describing 
how strategies do in fact get made.  The third group consists of only one school, the 
Configuration School, and clusters various elements of the other schools into distinct 
stages or episodes.  Table 2-1 also presents the difference between the intended 
messages of each school and the messages that are actually realised (Mintzberg et. al., 
1998).  For example, the Learning School’s intended message is to learn while its 
realised one is to play. 
All schools’ roots date back several decades and all have a degree of influence on the 
current period.  Mintzberg et. al. (1998) analysed the number of publications and 
attention within strategic management for each school where several trends are noticed. 
The three perspective schools showed successive dominance, design in the 1960’s, then 
planning in the 1970’s, followed by positioning in the 1980’s, which has since lost some 
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of its dominance but still remains influential.  In the last decade the Configuration and 
Learning Schools have been dominant.  
Table  2-2: Blending the strategy formation schools (Mintzberg and Lampel, 2001) 
Approach Schools 
Dynamic capabilities Design, Learning 
Resource-based theory Cultural, Learning 
Soft techniques (e.g., scenario analysis and 
stakeholders analysis) 
Planning, Learning, or Power 
Constructionisim Cognitive, Cultural 
Chaos and evolutionary theory Learning, Environmental 
Institutional theory Environmental, Power, or Cognitive 
Intrapreneurship (venturing) Environmental, Entrepreneurial 
Revolutionary change Configuration, Entrepreneurial 
Negotiated strategy Power, Positioning 
Strategic manoeuvring Positioning, Power 
Mintzberg and Lampel (2001) point to variants that cut across the schools and blend 
them together.  For example chaos theory, as applied to management might be seen as a 
hybrid of the learning and the Environmental schools.  The Dynamic Capabilities 
approach of Hamel and Prahalad (1994) is regarded by Mintzberg and Lampel (2001) as 
a hybrid of the learning and the Design schools where strong leadership to encourage 
learning exists.  On the other hand, Resource Based Theory, which seems similar, is 
regarded as a hybrid of the Learning and Cultural schools. 
2.3.4 Corporate and Business Strategy 
Although strategy is a comprehensive concept, it is sometimes applied to different kinds 
and levels of organisations, organisational activities, or geographic regions.  Literature 
distinguishes between business unit and corporate. Segev (1995) provides the following 
definitions: 
Business Unit is the level in the organisation at which the responsibility for the 
formulation of a multifunctional strategy for a single industry or product-market arena is 
determined.  Business unit is often referred to as Strategic Business Unit, or SBU. 
Corporations are a multi-industry or multi-product-market unit, that is, multi-unit 
business concerns.  Corporations do not compete directly in the market place; they do it 
through their business units. 
The corporate strategy level involves deciding what business to be in and how to 
segment environments and the organisation in such a way that different parts of the 
organisation can address opportunities with maximum overall results (Hatch, 1997).  
The strategy formation process at corporate level includes several unique aspects such 
as Synergy and Parenting Advantage.  Synergy is the ability of two or more units or 
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companies to generate greater value working together than they could from working 
apart (Campbell and Luchs, 1998; Goold and Campbell, 1998).  Goold and Campbell 
(1998) identify six forms of synergies: Shared Know-How, Shared Tangible Resources, 
Vertical Integration, Pooled Negotiating Power, Combined Business Creation and 
Coordinated Strategies.  Campbell et. al. (1995) claim that while the core competence 
concept appealed powerfully to companies disillusioned with diversifications, it did not 
offer any practical guidelines for developing corporate-level strategy.  To fill the gap, a 
Parenting framework was suggested focusing on which business should a company own 
and what parenting approach should be taken in order to get the best results.  
2.4 Strategy Formation Process 
Realised strategies can be regarded as consistency of behaviour. Mintzberg (1987) 
separates the definitions of strategy as plan (consciously intended course of action) and 
pattern (stream of actions).  Plans may go unrealised while patterns may appear without 
preconception.  Plan is labelled as ‘intended’ and pattern as ‘realized’ strategy, as 
shown in Figure 2-3, distinguishing ‘deliberate’ strategies, where intentions that existed 
previously were realised, from ‘emergent’, where patterns are developed in the absence 
of intentions, or despite them (which went ‘unrealised’). 
 
Figure  2-3: Deliberate and emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 1987) 
Emergent strategy evolves from activities taking place throughout the organisation and 
thus can be influenced by strategic planning, but is shaped by other influences as well. 
2.4.1 The Difference between Strategy Formulation and Formation 
According to the rational models of strategy, the formulation stage of the strategy 
process flows from the analysis.  The goals of the formulation are to discover ways to 
leverage opportunities and to close performance gaps by: consideration of alternative 
courses of action intended to achieve and/or maintain the fit between environmental 
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needs and organisational abilities, establishing criteria for selections among alternatives, 
and comparison and choice among alternatives (Hatch, 1997).  The plans for the future 
as mentioned are referred to as intended.  
Fully realized intended strategies rely on the artificial separation between formulators 
and implementers while emergent strategy does not.  In the case of emergent strategy 
the term formulation has to be replaced by formation because here strategies can form 
without being formulated, although strategies do not have to be purely emergent.  To 
allow for the fact that they can be, or more realistically partially are, the term Strategy 
formation is preferred over Strategy formulation (Mintzberg, 1994). 
2.4.2 Characteristics of Emergent Strategy 
Some state that strategy emerges within the general outline of a strategic plan, and from 
a foundation of activity taking place thorough the organisation and according to a 
pattern of trial and error learning (Hatch (1997) description of Quinn’s (1980) logical 
incrementalism view).  Others regard emergent strategies as strategies that come about 
without the explicit intention of managers but which result from the flow of more 
operational, day to day decision making (Johnson and Scholes, 1988).  Various 
functions contribute in various unexpected ways to the emergence of strategies.  For 
example, even the capital budgeting process, many times regarded as the buffer for 
initiatives, can drive the strategy formation process, through the emergence of strategy 
(the foot-in the door technique) (Mintzberg, 1994). 
In the last decade, strategic management witnessed a growing trend of linking strategy 
formation, in general and emergent strategy in particular, to theories of complex 
adaptive systems. 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
Emergence is the sense of much coming from little (Holland, 1998) or the whole is 
greater than the sums (Kauffman, 1995a).  Emergence is confronted everywhere in 
complex adaptive systems – ant colonies, neural networks, immune systems, the 
Internet, and the global economy, where the behaviour of the whole is much more 
complex than the behaviour of the parts (Holland, 1998).  Zimmerman (2000) defines 
the three words that compose Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) in the following way: 
Complex implies diversity or a great number of connections between a wide variety of 
elements.  Adaptive suggests the capacity to alter or change or the ability to learn from 
experience.  A system is a set of connected or interdependent agents.  An agent may be 
a person, a molecule, a species, or an organisation among many other things.  These 
agents act based on local knowledge and conditions and are semi-autonomous units that 
seek to maximise some measure of goodness or fitness by evolving over time. 
A Complex Adaptive System (CAS) behaves or evolves according to three key 
principles: order is emergent as opposed to hierarchical, the system's history is 
irreversible, and the system's future is often unpredictable (Dooly, 1996).  Beinhocker 
(2001) claims scientists have discovered that complex systems are difficult and often 
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impossible to predict because they exhibit punctuated equilibrium and path dependence.  
Punctuated equilibrium occurs when times of relative stability are interrupted by stormy 
restructuring periods (called punctuation points) caused by external events.  The idea of 
path dependence is that one cannot predict which path a certain development will take 
and that the respective outcome of this behaviour will thus depend on the individual 
path it has taken previously.  Waldrop (1992) refers to perpetual novelty, where 
adaptive agents are exploring their immense space of possibilities at the ‘Edge of 
Chaos’, in a position of bounded instability in between the extremes of stasis and chaos.  
“Like the surface of the ocean, a boundary molecule thick separating water from air, it 
is the space for all possible dynamical behaviors where a near infinity of ways for an 
agent to be both complex and adaptive exists” (Waldrop, 1992, pg 295). 
In healthy CAS, both competition and co-operation are necessary for sustainability, and 
this situation has been termed co-opetition (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1997).  Dee 
Hock, who founded the VISA organisation, says, “Neither competition nor cooperation 
can rise to its highest potential unless both are seamlessly blended.  Either without the 
other swiftly becomes dangerous and destructive” (Waldrop, 1992, pg 8).  Mahon 
(1999) describes Pond Ecology as another CAS metaphor with emphasis on co-
evolution and symbiosis.  The imagery is that of an eco-system, such as a pond, 
populated by micro organisms.  The nature and degree of collaborative and competitive 
activities between the micro organisms varies in response to both external (to the pond) 
and internal stimuli (within the eco-system itself, i.e. between micro-organisms and 
micro-organism groupings in the pond). 
Wood (1999) perceives organisations as complex, adaptive systems comprising 
physical, cognitive, and socially constructed realities.  Such systems co-produce each 
other and co-evolve with their environment.  In many organisations, such processes of 
co-production and co-evolution are unconscious, driven by incoherent political, 
economic, social, or technological forces in the organisation and its environment.  
Under such conditions, organisational success or failure is a function of a random walk, 
and outcomes are unpredictable and difficult to influence. 
Questioning the Management Role in Emergence Strategy 
Maclean and Macintosh (2003) stress that in essence, emergent properties exist at the 
level of the system, not at the level of the elements; they express a unity at the systems 
level which transcends differences amongst the elements, displaying them as features of 
an integrated whole.  Maclean and Macintosh (2003) illustrate this essence with a 
description by a familiar example, quoted from the contemporary philosopher Roger 
Scruton (1997): 
“When a painter applies paint to a canvas, he creates a physical object, by purely 
means.  This object is composed of areas and lines and paint arranged on a two-
dimensional surface.  When we look at the painting, we see those areas and lines of 
paint and also the surface, which contains them.  But that is not all we see.  We also see 
a face that looks out at us with smiling eyes”. 
This example suggests that whilst there is clearly a relationship between the 
configuration of elements and the quality of the emergent property, such relationships 
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are at present purely understood.  Maclean and Macintosh (2003) point that altering the 
shape of the mouth, or the mutual proximity of each eye will alter not only the geometry 
of these features, but will alter the general impression created by the face, but one does 
not really know how, until one sees the effect. 
This metaphor resembles some of the questions that arise concerning management’s 
role in an emergent strategy formation process.  How can management alter the shape of 
the organisation strategy?  Can it effect the general impression by changes in 
components in a systematic way or is there no cause and effect at all?  Can management 
create and support an environment and initial conditions for emergent strategy 
formation? If so, how? 
2.5 Management Role in Strategy Formation Process 
Three aspects of management role are presented.  The Navigator role describes 
management as implementing rational planned strategy based on strong cause and 
effect.  Later the paradox of control is presented followed by examples of management 
role as an Enabler to the emergence of strategies. 
2.5.1 Traditional Perception of Management Role 
The management role of senior management is often described as looking at and 
analysing the Big Picture and setting strategy.  This prescribes a role for managers in 
terms of making choices and staying in control as individuals.  In the Positioning School 
(Mintzberg et. al., 1998), for example, strategic management appears to be focusing 
outside the firm to explain performance.  In contrast, the resource-based view of the 
firm concentrates on what is happening inside, and what is unique to each organisation. 
Stern and Stalk (1998) claim that building strategic capabilities cannot be treated as an 
operating matter and left to operating managers, to corporate staff, or still less to SBU 
heads. 
“Only the CEO can focus the entire company’s attention on creating capabilities that 
serve customers.  Only the CEO can identify and authorize the infrastructure 
investments on which strategies capabilities depend.  Only the CEO can insulate 
individual managers from any-short-term penalties to the P&L of their operating units 
that such investments might bring about” (Stern and Stalk, 1998, pg 90).  
Johnson and Scholes (1988) claim that many strategists follow a logical incremental 
role of continually adapting to their environment, not rocking the boat too much so as to 
maintain efficiency, and performance, whilst also keeping the various stakeholders 
happy.  In the Entrepreneurial School (Mintzberg et. al., 1998), the strategic perspective 
is not so much collective or cultural, as in some of the other schools, as personal and the 
construct of the leader.  Consequently, in this school the organisation becomes 
responsive to the influence of that individual – subservient to his or her leadership.  
Foster and Kaplan (2001) believe corporations must be redesigned, from top to bottom, 
on the assumption of discontinuity.  Management must stimulate the rate of creative 
destruction through the generation or acquisitions of new firms and the elimination of 
marginal performers.  Collins (2001) contradicts the importance of the CEO in strategy 
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formation and claims, based on extensive research that good / great leaders would not 
start as expected with the vision and the strategy of a company.  Instead, they attend to 
people first, strategy second.  They get the right people on the bus, move the wrong 
people off, and usher the right people to the right seats. 
2.5.2 Paradox of Control  
Stacey (2000) points to the fact that complexity theory, related to management, has 
great implications for how the role of the manager is understood.  A manager cannot 
step outside the conversational processes that are part of the organisation simply 
because their work requires them to talk to others.  Therefore a manager cannot stand 
outside organisational processes and control them, direct them or even perturb them in 
an intentional direction.  All such intentions are gestures made to others in an 
organisation and what unfolds from ongoing responses.  Mintzberg et. al. (1998) 
perceive the role of leadership as not to pre-conceive deliberate strategies, but to 
manage the process of strategic learning, whereby novel strategies can emerge.  They 
claim that strategic management involves crafting the subtle boundary between thoughts 
and actions, control and learning, stability and change.  Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) 
claim managers should chart a course along the edge of chaos where a delicate 
compromise is struck between anarchy and order.  Success is measured by continual 
reinvention of the organisation.  Stacey (2000) claims some research into the decision-
making process of a number of company’s reveal that most strategic decisions are made 
outside a formal planning system, which is outside the bounded-rationality mode of 
decision making. 
Table  2-3: Paradox of control (Streatfield, 2001) 
In Control Not in Control 
Intended/Selected/Designed/Planned 
Aim/Goal/Objective/Target/Vision 
Detecting/Correcting deviation 
Forming 
Known 
Predictable/Certain 
Stable 
Order/Regular pattern 
Conformity/Consensus/Sharing 
Formal/Legitimate 
Conscious 
Habitual movement/Culture 
Evokes/Provoked/Emerging 
Exploring/Searching 
Amplifying Deviations 
Being formed 
Unknown 
Unpredictable/Uncertain 
Unstable 
Disorder/Irregular pattern 
Diversity/Conflict 
Informal/Shadow 
Unconscious 
Spontaneous movement 
Streatfield (2001) argues that mainstream thinking, with its focus on being in control 
excludes the aspect of not being in control, which does not represent truly the 
experiences of real managers.  The combination of both however is more of an adequate 
way of making sense of the experience of line management.  Managers are in control 
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and not in control at he same time.  The experiences of managing are characterised by 
the simultaneous presence of these aspects, summarised in Table 2-3. 
Lewin and Regine (2003) mention leadership paradoxes.  The fundamental paradox in 
this leadership style is leading by not leading.  Since processes unfold in complex 
systems in unpredictable ways, leading organisational change cannot come about by 
simply adhering to a conventional command and control approach, which is essentially 
linear.  To accept non-linear outcomes, an uncontrollable approach and uncertainty 
demand nothing less than a personal transformation of the leader.  
2.5.3 Management Role and Preconditions for Strategy Emergence 
Several scholars pursue the idea that management has an enabler role in establishing the 
environment and preconditions for the emergence of strategy.  In order to have a 
beneficial influence on the longevity of an organisation, business strategy must be 
conscious, coherent, communicable, and intelligent (Wood, 1999).  Wood (1999) 
suggests that in order to meet such criteria the strategy process needs to enable an 
organisation to: focus and sense (define the organisation and the context in which it is 
operating with some precision), anticipate (anticipate the ways in which the 
organisation's context changes and how the organisation might respond to those 
changes), influence (develop ways in which the organisation might change context in 
order to improve its own sustainability), act (motivate intelligent action at the right time 
in the right place in accordance with the themes of the strategy) and learn (promote 
learning coherent with itself and the context of the strategy). 
Hamel (2001) believes that all forms of complexity strategy are poised on the border 
between perfect order and total chaos, between absolute efficiency and blind 
experimentation, between autocracy and complete ad hocracy.  The profound 
implications for how one thinks about strategy and where one should focus attention if 
the goal is to develop a capacity for strategy innovation deep within organisations.  
Hamel (2001) believes there are live preconditions for the emergence of strategy such as 
encouraging new voices, new conversations, new passions, new perspectives and new 
experiments. 
The role of management according to Olson and Eoyang (2001) is to help clients 
identify their significant differences, to establish transforming exchanges that will make 
the differences generative, and to articulate the self-organising patterns that emerge. 
Mitleton-Kelly (2003) argue for a different approach to managing organisation through 
the identification, development, and implementation of enabling infrastructure, which 
includes the cultural, social, and technical conditions that facilitate the day-to-day 
running of an organisation or the creation of a new organisational form. 
 
Weick (2000) explains that an organisation operating in turbulence should constantly 
incorporate a sensemaking process.  When people talk about sensemaking in an 
organisational setting, they discuss at least seven properties (social context, identity, 
retrospect, cues, ongoing flows, plausibility, and enactment) of that setting that have an 
effect on their efforts to size up what they face.  One way to animate these seven 
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properties of sensemaking into a process is by means of a familiar recipe.  Weick (2000) 
offers an organisational context in which he identifies guidelines for management to 
pursue in order to foster improved sensemaking in the organisation.  Table 2-4 describes 
the seven properties of sensemaking and the management role as enabler.  
Table  2-4: Sensemaking properties and management role (based on Weick, 2000) 
Property of sense 
making 
Description Management Role 
Social context What I say and do is affected by the 
audience that I anticipate will audit the 
conclusions I reach. 
Encourage conversation. 
Identity The recipe is focused on the question of who 
I am.  The answer to which lies partly in 
what my words and deeds reveal about what 
I think and feel. 
Give people a distinct, stable 
sense of who they are and what 
they represent. 
Retrospect To learn what I think and feel.  I look back 
over what I said and did. 
Preserve elapsed data and 
legitimise the use of those data. 
Salient cues What I single out from what I say and do is 
only a small portion of all possible things I 
might notice. 
Enhance the visibility of cues. 
Ongoing projects My talk and action are spread across time, 
which means my interests early in the 
scanning may change by the time the 
scanning concludes. 
Enable people to be resilient in 
the face of interruptions. 
Plausibility I need to know only enough about what I 
think to keep my project going. 
Encourage people to accumulate 
and exchange plausible accounts. 
Enactment The whole recipe works only if I produce 
some object in the first place that can be 
scrutinised for possible thoughts and 
feelings. 
Encourage action. 
In the sensemaking view, people in the organisation try things out, discover what they 
are doing as they experience the outcomes of their actions, and then analyse the 
relationships to make sense out of their experience.  Their sensemaking becomes 
codified as a strategy when they claim to have intended what they actually did (Hatch, 
1997).  
Ambrossini and Bowman (2002) claim routines might be a source of advantage, 
therefore what causes success in an organisation is idiosyncratic to each organisation. 
They suggest that “The role of the manager and of the strategist and her/his vocabulary 
has to change.  Maybe one needs to start to understand strategy as recognising 
organisation routines and maybe the word manage needs to be replaced by words like 
protect, nurture and leverage rather than control, monitor or plan” (pg 37). 
Managers need to start understanding that the activities that create value need to be 
nurtured and may be leveraged to other parts of the organisation where they could be of 
even greater value.  Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) argue management should survive, 
change and reinvent in order to generate a continuous flow of competitive advantage.  
This will be achieved by implementing three main concepts that include the edge of 
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chaos (structures and chaos), edge of time (past and future) and time pacing (transitions 
and rhythm). 
One of the important aspects of strategy formation is crafting a conversation in the 
organisation that matters.  Beer and Eisenstat (2004) claim most failures in the 
organisations start when top management advocates a new direction and begins to 
develop a strategy without finding out what influential people in other parts of the 
organisation think of the new focus.  They thereby set themselves up to be blindsided by 
concerns that emerge later.  According to Beer and Eisenstat (2004), a conversation 
about strategy needs to move back and forth between advocacy and inquiry, has to be 
about the issues that matters most, has to be collective and public, has to allow 
employees to be honest without risking their jobs and has to be structured. 
One of the strategy tradeoffs management has to confront is balancing exploration and 
exploitation (March, 1991; Wood, 1999 and Benner and Tushman, 2003).  Exploration 
includes things captured by the terms such as search, variation, risk taking, 
experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery and innovation supporting long term 
sustainability, while Exploitation includes such things as refinement, choice, efficiency, 
selection, implementation, execution mainly of existing capability supporting short term 
optimisation.  Managers should enable multiple strategy or dynamic multi-movements 
of exploration and exploitation, focusing on short term and long term, existing and new 
competence, collaboration and competition all at once. 
2.6 Business Environment 
At the heart of the traditional approach to strategy lies the assumption that executives, 
by applying a set of powerful analytic tools, can predict the future of any business 
accurately enough to choose a clear strategic direction for it.  The process often involves 
underestimating uncertainty in order to lay out a vision of future events sufficiently 
precise to be captured in a discounted-cash-flow (DCF) analysis (Courtney et. al, 1997).  
Yet recent advances in technology coupled with global political climate that is 
favourable to free markets caused some industries to be more turbulent (Chakravarthy, 
1997).  Hamel and Valikangas (2003) claim the world is becoming turbulent faster than 
organisations are becoming resilient.  In the last decade, a growing number of strategic 
approaches have tried to cope with turbulence (for example Stacey’s (2000) Complex 
Responsive Processes and Mintzberg et. al.’s (1998) Learning School). 
An interesting debate in strategy has long focused on the sources of performance 
differences among firms.  Mcgahan and Porter (1997) argue that despite the resource 
base line of thought, the firms performance is most influenced by unique organisational 
processes affected by idiosyncratic historical factors, industry still matters.  The results 
of their empirical study indicate that variation in year effects, corporate-parent effects, 
and segment–specific effects account for the aggregate variance in business segments 
profits.  Another finding is that the importance of the effects differs substantially across 
economic sectors.  
The term turbulence holds a variety of definitions between managers and might be over 
used.  A common approach in the literature is to define turbulence as the result of two 
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main influences – complexity and dynamics (Duncan, 1972; Mintzberg et. al., 1998 and 
Buchner et al., 1998).  Complexity is the number of external factors that have to be 
considered during the decision making process, the disparity of these factors and their 
distribution across the various business areas.  Dynamics is the frequency of change in 
the factors in decisive business areas, the degree of radicalism these changes exhibit and 
the regularity of their occurrence.  Only situations that combine high complexity and 
high dynamics lead to what is referred to as a turbulent environment.  
It is recognised, then, that in conditions far from certainty managers have to apply 
significantly different decision-making modes to those required in conditions close to 
certainty.  One approach for describing uncertainty is Courtney et. al’s. (1997) four 
levels of uncertainty.  Level one is referred to as clear-enough future.  At this level 
managers can develop a single forecast of the future that is precise enough for strategy 
development.  Although it will be inexact to the degree that all business environments 
are inherently uncertain, the forecast will be sufficiently narrow to point to a single 
strategic direction.  Level two refers to alternate futures.  At level two, the future can be 
described as one of a few alternate outcomes, or discrete scenarios.  Analysis cannot 
identify which outcome will occur, but it can help to identify the respective probability 
of each scenario.  The possible outcomes are discrete and clear, but it is difficult to 
predict which one will occur.  The best strategy is dependent on which one does occur.  
Level three refers to a range of futures.  At level three, a range of potential futures can 
be identified, that range is defined by a limited number of key variables, but the actual 
outcome may lie anywhere along a continuum bound by that range.  There are no 
natural discrete scenarios.  Level four refers to true ambiguity.  At level four, multiple 
dimensions of uncertainty interact to create an environment that is virtually impossible 
to predict.  Unlike level three situations, neither the range of potential outcomes or 
scenarios can be identified within that range.  It might even be impossible to identify, 
much less predict, all the relevant variables that will define the future.  Level four 
situations are quite rare, and they tend to migrate toward one of the other levels over 
time. 
2.6.1 Contingency Theory and Decision Making under Uncertainty 
The development of contingency theory was a reaction against the idea that there is one 
best way in management, such as the 1960’s clear prescriptions like Management by 
Objectives (MBO), which were dominant (Stacey, 2000).  Instead, the effectiveness of a 
particular organisational structure, culture or strategy is contingent upon (depends upon) 
a number of factors.  The most important of these contingency factors are usually held 
to be: the environment (particularly the market), size of the organisation, the technology 
it employs, the history and the expectations of employees and customers.  Stacey (2000) 
states that success will be secured when an organisation obtains a good match between 
its situation and its strategic structure.  Mintzberg et. al. (1998) identify four dimensions 
to describe environment, Stability where an organisation’s environment can range from 
stable to dynamic, Complexity where an organisation’s environment can range from 
simple to complex, Market diversity where an organisation’s environment can range 
from integrated to diversified and Hostility where an organisation’s environment can 
range from munificent to hostile.  Stacey’s (2000) criticism of contingency theory is its 
main assumption that approximately the same cause will have the same effect.  It does 
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not envisage escalation in which a tiny difference between two causes leads to two 
completely different outcomes.  It does not for example, allow for the possibility that 
two organisations operating in the same environment may develop in totally different 
directions simply because one gained a slightly bigger market share than the other, in a 
particular product line at a particular point in time. 
Figure  2-4 presents an example of strategy under varying levels of uncertainty presented 
in a contingency theory framework (Hatch, 1997; based on Mintzberg, 1990).  Hatch 
(1997) describes the following characteristics of each quadrant.  In a stable environment 
it is presumed that a rational model can exist since the level of uncertainty is low.  In the 
case of low environmental complexity coupled with rapid change, a moderate level of 
uncertainty exists and a rapid response is essential (formulators implement).  In a stable 
environment that is complex, uncertainty is moderate however the situation is complex.  
This condition is frequently associated with organisations that rely heavily upon 
expertise (for example, hospitals and universities).  The most challenging environmental 
conditions are associated with the category of high uncertainty.  
Mintzberg et. al. (1998) state that: “The external environment is not some kind of pear 
to be plucked from the tree of external appraisal.  It is, instead, a major and sometimes 
an unpredictable force to be reckoned with.  Sometimes conditions change unexpectedly 
so that intended strategies become useless.  Other times environments are so unstable 
that no intended strategy can be useful…” therefore “In an unstable or complex 
environment… either the “formulator’ has to be the ‘implementor’, or else the 
‘implementors’ have to ‘formulate’.  In other words, thinking and action have to 
proceed in tandem…” (Mintzberg et. al., 1998, pg 41). 
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Figure  2-4: Strategy under varying levels of uncertainty presented in a contingency theory 
framework (Hatch, 1997; based on Mintzberg, 1990) 
High rate of change and high complexity conditions occur in all organisations 
sometimes (i.e. at the point at which you experience a totally unexpected shift in 
environment) and in some organisations much of the time (i.e. organisations heavily 
involved in new technologies). Hatch (1997) claims that in turbulent situations, strategy 
is used as a sensemaking device to allow organisational members to act and thereby to 
produce order out of the chaotic experiences. 
When levels of uncertainty are very high managers are, by definition, ignorant even of 
the outcomes that might possibly flow from a decision they make and an action they 
take (Stacey, 2000, pg 93).  They do not know how their actions may be related in a 
cause-and-effect sense to the outcomes of those actions.  As the environment becomes 
more complex and as organisations grow in size, companies differentiate into functions.  
Research shows the more unpredictable the environment becomes the more 
decentralised the organisation becomes, pushing the focus of decision making down the 
hierarchy.  Organisational conflict solutions are very much dictated by the need to adapt 
to the environment (Stacey, 2000). 
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Figure  2-5: Decision making under conditions of certainty and uncertainty (Olson and Eoyang, 
2001) 
Olson and Eoyang (2001) present an alternative model (Figure 2-5) that represents 
decision-making under conditions of certainty and uncertainty.  The dimension of 
predictability of outcome classifies decisions as to their likely outcomes, that is, whether 
the individual or group has a high or low degree of certainty about their outcome.  The 
second dimension identifies the number of alternatives available.  Few alternatives 
narrow the decision towards certainty.  Within the models there are five types of 
decisions: rational, preference, good luck, self-organising and random.  Rational 
decisions can be made in a system when there are few alternatives with highly 
predictable outcomes.  Preference is associated with high predictability and many 
alternatives leading to many feasible alternatives.  Making a decision in this domain 
often requires negotiation, compromise, or exertion of political influence.  Good Luck 
represents low predictability and few alternatives, where searching for patterns in the 
randomness are a better path than in-action.  Randomness reflects low predictability and 
many alternatives where any option is equal to another.  Self-organising represents the 
complexity that exists between randomness and the areas handled by traditional 
decision-making, where the decision involves a high number of interactions. 
Stacey (2000) mentions several interesting models to describe the effect of uncertainty 
on the decision-making mode.  Stacey (2000) presents Thompson and Tuden’s (1959) 
model (Figure 2-6) that shows how managers shift from one mode of making decisions 
to another, as the situation changes.  Where causal connections are clear objectives 
shared, the conditions exist for managers to take decisions in a rational way.  However 
as they move away from these conditions it becomes impossible to apply rational logic 
and so they have to use other approaches.  Thus, when causal connections are clear but 
managers object, conflict decisions have to be made in a political manner.  When 
managers are agreed on what they should be trying to achieve but the causal 
connections make it unclear how to do so, then they will have to use judgemental or 
intuitive modes.  The most difficult situation is where causality is unclear and objectives 
conflict. Here managers will have to decide a way that combines intuitive individual 
judgements with political interaction in a group. 
 27
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
Figure-  2-6- Models of decision-making: types of uncertainty (Thompson and Tuden, 1959) 
Duncan (1972) distinguishes environments that are static from those that are dynamic.  
The two measures create four archetypal environments (Figure 2-7).  The simplest 
archetype is the static and simple environment, where the appropriate organisational 
system is a mechanistic one with rational modes of decision-making.  The most 
demanding of these archetypal environments is the complex dynamic one; it is only 
organic organisational systems that will survive - those with flexible, political, intuitive 
modes of making decisions.  In between these extremes, some pragmatic combination of 
the mechanistic and organic is required. 
 
Figure  2-7: Dimension of the environment (Stacey, 2000; based on Duncan, 1972) 
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2.6.2 Strategy and Turbulent Environments  
In turbulent environments, long term forecasting is impossible and dramatic change can 
occur unexpectedly.  As a result, flexibility and adaptiveness are essential for 
organisations.  Guidelines and decision rules can help cope with complexity (Levy, 
1994).  Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) investigate the sources of competitive advantage in 
high-velocity markets.  The secret, they say, is strategy as simple rules.  The companies 
know that the greatest opportunities for competitive advantage lie in market confusion, 
but they recognise the need for a few crucial strategic processes and a few simple rules.  
In traditional strategy, advantage comes from exploiting resources or stable market 
positions.  In strategy as simple rules, advantage comes from successfully seizing 
fleeting opportunities. 
Traditional strategy tends to emphasise a single focused line of attack - a clear statement 
of where, how, and when to compete.  Beinhocker (1998) states that in a complex 
adaptive system a focused strategy to dominate a niche is necessary for day-to-day 
survival, but not sufficient in the long run.  Given an uncertain environment, strategies 
must also be robust, that is, capable of performing well in a variety of possible future 
environments.  Beinhocker’s (2001) guidelines for creating robust adaptive systems 
include investing in diversity, valuing strategies as real options, incorporating a 
population of strategies and bringing the market inside by corporate venturing.  
Corporate venturing is the funding of new internal ventures that, while distinct from a 
company’s core business, and granted some autonomy, remain legally part of the 
company (Chesbrough, 2002).  
In financial investment literature in the last decade, there is growing criticism on 
traditional analysis approaches (i.e. Net Present Value and Discounted Cash Flow) for 
not incorporating uncertainty and management flexibility.  Real options analysis 
provides a linkage between managerial flexibility and investment uncertainties 
(Micalizzi and Trigeorgis, 1999).  Real options literature is composed of four main 
categories that include deferment or temporary suspension, expansion, switching and 
contraction and /or abandonment of investments.  Luehrman (1998) presents a portfolio 
model for real option incorporating the velocity of investment assumptions representing 
how much things can change before an investment decision must finally be made.  The 
model suggests monitoring the options and looking for ways to influence the variables 
that determine option value and outcomes. 
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Table  2-5: Models of strategy (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). 
 Five Forces Core Competence Game Theory Competing on the 
Edge 
Assumptions Stable industry 
structure 
Firm bundle of 
competences 
Industry viewed 
as dynamic 
oligopoly 
Industry in rapid, 
unpredictable 
change 
Goal Defensible 
position 
Sustainable 
advantage 
Temporary 
advantages 
Continuous flow of 
advantages 
Performance 
Driver 
Industry structure Unique firm 
competences 
Right Moves Ability to change 
Strategy Pick an Industry, 
pick a strategic 
position, fit the 
organisation 
Create a vision, 
build and exploit 
competences to 
realize vision 
Make the "right" 
competitive and 
collaborative 
moves 
Gain the "edges" 
time pace, shape 
semi coherent 
strategic directions 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) link the practical concerns of business managers to 
complexity and evolution.  They recommend a strategy that harnesses the dynamic 
nature of change to create a continuous flow of competitive advantages.  Table 2-5 
presents a comparison between the assumption and themes presented by Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1998) as ‘competing on the edge’ to more traditional strategy concepts such 
as five forces, core competence and game theory.  It can be seen that the main 
assumptions regarding the environment differ and assumptions also vary regarding the 
environment in the derived goal, performance driver and strategy concepts.  For 
example in the five forces model (Porter, 1980) the assumption of a stable environment 
is essential to allow a defensible position compared to the ‘competing on the edge’ 
model where industry is in rapid, unpredictable change therefore the desired goal is 
acontinuous flow of advantages. 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) regard one of the great challenges any business or 
organisation can face is how to deal with the unexpected.  Based on research conducted 
in high reliability organisations (HROs) such as aircraft carriers, nuclear power plants, 
fire fighting, they unfolded the devolved ways that these organisations have to confront 
the unexpected.  HROs make up what Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) have termed as 
mindfulness, meaning they organise themselves in such a way that they are better able to 
notice the unexpected in the making and halt its development.  The characteristics of the 
term are preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise. 
Kauffman (1995b) provides a metaphor for co-evolution of business with competitors 
named the Red Queen Effect, after her comment to Alice: “You have to run faster and 
faster just to stay in the same place!”  In biology where this effect applies, all species 
keep changing in a never-ending race simply to sustain their current level of fitness.  A 
study (Beinhocker, 1997) of the performance of more than 400 companies over 30 years 
reveals that firms find it difficult to maintain higher performance levels than their 
 30
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
competitors for more than about five years at a time.  Long-term superior performance 
is achieved not through sustainable competitive advantage but by continuously 
developing and adapting new sources of temporary advantage and thus being the fastest 
runner in the race.  
Hamel and Valikangas (2003) believe resilience should be the new strategy of surviving 
organisations.  In a turbulent age, the only dependable advantage is a superior capacity 
for reinventing the business model before circumstances force the company to.  Any 
organisation that hopes to become resilient must address four challenges.  The first are 
The Cognitive challenges where a company must become free of denial, nostalgia and 
arrogance and be deeply conscious of changes that are likely to affect its success.  The 
Strategic challenges where resilience requires alternatives as well as awareness; 
creating a platform of new options as compelling alternatives to dying strategies.  The 
Political challenge is when organisations must be able to divert resources from 
yesterday's products and programmes to tomorrow’s.  The last challenge is The 
Ideological challenge where companies need to embrace a creed that extends beyond 
operational excellence and flawless execution. 
"Strategic resilience is not about responding to a one time crisis…it's about 
continuously anticipating and adjusting to deep, secular trends that can permanently 
impair the earning power of a core business.  It's about having the capacity to change 
before the case for change becomes desperately obvious” (Hamel and Valikangas, 
2003). 
Gates and Hemingway (2001) claim that time to market is shrinking for every business.  
The most important speed issue is often not technical but cultural.  They state that 
management should therefore encourage and support the following critical success 
factors: fast response, share bad news and act, build a flat organisation, foster discussion 
and foster experimentation including rewarding worthy failure. 
2.7 Gap in Existing Literature 
Management’s role in the intended strategy formation process was widely discussed in 
previous years and generally agreed upon (for example Johnson and Scholes, 1988; 
Stern and Stalk, 1998 and Foster and Kaplan, 2001).  However, in the last decade, 
management’s role in the emergent strategy formation is widely debated.  While some 
claim that preconditions can be set (for example Wood, 1999; Hamel, 2001; Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1998 and Ambrossini and Bowman, 2002), others claim that management 
cannot set any preconditions aside for participating in the ongoing conversation that is 
taking place (for example Stacey, 2000 and Streatfield, 2001).  Furthermore, the 
paradox of control (for example Kauffman, 1995a; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998 and 
Streatfield, 2001) in an organisation and the implied blend of management activities in 
different organisations or in the same organisation at different times have to be further 
explored. 
Links have been made in literature to the general implication that increased uncertainty 
and turbulence in the business environment leads to a strategy formation process that is 
more emergent, organic and natural (for example Mintzberg, 1990; Hatch, 1997; Stacey, 
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2000 and Olson and Eoyang, 2001).  However, what is missing is empirical data to 
support these links.  
Literature differentiates between corporate strategy and SBU (Strategic Business Unit) 
especially when addressing portfolio management, synergy and core competence (for 
example Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Segev, 1995 and Goold and Campbell, 1998).  
However in discussing strategy formation in general and emergent strategy in particular, 
little differentiation if any is done based on company size.  Most literature evolves 
around large companies while small companies have tended to be neglected.  
This research sets to contribute to knowledge by investigating the relationships between 
strategy formation, management role, business environment and organisation type both 
in a theoretical and empirical way.  The following objectives are therefore set for this 
research. 
Objective 1:  
To contextualise the different types of strategy theory that exist with relation to the 
strategy formation process. 
Objective 2:  
To investigate the relationships between the strategy formation process, the 
management role within this process, the organisation type and the business 
environment that the organisation operates in.   
Objective 3:  
To develop a model to describe and explain the relationships between the strategy 
formation process, the management role within this process, the organisation type and 
the business environment that the organisation operates in.   
This has led to the development of four research questions to help focus the research 
study.  These are: 
1. What is the blend between intended and emergent strategy formation processes? 
2. What are the constraints that stop intended strategy from being realised? 
3. What role does the business environment play within the strategy formation 
process? 
4. What role does management play within the strategy formation process? 
2.8 Summary 
The literature review chapter has presented an extensive but not exhaustive review of 
the literature within the field of strategy management.  This review included the 
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description of three frameworks offering an overarching perspective on the field; these 
were the models of Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999), Stacey (2000) and Mintzberg et. 
al. (1998).   
The review of the literatures surrounding the strategy formation process, the role of 
management and the business environment of organisations within this process has led 
to several conclusions and acts as a basis for the research study.  Firstly it has been 
concluded that within the literature surrounding intended strategy formation, the role 
that management plays is well documented and clear.  Whereas, from the review of the 
literature surrounding emergent strategy formation, the role of management is less well 
defined and there appears to be great debate about what this role should involve.  
Secondly, there is now a firm recognition that organisations face business environments 
that are not only stable and static but also turbulent and dynamic.  Historically, literature 
within the field of strategy management has focussed upon the former business 
environment condition but increasingly focus is being applied to the latter.  This has 
allowed for a link to be established within theory which states that organisations facing 
a turbulent business environment tend to adopt a more emergent strategy formation 
process.  Finally it was concluded that scant attention has been paid to, within literature, 
organisational type and size when discussing strategy formation, especially in the 
context of emergent strategy formation.  It was concluded that discussions very often 
focus around large, multinational organisations and smaller organisations have been 
somewhat ignored. 
From these conclusions, gaps in the existing body of knowledge were identified and 
research objectives and questions developed for the study.   
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3 Research Methodology 
This Chapter outlines the different research approaches available for a social inquiry 
and describes the research design chosen for this research.  The aim is to select the 
most appropriate research methodology through comparison with alternative 
approaches. 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Prior to an inquiry of this nature it is necessary to design the research approach that will 
be adopted.  The researcher must make several choices (Figure 3-1) as to what the 
appropriate research methodology is for the study in question.  The decisions are not 
based on researcher preference but on the nature of the inquiry itself and the research 
questions posed at the start.  There may be several appropriate research paths and at the 
same time, many inappropriate ones (Easterby-Smith, et. al., 1991).  The 
methodological design should be limited by the goal of providing valid, credible and 
useful answers to the research questions selected (Robson, 1993).   
This Chapter outlines some of the research strategies available to researchers involved 
in a social inquiry and the discussions surrounding the various options.  The particular 
research strategy chosen for this study will then be presented and the rationale behind 
the choice explained.   
Robson (1993) defines research strategy as the “general approach taken in an enquiry”.  
Strategies and the methodologies should be developed with specific regard to the 
research questions posed and should be appropriate to the given setting.  After 
reviewing the research strategy literature and considering the research question the 
following strategic alternatives for decisions have been identified. 
 35
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
 
Figure  3-1: Strategic research decisions  
3.2 Research Perspectives 
The study of people and how they think, feel and behave both as individuals and groups 
clearly lies within the domain of the social sciences.  In attempting to understand the 
relationships between organisations and how these are perceived and operated by the 
people involved in them, it is therefore necessary to employ methods and approaches 
originating from the social sciences.  The social sciences include areas such as 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, politics and education and each area has its own 
epistemological and methodological preferences.   
In designing a research inquiry, Patton (1990) states that it is important to know about 
the methodological paradigms debate in the field of a social inquiry in order to 
appreciate the choice of methods and perspectives (worldviews or paradigms) available 
to a researcher.  There are two major and opposing perspectives on which research into 
social inquiry is based, the Positivist paradigm and the Phenomenology paradigm.  
There are a number of other research perspectives available to a researcher (see Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994, pg. 13), but for the purpose of this inquiry the more traditional 
perspective of Positivism is outlined and contrasted to the alternate perspective of 
Phenomenology.   
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3.2.1 Positivism versus Phenomenology 
Table  3-1: Comparison of positivism and phenomenology research philosophy (adapted from Gill 
and Johnson, 1991 and Easterby – Smith et. al., 1991) 
 Positivism – Deduction Phenomenology - Induction 
Basic 
beliefs 
• Explanation via analysis of causal 
relationships and fundamental laws. 
• World is external and objective. 
• Observer is independent. 
• Science is value free. 
• Explanation of subjective meaning held 
by subjects through understanding. 
• World is socially constructed and 
subjective. 
• Observer is part of what is observed. 
• Human interests drive Science. 
Researcher 
should 
• Use various controls, physical or 
statistical, to allow the testing of 
hypotheses. 
• Use highly structured research 
methodology to ensure above. 
• Formulate hypotheses and test them. 
• Reduce phenomena to simplest of 
elements. 
• Be committed to research everyday 
settings, to allow access to, and to 
minimise reactivity among the research 
subjects.  
• Use minimum structure in research 
methodology to ensure above. 
• Develop ideas through induction from 
data. 
• Look at the totality of each situation. 
Preferred 
Methods 
• Generation and use of quantitative 
date. 
• Operationalisation and measurement. 
• Large samples. 
• Generalisation. 
• Rigour and Validity. 
• Generation and use of qualitative data. 
• Multiple methods / viewpoints. 
• Small in depth samples. 
• Context-bound understanding. 
• Trustworthiness, utility and 
triangulation. 
There are two major perspectives on research. The positivist that claims that all 
sciences, including the social sciences, are concerned with developing explanations in 
the form of universal laws or generalisations.  Any phenomenon is explained by 
demonstrating that it is a specific case of some such law.  The laws are of the form of 
constant conjunctions between events, or in the case of social sciences, statistical 
correlations or regularities (Blaikie, 1993).  Whereby, the opposing view, the 
phenomenological approach, states that reality is socially constructed rather than 
objectively determined.  The focus here is on inductively understanding what is 
happening and why, by collecting and understanding data from social interactions.  
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Table  3-2: Selected research perspective (adapted from Behling, 1980 and Blaikie, 1993). 
Strategic Decision Mainly Phenomenological. 
Reason • The author has chosen to adopt a phenomenological research 
perspective. 
• The author’s belief is that the organisational world is socially 
constructed and subjective and that the observer is part of the 
phenomena.   
• The investigation of strategy formation within organisations is 
clearly an enquiry into a social phenomenon.  There are five main 
objections that could be raised against using a positivist approach in 
research of strategy formation within organisations (Behling, 
1980): 
• Uniqueness, such that general laws cannot be drawn. 
• Instability, as organisations change over time. 
• Sensitivity, as the subject of the study may change because it is 
aware that it is being studied. 
• Lack of realism, raises questions about the validity of the 
findings in unreal situations. 
• Epistemological differences, natural science seeks an 
understanding of cause and effect. Social science seeks to 
explain the significance or meaning of phenomena. 
3.3 Research Purpose 
Having identified the most appropriate research perspective to adopt for one’s research 
inquiry the next consideration is establishing the reason for carrying out a research 
study.  Robson (1993) states that in addition to the desire to make a contribution to 
knowledge the purpose of the research may be to either explore, to explain or to 
describe a particular event or situation.   
Exploratory research by its nature is exploring subject areas looking for new insights. It 
is trying to find out what is happening and asking questions of new and emerging 
subjects.  Generally it is qualitative in its approach. 
Explanatory research seeks to explain an established situation.  This may be in the form 
of a problem and will use both qualitative and quantitative data to provide an 
explanation for the cause of the problem. 
Descriptive research portrays an accurate profile of a person, activity or condition. The 
researcher must have substantial knowledge of the situation to assist in gathering 
information to conduct the research. Both qualitative and quantitative data is used. 
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Table  3-3: Selected research purpose (adapted from Robson, 1993) 
Purpose of Enquiry Exploratory and Descriptive  
Reasons Exploratory because the research: 
• Sought new insights from complexity theory. 
• Asked emerging questions. 
• Assessed phenomena in a new light. 
• Was based mainly on qualitative data.  
Descriptive because the research: 
• Portrayed an accurate profile of persons, events or situations. 
• Methodologies and tools were developed and tested in organisations as a 
means of validating the conceptual framework. 
3.4 Research Strategy 
Robson (1993) states that it is satisfactory to consider three main research strategies; 
Case Study, Experiment, and Survey.   
Experiments entail the testing of theories and hypotheses systematically.  The 
researcher is able to control and fix all possible variables within a controlled 
environment (usually laboratory).  The researcher is then able to manipulate the 
variables and measure the effect of the change.  Experiments occur through the direct 
intervention of the researcher under laboratory conditions (Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
Surveys entail gathering information from a segment of the larger population to 
understand something about that population.  This method usually employs the use of a 
standardised questionnaire or / and a structured interview, with standard questions 
(Robson, 1993).   
Case studies, as defined by Robson (1993), are empirical investigations “of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence.”  The case studied can be virtually anything, involving one person, a group of 
people, an institution, or an innovation.  The purpose is to develop detailed information 
and understanding about a single ‘case’ or of a small number of related ‘cases’ (Yin, 
1989).  The method of data collection is via a number of techniques for example, 
interviews, observation, and workshops. 
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Table  3-4: Research strategy selected (adapted from Robson, 1993; Yin, 1994, Hartley, 1994 and 
Behling, 1980) 
Strategic Decision A hybrid or combined strategy based on Case Studies and Surveys  
Reasons • Experiments are ruled out since there is lack of realism.  In investigating the 
strategy formation process within organisations it may be impossible to 
recognise, control or manipulate some key variables – for example, the 
economic climate in which the researcher performs the study. 
• Hartley (1994) claims that case studies are ‘meaningful’ and ‘rich’ compared 
with the sometimes ‘dustbowl’ empiricism of quantitative techniques. 
Surveys and Case Studies will be used as multiple methods to establish 
different views of the phenomena.  
3.4.1 Pure, Applied and Action Research 
“One begins with the assumption that one cannot understand a human system without 
trying to change it.  The essential dynamics of the system are assumed to remain 
invisible to the passive observer.  Only by becoming a member of the system and 
learning over a long period of time how it operates could the passive observer decipher 
it” (Schein, 1989). 
Traditionally research has been classified into two types - pure and applied – and it was 
generally considered that pure research supplies the theories and applied research uses 
and tests them out in the real world.   
Pure research attempts to expand the limits of knowledge rather than directly involving 
the researcher in a particular, pragmatic problem (Zikmund, 1991).  The key factor of 
pure research is that it is intended to lead to theoretical developments, that may or may 
not have any practical implications with results often disseminated across an academic 
audience (Robson, 1993). 
Applied research is conducted when a decision must be made about a specific real-
world problem, and is aimed at answering specific questions or in deciding on a 
particular course of action (Zikmund, 1991).  Dissemination is often to both academic 
and industrial audiences, and is seen to be more pragmatic in its approach. 
Robson (1993) points out however that this categorisation is too rigid to characterise 
what happens in most academic disciplines, where, for example, real world research 
generates its own concepts and does not just rely on the application of ‘pure theories’. 
This leads to the third element of research, known as Action Research, which assumes 
that research should lead to change, and that change should be incorporated into the 
research process.  It rests on the notion that to understand something well, you should 
try changing it, and understand how a phenomenon develops over time. 
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Table  3-5: Research type selected (adapted from Robson, 1993; Yin, 1994; Foster, 1972 and Eden 
and Huxham, 1996) 
Research Classification Applied and Action Research 
Reasons • Applied research since the research will be conducted about a specific real 
world problem.  
• Action Research since some new concepts will be generated and tested. 
The author will be involved in working with members of the organisations 
over a matter which is of genuine concern to them and in which there is 
intent by the organisation members to take action based on intervention. 
The research will not rely purely on the application of ‘pure theories’.  
3.4.2 The Selected Research Approach 
The selected research approach is summarised in Figure 3-2.  The research adopts a 
hybrid or combined strategy based on case study and survey approach, which involves 
an exploratory and descriptive study.  This adopts the collection of qualitative data from 
a variety of sources through applied and action research.  An exploratory approach was 
chosen as the research sought to gain new insight from theory, and assessed the strategy 
management field from a new perspective, which involved asking emerging and 
exploratory questions.  A descriptive approach was also applicable as the research 
involved the collection of data that portrayed an accurate profile of persons, events and 
situations.  Case studies and surveys were used as an approach that allowed for the 
collection of rich and meaningful data from a multiple of qualitative sources such as 
interviews, workshops and questionnaires.  The research is defined as both applied and 
action orientated in type.  It can be described as applied, as it was carried out mainly in 
the context of the real world i.e. in an organisational setting, dealing with a real world 
problem where the results are of interest both to the academic and industrial audience.  
It can also be defined as action research as some new concepts and models were 
generated and tested in an organisational setting working with the members of the 
organisation to solve a genuine problem.   
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Figure  3-2: Selected research approach 
3.5 Data Collection 
There are two distinct models for data collection and analysis.  The first states that the 
data is collected and then analysed and the second model states that data collection and 
analysis can happen concurrently (Robson, 1993).  The two approaches are shown in 
Table 3-6, the first as a positivist, quantitative approach and the second as a 
phenomenologist, qualitative approach.   
The quantitative approach is deemed as the ‘scientific’ approach (Robson, 1993).  The 
research starts with the development of a hypothesis, from the theory, that requires 
testing.  Testing the hypothesis involves experiments or other forms of empirical 
inquiry.  This approach is very much involved with facts and figures and the use of 
measurable data and quantities.   
Table  3-6: Comparison of quantitative and qualitative data collection methods.  (Bouma and 
Atkinson, 1995) 
Aspect of Research Quantitative Qualitative 
Relationship between researcher 
and subject 
• Distant • Close 
Research strategy • Structured • Unstructured 
Nature of data • Hard 
• Reliable 
• Rich 
• Deep 
Relationship between theory and 
research 
• Confirmation • Emergent 
The qualitative approach differs in that theory and concepts tend to arise from the 
inquiry, coming after data collection rather than before (Robson, 1993).  In general, 
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qualitative studies can be defined as any kind of research that produces findings that 
have not been arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  The research often deals with human issues, and is 
conducted through contact with field or life situations.  This can be reflecting on the life 
of individuals, groups, societies, and organisations (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  The 
researcher may often start with a research question or concept alone, and then allows an 
initial period of research to assist in developing hypotheses (Robson, 1993).   
Table  3-7: Selected data type (adapted from Robson, 1993; Yin, 1994 and Becker and Geer, 1982) 
Strategic Decision Mainly Qualitative, partially Quantitative  
Reasons • Due to the type of research question, amount of resources and availability of 
data, a multi data type approach will be taken relying mainly on Qualitative 
data but with some quantitative data. The analysis of qualitative data will 
enable to unfold complex situation from small samples. 
3.5.1 Qualitative Data Collection Techniques 
Several data collection techniques appropriate to a qualitative inquiry were considered 
for this research study.  These are outlined below and the chosen techniques for the 
study are identified in the relevant sections.   
Interviews 
Robson (1993) describes interviews as a form of conversation with a purpose.  There 
are several types of interviews, which are based on the degree of structure and 
formality.  They vary from being highly structured to free range conversations using 
closed and open-ended questions respectively (Yin, 1989).   
The fully structured interview has predetermined questions and responses in a 
predetermined order.  The interviewer will ask the respondent a series of pre-established 
questions with a limited set of response categories.  This is similar to an interview 
administered questionnaire (Fontana and Frey, 1994: in Denzin and Lincoln, 1994).  All 
respondents receive the same set of questions, asked in the same order, with little room 
for variation in responses.  This method benefits from being highly reliable in terms of a 
standardised set of responses which are easy to compare.  A disadvantage is that it does 
not allow for an investigative conversation to develop which limits the amount of rich 
data that can emerge.   
A semi-structured interview is where the researcher has prepared a number of interview 
questions in advance, when and where the questions are used in the interview is 
determined by the interviewer and he/she has the ability to adapt these depending on the 
responses of the interviewee (Wengraff, 2001).  The ability to improvise in an interview 
is very difficult and the researcher needs to be well prepared, as predicting the 
interviewees’ responses to a question is virtually impossible.  Wengraff (2001) states 
that “most of the informant’s responses can’t be predicted in advance and you as 
interviewer therefore have to improvise probably half – and maybe 80% or more – of 
your responses to what they say in response to your initial prepared question” (p. 5).  He 
 43
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
goes on to add that the ability to improvise requires a high degree of training and mental 
preparation.  To be successful, he believes semi structured interviews require: 
• As much preparation as structured interviews before the session. 
• More discipline and creativity than structured interviews. 
• More time for analysis and interpretation after the session than structured 
interviews. 
The unstructured interview requires the researcher to go into the interview without a 
predetermined set of questions or an interview schedule.  It provides a greater breadth 
than other types as it is qualitative in nature (Fontana and Frey, 1994: in Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994) and the content of the interview is usually guided by the responses of the 
previous question.  The benefit of an unstructured interview is that the data collected is 
usually rich and authentic containing revealing information (Eysenck, 1998).  It is also a 
good way of establishing a relationship with the respondent.  Robson (1993) states that 
a disadvantage of the method is the difficulty of comparing interviews and responses 
with each other as each interview will have been slightly different.  Another 
disadvantage is that the lack of structure could lead to a collection of irrelevant 
information for the interviewer.  It is recommended that this type of interview be used if 
there is an opportunity to hold more interviews with the respondent.  An initial 
unstructured interview is then a sound way to establish a good relationship with the 
interviewee (it can act as an ice breaking exercise).  The remaining interview(s) should 
then be more structured.   
Workshops / Focus Groups 
Workshops, sometimes described as focus groups, are a method of discussing issues 
around a particular subject with a specific group of participants.  It is a means by which 
a group can work on or explore specific issues and problems in order to learn or acquire 
more information (Gilgeous, 1995).  Krueger and Casey (2000) state that the purpose of 
a focus group “is to listen and gather information” and that it is a “way to understand 
how people feel or think about an issue, product, or service” (pg. 4).  In an academic 
setting, the workshop can provide a primary or secondary data collection source for the 
researcher.  In this situation the goal is to collect data that is of interest to the researcher 
and gain further insights around a research area (Krueger and Casey, 2000).  For the 
purpose of a data collection technique it is necessary to plan and develop questions 
around the subject area to prompt group discussions and to ensure that the relevant data 
is collected.  Krueger and Casey (2000) state that focus groups have distinctive 
characteristics, these are: 
• They involve homogenous people in a social interaction. 
• Their purpose is to collect qualitative data from a focused discussion. 
• They are a qualitative approach to gathering information that is both inductive and 
naturalistic. 
The actual workshop process can be designed in various ways but in general it involves 
a small group of people (6-10) in an informal, relaxed, face-to-face setting.  The aim is 
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to achieve common intellectual goals through active participation in the discussion of a 
certain subject or concept.  The workshop should be designed in advance establishing a 
clear agenda and defining the desired outcomes of the event.  Data is collected through 
various workshop techniques, for example through group brainstorming and on post it© 
notes.  The workshop process is active and encourages participation from all members.  
Ideally there should be a group facilitator who guides the conversation and structure of 
the process so that the data gathered is applicable to the research subject.   
Using workshops as a method to generate data and information has several advantages.  
In comparison to a standard interviewing process the workshop tends to provide a more 
open setting for participants as well as offering more excitement and stimulation with 
regards to interaction with other people (Lettice, 1996).  This in turn encourages debate 
and discussion, resulting in new ideas and rich data from multiple perspectives.  The 
process allows the researcher to gain a good understanding of the research area and the 
ability to explore, with experts, issues of interest that arise during the workshop.   
However there are some drawbacks that the researcher needs to be aware of when using 
workshops, so that they can be minimised.  Workshops are time consuming and it is not 
uncommon to run a workshop for a day or two.  It is difficult for participants to justify 
taking this time out from their regular working day.  As a compromise it often means 
shortening the workshop and thus covering fewer questions or covering the issues in 
less detail.  The workshops run a risk of producing high level information, this problem 
can be minimised by having clear and focused questions for the participants, a facilitator 
who understands what the important issues are, enough time to develop deep 
discussions and having participants knowledgeable in the research area.  A skilled 
facilitator is often needed to run a workshop to deal with issues such as a difficult 
participant influencing the running of the workshop, or one or two dominant 
participants influencing the opinions of weaker group members.  The facilitator’s role 
also means ensuring that all questions are covered and that interesting issues are picked 
up on and discussed thoroughly.  This is a difficult, all encompassing role and it is 
recommended that the researcher is trained in facilitation, or that a trained facilitator is 
brought in.   
Literature Review 
For a research inquiry, a literature review is sometimes considered as the logical starting 
point (Hart, 1998).  The purpose is to gather information on the area under investigation 
so that the researcher can gain knowledge about the subject area.  It is also important in 
narrowing down the scope of the research by identifying the gaps in current knowledge 
thus helping to focus the research questions for the inquiry (Robson, 1993).  Hart (1998) 
defines a literature review as “The selection of available documents (both published and 
unpublished) on the topic, which contain information, ideas, data and evidence written 
from a particular standpoint to fulfil certain aims or express certain views on the nature 
of the topic and how it is to be investigated, and the effective evaluation of these 
documents in relation to the research being processed” (pg. 13).  Robson (1993) states 
that the academic tradition of conducting a literature review as the foundation for the 
inquiry and at the beginning of the study may not always apply to real world studies.  
He argues that research literature can provide a background resource to the researcher 
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rather than the essential starting point for the research designs.  This view places more 
emphasis on the client group and the additional information available at a practitioner 
level that could help guide the research design.  Robson (1993) states that a “good 
understanding about what is already known, or established, does not then have the 
absolutely central role in applied real world enquiry that it does in fundamental, 
discipline-developing research” (pg. 23) but he believes that it is still very important.  It 
is necessary therefore to have a strategy for collecting and recording the information 
gathered from the various literature sources available in the inquiry and a clear 
understanding of why one should do this.  Strauss and Corbin (1990, pg. 50 – 53) 
suggest that existing literature can be used for five purposes in qualitative research: 
• To stimulate theoretical sensitivity – by providing concepts and relationships that 
can be compared to the actual data collected. 
• To provide secondary sources of data – to be used perhaps as initial hypotheses 
testing of the researchers’ concepts and ideas. 
• To stimulate questions during data gathering and data analysis. 
• To direct theoretical sampling – to guide the researcher as to where to go to uncover 
phenomena that are important for theory development. 
• To be used as supplementary validation – to explain why the findings support or 
differ from the existing literature.  
There is a danger for researchers to treat the literature review as a separate entity in their 
research thesis and that it is done simply to show that the researcher knows the area 
(Silverman, 2000).  Wolocott (1990) states that “I expect my students to know the 
relevant literature, but I do not want them to lump it all into one chapter that remains 
unconnected to the rest of the study.  I want them to draw upon the literature selectively 
and appropriately as needed in the telling of their story” (pg. 17).  Silverman (2000) 
stipulates that the literature review should combine knowledge with critical thought and 
should be written mainly after the data analysis is completed.  He argues that until the 
researcher has conducted the data analysis he/she will not know what literature is 
relevant.  This does not mean that no literature review should be conducted at the early 
stages, as it is necessary to gain an understanding of the field, but that the bulk of the 
reading and documentation is best done concurrently with data collection and analysis.   
Observational Methods 
The actions and behaviour of people is an important aspect in social inquiry therefore a 
technique that observes what people do in their real life setting and then recording this 
in some descriptive way for analysis is naturally appealing (Robson, 1993).  However, 
this technique is highly subjective as it involves describing somebody else’s actions 
using one’s own perceptions and biases.  Patton (1990) states that “scientific inquiry 
using observational methods requires disciplined training and rigorous preparation” 
(pg. 200).  Robson (1993) describes two very different types of observational methods; 
participant observation (described as a qualitative style, with roots in anthropology 
studies) and structured observation (which is a quantitative style used in a variety of 
disciplines).  Robson (1993) states that observation can take on a variety of forms and 
be used for several purposes in a study; these are outlined in Table 3-8. 
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Table  3-8: Purpose and use of observation in an inquiry (Robson, 1993) 
Observation use Observation purpose 
Exploratory phase • To find out what is going on in a situation. 
• Unstructured form. 
• A precursor to subsequent testing of insights. 
Supportive or 
Supplementary 
data collection 
technique  
• To complement or set in perspective data obtained by other means. 
• Validate or corroborate insights obtained by other techniques i.e. interviews. 
• Can be used as a primary method particularly in a research study of 
descriptive purpose. 
Experimental 
research 
• Used within the context of a controlled experiment as direct observation of 
laboratory experiment or in field research. 
The driving force for the observational data collection method is what the researcher is 
trying to find out from the situation, this is guided by the research questions.  The 
researcher also needs to decide what type of information to collect during the 
observation period.  Robson (1993) outlines two types of information; these are 
narrative accounts and coded schedules.  The narrative accounts involve informal 
information gathering, in an unstructured qualitative manner, where the researcher has 
considerable freedom.  The coded schedules are more formal and structured where the 
researcher has a clear direction of what is to be observed and is only concerned with 
pre-specified subjects and all other occurrences are irrelevant (Robson, 1993).   
The role of the observer in an inquiry can vary greatly; the two extremes are that of the 
participant observer – a researcher who participates fully with the intention of becoming 
a fully accepted member of the group, and the pure observer – who seeks to be 
unnoticed and in the background.  The different roles within participation observation 
are described in Table 3-9.  
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Table  3-9: The role of the observer in a participant inquiry (adapted from Robson, 1993) 
Role of Observer Description Comments 
The complete 
participant 
• Conceals that they are an observer. 
• Seeking to become a full member 
of the group. 
• Deliberate and planned deceit 
of group members. 
• Unethical. 
• Used within undercover 
police/government operations. 
The participant as 
observer 
• The group is told from the start 
that they are being observed. 
• Observer seeks to gain the trust 
from the group and build 
relationships. 
• Not easy to maintain dual role 
of observer and group member. 
• Dependent on many variables 
i.e. cultural, gender etc. 
The marginal 
participant 
• Lower degree of participation. 
• Largely a passive member but 
striving for complete acceptance. 
• Some marginal roles can be 
undistinguishable from the 
complete participant observer. 
The observer-as-
participant 
• The group know that the 
researcher is there to observe them. 
• The observer takes no part in the 
group activity. 
• The observer’s presence is still 
affecting the group dynamics, 
therefore to claim no 
participation in group activity is 
arguable. 
It is possible to take a more structured approach to observation which sees the 
researcher as taking a detached, pure observer position and using a quantitative 
systematic observation method which involves the development of coding schemes as a 
way of quantifying behaviour.  This is in contrast to the described participant observer 
technique which uses primarily qualitative techniques and is somewhat unstructured and 
has a narrative form of recording human behaviour.   
In conclusion, the participant observation method can be said to be appropriate for real 
life situations, as it is a technique that allows the researcher to become directly involved 
in the phenomenon under investigation.  This overcomes the artificiality issue of 
interviews and questionnaires where respondents could be ticking boxes and tailoring 
their response to make themselves look good or to please the interviewer (Robson, 
1993).  Conversely the approach has been criticised as it is difficult to ascertain as to 
what degree an observer affects the situation and the technique is often time consuming.  
The biggest debate surrounds the subjectivity of the method.  Once it is accepted that 
the observer can only observe the situation through his/her own interpretations then 
measures can be taken to limit personal bias and the subjectivity of the data (Robson, 
1993).     
Survey / Questionnaire 
A survey is a research method which gathers information from a number of individuals - 
the sample - in a standard, robust way, in order to learn something about the larger 
population from which the sample has been drawn (Ferber et al, 2000). Surveys come in 
many different forms and have a wide variety of purposes, but they do have certain 
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characteristics in common (Robson, 1993).  In an authentic survey, samples are 
scientifically chosen so that each individual in the population has a known chance of 
selection.  In this way, the results can be reliably projected to the larger public.   
Typically, information is collected by means of standardised questions so that every 
individual surveyed responds to exactly the same question.  The survey's intent is not to 
describe the particular individuals who by chance are part of the sample, but to obtain a 
statistical profile of the whole population (Gill and Johnson, 1991).  The sample size 
required for a survey will depend on the reliability of the results required, the size of the 
population, and on how the results will be used.  Surveys provide a speedy and 
economical means of collecting data about a population – they are simple to administer, 
quick to distribute, and can easily be reused.  Responses can be generalised to other 
members of the population and are often applicable to other similar populations.  The 
survey methodology enables specific theoretical propositions to be tested in an objective 
fashion and can be used to confirm and quantify the findings of qualitative research 
(Zikmund, 1991).  However, surveys are just a snapshot of behaviour at one place and at 
one time, and it is dangerous to assume that they are valid in any other contexts (Gill 
and Johnson, 1991). In addition, response rates from surveys are often poor and can lead 
to inaccurate sampling of the population.   
Table 3-10 outlines the data collection techniques used in this research study and the 
context in which they were used. 
Table  3-10: Data collection techniques adopted in the research study 
Data collection techniques 
used 
context used 
Interviews • Within the overall research design interviews were used at several 
phases in the research.  Within the action research, case study and 
survey approach interviews were the main source for gathering 
information and input from the organisations. 
Workshops • During the action research phase workshops were conducted with 
the organisation members to validate and populate Mintzberg’s 
(1987) model.  Workshops were also used to make interventions in 
the strategy formation processes of HiCo based on the authors new 
theories. 
Questionnaires • Detailed questions were asked in the Survey phase of the research 
to gather information from a wide sample of respondents. 
Observation • Throughout the action research phase of the study the author was 
continually observing the organisation, its people and its processes.  
The author took the role of observer as participant. 
Documents • Whenever possible the author validated the research through the 
gathering of additional organisational documentation.  
3.6 Research Design 
The following section deals with the research design in terms of how the chosen 
research approach was implemented.  The section describes the chosen strategy, 
methods and sources. 
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3.6.1 Use of Multiple Methods and Sources 
Using more then one method or source in investigation can have substantial advantages. 
Robson (1993) points to the following advantages: 
• Reduction of inappropriate certainty – Using additional methods may point to 
differing answers, which remove specious certainty. 
• Triangulation – a method of finding out where something is by getting a ‘fix’ on it 
from two or more places. 
• Complementary purposes – use of different methods for alternative tasks (good for 
initial exploratory research). 
• Enhance Interpretability – multiple methods used in a complementary fashion. 
• Assess the plausibility of threats to validity (a particular pattern of findings and 
context from one method can leave interpretation open to particular ‘threat’). 
The research was conducted using multiple methods and sources within and from 
various environments (Figure 3-3).  The planned methods were survey, case study and 
action research.  A literature review was conducted in parallel with the research.  
 
Figure  3-3: Multiple methods and sources 
The source of data includes three populations – referred here as group A, group B and 
group C - consisting of 17 companies from 13 industries of small, medium and large 
size and based in 8 countries (Figure 3-4).    
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Figure  3-4: List of researched companies by group 
Figure 3-4 outlines the three different research strategies adopted and the number and 
type of companies that participated in each group.  In group A an in-depth case study 
strategy was adopted within HiCo using a two year action research project.  This is 
described in more detail in Chapter 4.  In group B, 6 companies participated in a 
multiple case study strategy which involved collecting data using multiple sources 
within these companies.  Finally, group C consists of the whole sample of organisations 
where a survey approach was adopted.  
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Figure  3-5: Geographical distribution of the 17 researched companies 
The eight countries involved in the research were Germany, Austria, Israel, Great 
Britain, Spain, Italy and Switzerland (Figure 3-5).  
3.6.2 Action Research – HiCo (Group A) 
This piece of research took place between 2002 and 2004 and the aim was to 
experience, first hand, a strategy formation process in a turbulent environment as well 
as to test some of the emerging ideas from the research.  HiCo is a large half a billion 
dollars technologies intensive company, with global sales in more then 100 countries, 
and consists of several SBUs (Strategic Business Units) and RBUs (Regional Business 
Units).  The research in HiCo was both at the corporate strategic levels and SBU level, 
and was conducted through a combination of participant observation, structured 
workshops, interviews and diary records and document study.  In total the data 
collection consisted of 14 workshops, 4 interviews, 15 corporate Strategy Forum official 
meetings, 21-business unit management or other substantial meetings (Appendix A and 
B). 
The author’s aim from the action research was to develop and elaborate theory from 
practice.  Figure 3-6 describes the cyclic nature used in the research. 
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Figure  3-6: The cyclical process of action research (Eden and Huxham, 1996) 
HiCo action research (group A) served in a continuous interactive way for testing 
research ideas as well as a source of generating new emerging ideas.  The author 
consults with HiCo (a half a billion revenue Hi-tech company) as a consultant to the 
corporate strategy formation process.  New ideas from literature review and research 
initial findings were tested in the action research and new questions and ideas emerged 
from the process. 
Based on several action research characteristics provide by Eden and Huxham (1996) 
the following design analysis was conducted (Table 3-11). 
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Table  3-11: General and specific characteristics of Action Research (based on Eden and Huxham, 
1996) 
General Action research Characteristic Actual Action Characteristic 
• Action research demands an integral 
involvement by the researcher 
• The author had the mandate to shape the 
process and be involved as facilitator in all 
aspects. 
• As well as being useable in everyday life 
action research demands valuing theory 
• It was possible to fulfil the requirements of the 
customer and at the same time consider the 
more theoretical implications.  Reporting and 
discussing progress with academic colleagues 
and supervisor helped to look at things in 
perspective. 
• Theory building, as a result of action research, 
will be incremental, moving through a cycle of 
developing theory to action to reflection to 
developing theory, from the particular to the 
general in small steps 
• Since this research was based on multiple 
methods and sources used in sequence and in 
parallel, the feedback loop included external 
inputs to the action research, allowing larger 
possible steps, or at least more solid ones. 
• For action research, the processes of 
exploration of the data – rather than the 
collection of the data – in the detecting of 
emerging theories and development of existing 
theories must either be replicable or, at least, 
capable of being explained to others 
• A diary was kept along the research period 
documenting motivation, thoughts, actions etc. 
The information complemented the data 
collection and shed light on various issues.  
• Action research requires that the theory 
development which is of general value is 
disseminated in such a way as to be of interest 
to an audience wider involved with the action 
and/or with the research 
• The researcher used action research to provide 
a rich source of examples and stories to 
illustrate the theory. 
• Photographs were also taken. 
3.6.3 Multiple Case Studies (Group B) 
A multiple case study approach was adopted for conducting an empirical inquiry that 
investigated the strategy formation process in six different companies within their real-
life contexts.  Companies projected their perceived position on the conceptually 
developed Strategy Formation Matrix (Chapter 5) for the purposes of validating the 
model and as a basis for further expansion.  
The six companies in the multiple-cases study, presented in Table 3-12, were chosen 
based on their diversified characteristics in terms of size, line of business and 
geographical origin (all European based).   
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Table  3-12: List of researched companies within the multiple cases study 
Company Size Short Name Section 
Multinational Conception and Manufacturing 
Company 
Large L5 6.2 
Global Financial Company Large L7 6.3 
Industrial Design company Medium M2  6.4 
SW company Medium M3 6.5 
High Precision Parts Manufacture Small S3 6.6 
Biotechnology Company Small S5 6.7 
Data collection began on June 2002 and ended in February 2004, consisting of multiple 
sources from workshops, interviews, surveys, internal documents and external 
documents – for example newspapers and Internet sites.  The investigation is described 
in more detail in Chapter 6. 
3.6.4 Survey (Group C) 
A further analysis was conducted to investigate how the business environment is related 
to the companies’ perceived strategy formation process.  The author adapted an existing 
model which he called the Business Environment Matrix and used a survey approach to 
investigate the role that the business environment played on the strategy formation 
process.  As described earlier the survey approach entails gathering information from a 
segment of the larger population, employing the use of a several data collection methods 
(Robson, 1993).  Data collection began on June 2002 and ended in February 2004.  For 
this piece of research, multiple sources of data were used, such as workshops, 
interviews, surveys, internal documents and external documents (such as newspapers 
and the Internet) and the whole sample of companies participated.  Data collection 
included: 
• An initial background survey, these involved interviews with six organisations. 
Background on the rest was gathered by other means i.e. though documentation 
(Appendix C). 
• MENI (Management role Environment and Networking Importance) analysis.  
The data was gathered through workshops with nine organisations (Appendix E) 
and through semi structured interviews with the eight remaining organisations 
(Appendix D). 
• A strategy formation process workshop analysis with nine of the organisations 
(Appendix F). 
• A context analysis workshop with five of the organisations (Appendix G). 
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• An industry structure analysis with two of the organisations (Appendix H).  
Along the course of the research several discussions were held with company’s 
managers for clarifications and sense making.  The investigation is outlined in greater 
detail in Chapter 7.  
Figure 3-7 summarises the research design adopted within this inquiry.  The action 
research stage of the study involved populating Mintzberg’s (1987) strategy model 
through examples and information derived from real life within the HiCo case company.  
Following this stage the author developed a matrix, based on the action research study 
and from literature, which was named the Strategy Formation Matrix.  Multiple case 
studies were then carried out to populate the Matrix using data from six different size 
and type organisations.  The data collection phase was completed by the development 
and populating of a Matrix that allowed the mapping of the organisations’ Business 
Environment in the context of Strategy Formation.  This phase was carried out through 
a survey research approach using multiple methods for gathering the data within 17 
organisations.  
 
Figure  3-7: Research design 
Table 3-13 outlines the volume and intensity of the data collection across the three 
populations (groups A, B and C). 
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Table  3-13: Data collection  
 Data collection Method Estimated 
Number of 
Hours 
Time scale 
4 interviews 11 hours 
14 workshops 28 hours 
35 observation 
(meetings) 
96 hours 
Action research  
(Group A) 
Documents (internal + 
external) 
 
August 2002  -February 2004 
6 interviews 12 hours 
4 workshops 19 hours 
Multiple Case 
Studies (Group 
B) 
Documents (internal + 
external) 
 
June 2002 - February 2004 
14 interviews 14 hours 
4 workshops 12 hours 
Case Studies 
(Survey C) 
Documents (internal + 
external) 
 
October 2002 – March 2003 (for 
seven companies) 
 
June 2002 – February 2004 
(for three companies that were also 
active in the RODEO project and 
attended some of group B activities) 
3.6.5 Exploration, Expansion and Validation 
Silverman (2000) states that crucial to a social inquiry are the researcher’s ability to 
show that the methods used were reliable and that the conclusions are valid.  Yin (1994) 
identifies three forms of validity relevant to exploratory research – construct validity, 
external validity and reliability.  Construct validity is described as the degree of 
certainty one has that the phenomenon has been appropriately measured and studied.  
External validity concerns the extent of confidence one has that the findings can be 
generalised beyond the immediate case.  Reliability concerns the researcher’s 
conviction that the research and its findings are repeatable. 
The three approaches adopted (action research, case study and survey) by the author 
were not carried out in a linear, sequential fashion, rather the approach took on an 
iterative design.  This helped to move the research and the author’s perceptions forward 
to improve the overall research design process.  Figure 3-8 describes how this process 
worked.  
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Figure  3-8: Exploration, Expansion and Validation 
The use of these multiple data sources helped to strengthen the overall outcomes of the 
research.  This issue of research validity and reliability is addressed in the final sections 
of each Chapter as the author reflects on the research design taken and its strengths and 
limitations.    
3.6.6 Data Analysis 
The research consisted of quantitative and qualitative data analysis.  The quantitative 
data analysis consisted of building a computerised database of rows and columns where 
each row corresponded to a case.  The cells in a column contained the data for a 
particular variable.  Robson (1993) suggests direct ‘keying’ of data analysis software for 
small-scale enquiries where automatic reading is neither possible nor economically 
justifiable.  The analysis included cross-tabulation, statistical significance tests, 
frequency distributions and graphical displays.  The computerised database included 
additional information on industry type, company size, location (country of main 
office), date of data collection and referred date, in terms of years.  Different queries 
were run against the database to assess the impact of different variables on the results.  
The results from the quantitative analysis are presented in Chapter 7.  
The qualitative data was based on workshops, meetings, internal and external 
documents, interviews and an observation diary, enabling triangulation and cross 
analysis between the various sources.  Yin (1994) offers four dominant analytical 
techniques.  These are: pattern-matching, explanation building, time-series, and 
program-logic.  The data collected was analysed on an ongoing basis.  Miles and 
Huberman (1994) suggest that a researcher should be “interweaving data collection and 
analysis from the start”.  They state that it helps the researcher go back and forth 
between thinking about the existing data and generating strategies for collecting new 
and sometimes better data.  They add that this approach enables the possibility of 
collecting new data to fill in the gaps that may emerge in the data or to test any 
hypotheses that may emerge.  The analysis of the interview data adopted this approach 
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and involved developing the theoretical concepts from the data through coding.  Once 
initial interview data was collected, the researcher began categorising the data by 
looking for patterns and themes.  Other techniques adopted included putting data into 
different arrays, a matrix of categories, data displays (flowcharts), tabulating the 
frequency of different events and categorising information into chronological order.  
The themes that emerged from this analysis were triangulated across multiple sources 
and concepts, and the dominant themes that emerged are presented in this thesis, 
predominantly in Chapters 4 and 6.  
3.7 Summary 
The purpose of this Chapter was to outline the different research approaches available 
for a social inquiry and describe the research design chosen for this study.  In summary, 
the research was carried out in roughly three phases over a two year period (2002 – 
2004).  The first phase involved an action research study to validate the conceptually 
developed Strategy Formation Matrix (Chapter 5) and also to use the results as a basis 
for further expansion.  The study enabled the author to experience first hand the strategy 
formation process and informed the further development of the model.  The second 
phase involved a multiple case study approach for conducting an empirical inquiry to 
investigate the strategy formation process in six different companies within their real-
life contexts.  The author felt it was important to validate the conceptually developed 
Strategy Formation Matrix and asked companies to project their perceived position on 
the Matrix (Chapter 6).  Finally a further analysis was conducted to investigate how the 
business environment related to the companies’ perceived strategy formation process.  
The author adapted an existing model and called it the Business Environment Matrix 
(Chapter 7) and used a survey approach to investigate the role that the business 
environment played on the strategy formation process.  This third phase enabled the 
author to develop the concepts further to include the business environment and test them 
in organisational settings.   
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4 Strategy Formation in HiCo 
This Chapter aims to explore and test emerging themes through the action research 
case study in HiCo.  The Chapter outlines the principles of action research, describes 
the process of populating, validating and refining Mintzberg’s (1987) model and 
concludes with the strength’s and limitations of the research approach. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this investigation was to further populate, validate and refine 
Mintzberg’s (1987) model, which describes strategy formation as intended and 
emergent, using data from a real world environment.  Within the case of HiCo, the 
author used sixteen examples from within HiCo, gathered through an action research 
approach, to investigate and gain a deeper understanding of the organisation type, 
environment, constraints and management role in the strategy formation process.  The 
investigation also raised issues for further inquiry. 
HiCo is a telecom vendor that provides advanced telecommunications solutions to 
leading carriers and service providers worldwide.  HiCo employs over 3,000 people and 
produces a yearly turnover of over half a billion dollars.  It consists of corporate units, 
several business units, regional sales offices located around the world and some 
subsidiaries.  The author served as an internal consultant in HiCo for three years prior to 
the action research.  The scope of work was focused on business processes (i.e. 
performance measurements, risk management and strategy formation).  The author 
supported, to various degrees, the HiCo units and subsidiaries.  
The action research was launched in August 2002, in terms of formal research data 
collection and analysis methods.  However, information from previous periods, if 
available, is supplied for benchmarking and pattern recognition, supported by 
documentation.  The action research duration was nineteen months and ended in 
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February 2004.  The data collection consisted of 14 workshops, 4 interviews, 15 
Corporate Strategy Forum meetings, and 21 business unit management or other 
substantial meetings (Appendix A and B).  The company name and sensitive business 
information is altered or omitted for confidentiality reasons. 
4.2 Principles of Action Research 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, this phase of the research is conducted using an action 
research approach.  Lincoln and Guba (1985) define the difference between the 
positivist and the constructivist viewpoint and the relationship between the researcher 
and the findings: 
• Positivist version: the inquirer and the object of the inquiry are independent; the 
knower and the known constitute a discrete dualism. 
• Constructivist version: the inquirer and the object of inquiry interact to influence on 
another; knower and known are inseparable. 
Within this study the author adopted a constructivist stance with regards to the 
relationship between the researcher and the findings.  The involvement of the researcher 
in generating meaning is central to an action research approach.  Schein (1989) states 
that there is an assumption that understanding a human system can only come from 
trying to change that system, and that one must become a full member of that system to 
learn from and understand the changes that occur over a long period of time. Adopting 
this assumption it can be stated that the role of an action researcher is therefore active 
rather than passive.  One deliberately instigates a change in order to understand the 
underlying principles and assumptions at work in a particular context.   
Action research does have its critics; there is still a belief that because of this 
embroilment in the subject matter it is not accepted as ‘real’ research as fundamentalists 
believe that there must be a strict separation between science, research and action 
(Bannister, et al., 1994).  However this notion of action research is becoming 
increasingly accepted especially in the domain of ‘real world’ research.  With more 
focus on industrial research and the attempt to bridge the gap between Mode 1 and 
Mode 2 types of research it is clear that practitioner research does have a valid place 
within academic research providing a rich source of intertwined data, action and 
practice (Bannister et al., 1994).   
As described by Robson (1993), Lewin coined the term action research in 1946.  He 
discriminated problem-solving research from objective scientific research, by 
suggesting that researchers take on the role of actively promoting change rather than 
simply observing and explaining change.  He concerned himself with the rights of the 
participants, particularly focusing on the power relations between the researcher and the 
researched.  His initial formulation of the action research process was a spiral of cycles 
of planning, acting, observing and reflecting, however, the term action research has 
been used in somewhat different senses by later workers…but improvement and 
involvement seem central to all uses of the term (Robson, 1993).   
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Rapoport (1970) believed that action research has two purposes “to contribute both to 
the practical concerns of people in problematic situations and to the goals of social 
science by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable framework”.  Although 
Rapoport’s (1970) assumption that action research provides learning for the academic 
world has been challenged by advocates of a purely practitioner approach, it is central to 
the purpose of this thesis.  The researcher makes two fundamental assumptions whilst 
conducting the work.  Firstly, practitioners benefit from the concepts and insights 
developed through the pursuit of understanding and explanation by academics.  
Secondly, it is the application of such insights in a real world setting that generates 
greater understanding and the expansion of knowledge. 
4.3 Populating and Validating Mintzberg’s (1987) Model 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Mintzberg (1987) separates the definitions of strategy as plan (consciously intended 
course of action) and pattern (stream of actions).  Plans may go unrealised while 
patterns may appear without preconception.  A plan is labelled as intended and pattern 
as realized strategy, as shown in Figure 4-1, distinguishing deliberate strategies, where 
intentions that existed previously were realised, from emergent, where patterns 
developed in the absence of intentions, or despite them (which go unrealised). 
Maclean and Macintosh (2003) provide the following description of emergent: 
“Emergent properties appear as macroscopic patterns in collections of elements   
amongst   which   non-linear   interactions take   place.  The non-linearity means that 
such patterns cannot be understood in terms of simple sums or differences of 
interactions between the elements but arise out … of interconnectivity of the system in a 
way which makes cause and effect relationships difficult to characterise or predict. In 
essence, emergent properties exist at the level of the system, not at the level of the 
elements; they express a unity at the systems level which transcends differences amongst 
the elements, displaying them as features of an integrated whole” (pg 153). Christensen 
and Raynor (2003) claim emergent strategy bubbles up from within the organisation in 
the cumulative effect of day-to-day prioritisation and investment decisions made by 
middle managers, engineers, salespeople, and financial staff.  These tend to be tactical, 
day-to-day operating decisions that are made by people who are not of a visionary, 
futuristic, or strategic state of mind. 
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Figure  4-1: Mintzberg’s (1987) model of intended and emergent strategy formation process and 
distribution of cases 
This section investigates the outlined Mintzberg (1987) model through eight HiCo 
action research cases, in two subsections.  These are outlined below. 
Intended Strategy: 
Case 1 - How long is “Long Term” planning 
Case 2 - Strategic goals project 
Case 3 - Seeking synergy between units 
Emergent Strategy: 
Case 4 - Competing and underground development  
Case 5 - Co-creating the future with customers 
Case 6 - The Clown who became king 
Case 7 - Unexpected strategy formation process outcomes 
Case 8 - Empowering employees 
4.3.2 Intended Strategy Formation Process 
Case 1: How long is “Long Term” planning 
Strategy formation processes are recognised by managers in HiCo as a process dealing 
with the Long Term outcome of the organisation, and the necessary derived actions for 
today to plan for the future. 
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In the research period, the author encountered several practical definitions of the term 
Long Term.  The duration of the term depended mainly on the origin and the motivation 
of the strategy formation process.  For example, in one case, when a sales activity in a 
large geographical region of the world was evaluated to justify its existence, a horizon 
of four years was used.  At the end of 2003 a long-term business plan formation process 
was conducted based on a five year duration period, while at the beginning of the same 
year a corporate cross company strategy formation process was conducted without a 
clear scope of time frame.  
The strategy formation output of a process conducted for example in business unit A in 
2002 consisted of clear, long-term (4 years) recommendations concerning: business 
model, product positioning, geographical focus, sales channels, Research and 
Development (R&D) roadmap, re-organisation and new incentive plan.  In 2004, a cross 
company committee was appointed to define HiCo’s vision based on an outlook of six 
years. 
In HiCo the average development turnaround of new product is roughly between one to 
two years, depending on the business unit and its type of products.  Defining marketing 
requirements for new products after design and prior to the production and sales 
penetration period can extend new product launch for up to four years.  Therefore R&D 
resource allocation at each phase has substantial impact on the long-term revenues, 
which means that defining a long-term road map is crucial.  However the road map 
usually serves as a basis for the design and development process and flexibility is built 
in as it is assumed that change will occur in the form of new emerging short term needs 
(i.e. customer demand for new feature, new opportunity, budget or other constraints). 
External analysts, for example, supply market research consisting of demand and 
technological trends, with forecasts of up to five years.  However, in 2002 when the 
market was witnessing some turbulence and uncertainty, investment house and research 
centres reduced the frequency and the time frame of the market reports. 
Insights:  
Long Term is a relative term dependent on the need of the organisation and the 
external business environment. 
⇒ 
Case 2: Strategic Goals Project 
At the beginning of 2002 the author was asked by the CEO of HiCo to launch a cross 
company Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton 1996, 2001 and 2004) strategic 
process.  The main goal of the initiative was to define strategic targets for corporate and 
business units and to put in place adequate measurements.  
The Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) is a performance management 
system (not only a measurement system) that enables organisations to clarify their 
vision and strategy and translate them into action.  It provides feedback around both the 
internal business processes and external outcomes, in order to continuously improve 
strategic performance and results.  The Balanced Scorecard suggests that one views the 
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organisation from four perspectives: Learning and Growth Perspective, Business 
Process Perspective, Customer Perspective and Financial Perspective. 
The author conducted meetings and workshops in different units of the company - 
Corporate management, business unit A, business unit B, business unit C and business 
unit D.   Enthusiasm and cooperation to the project varied between the different 
organisation units.  Although managers were used to financial targets and 
measurements, generally unless a major reorganisation process was taking place, 
internal objectives transparency was limited and not discussed frequently with corporate 
management.  Business unit B, for example, perceived the initiative as a shift to a 
tighter management control.  Only after some persuasion, from corporate level, did they 
generate their derived strategic goals and targets.  The business unit manager, without 
conducting a workshop and with no assistance from the author, led the process.  
Business unit A, on the other hand, was enthusiastic about the process.  The business 
unit manager regarded the initiative as an opportunity to discuss the strategic objectives 
of year 2003 with his management in a structured way, prioritise goals, and 
communicate internally and externally the outcomes.  In business unit C and business 
unit D the initiative was accepted mainly as “another corporate demand” and showed 
little enthusiasm when first approached.  However, once they began the process 
managers immediately recognised its potential added value and led the process actively.   
In the past the author had experienced various performance measurement projects, in 
various levels and with different scopes.  One of the main lessons learned was that the 
goals derived from strategy were rarely fully implemented.  Although perceived as 
important, many of the long-term goals when confronted with the short term constraints 
and challenges were not realised within the defined time frame.  To overcome this 
problem, the author created a graphical facilitation tool (Figure 4-2) adding three other 
factors, to the four Balanced Scorecard perspectives.  The first additional factor was 
support needed from external entities in order to achieve the goals.  For example, some 
of the business unit’s activities were highly dependent on the Regional Sales Units or 
corporate approval.  A second added factor was mapping of major uncertainties.  Some 
business units mapped specific market trends while others mentioned immature 
technology where the future outcome was not yet transparent.  The third added factor 
was short-term challenges.  The business units and corporate management mentioned 
short-term challenges which were financial oriented (i.e. improving cash flow, 
inventory reduction and profit targets) sales targets (i.e. penetrating a specific customer) 
and technology (i.e. finishing a specific product development). 
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Figure  4-2: Strategic goals workshop template 
During the first meetings in each of the units, participation of all management members 
was active and enthusiastic.  All managers clearly understood the model and the 
differences between short-term versus long-term goals.  In all meetings the initial part of 
the workshop generated a large number of suggestions, followed by an open discussion 
on understanding the outcomes and narrowing down to ten goals.  When encountering 
the prioritisation stage, some of the discussed themes reflected a deep gap in 
understanding, between the managers.  For example marketing position and 
development roadmap were perceived and interpreted differently by various managers.  
Other interesting discussion occurred around investments in human assets in terms of 
motivation and specific skills.  The manager of business unit A regarded the session as 
“important to identify gaps in strategy perception and align all managers to sail in the 
same direction”.  
Each business unit’s long term challenges had different characteristics.  The corporate 
units’ challenges were mainly concerned with internal workflow, new investments and 
alliances.  Business unit A considered shifting its geographical focus from one part of 
the globe to the other as its main challenge.  Business unit C’s long-term goals included 
penetration to new and existing customers with a new product.  Business unit D was 
trying to justify investment in a new family of products as its current product was 
caught in the aging life cycle. 
The session held at corporate level included a problem not confronted at the business 
unit level.  One manager named the problem as the “two hats dilemma”.  The corporate 
management was in charge of both the overall company performance and strategy while 
at the same time providing major services to the business units; such as operation 
(including production), IT, compliance laboratories and financial support.  To overcome 
this problem, for this initiative the corporate management decided to focus only on the 
overall company performance. 
The second workshop meeting included approving targets and measurements to the 
goals identified in the first workshop.  In most cases the meeting was held after the 
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author had conducted preliminary work with some of the managers.  Confronted with 
the need to take responsibility and define clear goal measurements the enthusiasm, 
experienced at the first workshop, deteriorated.  While business unit managers tried to 
define aggressive targets, managers directly responsible for the goals tried to lower 
expectations.  In some cases a discussion evolved on interlinks between targets and the 
importance of cross company co-operation. 
Managers made use of the outcomes to communicate the unit goals internally and 
externally.  The manager of business unit A, for example, conducted a series of 
presentations in all departments to all level of employees.  The CEO of HiCo presented 
the process and its output to the company’s Board of Directors.  During 2002 the targets 
were updated once and several follow-ups were conducted.  However market dynamics 
left some of the targets invalid due to the large deviation from actual results.  
In 2003, the company CEO changed the model categories of the scorecard to financial, 
strategic (mainly market driven) and enabler (environmental such as motivation and 
infrastructure) and launched an incentive plan based on results.  Managers were graded 
mainly for their direct responsibilities but also based on collective corporate and other 
unit success.  Although there were periodical changes, due to internal and external 
turbulence, the incentive plan generated motivation to sustain the process by periodical 
updates.  In 2004 the project saw the start of its third year. 
The benefit of the strategic goals project was mainly to offer structured discussions 
between the CEO and managers and internally within the units.  The discussions 
focussed on Long term versus short-term goals, constraints and priorities.  The process 
helped align expectations between the different stakeholders and define clear targets.  
However without the project serving as a platform for incentive plans the author doubts 
whether the managers would have been committed enough to allocate time to maintain 
the project. 
Insights: 
Strategic goals are beneficial mainly for structured discussion, decision making 
and communicating strategy. 
⇒ 
⇒ Strategic goals initiatives tend to fade away unless linked to an incentive plan. 
Case 3: Seeking Synergy Between Units 
Synergy is defined as the ability of two or more units or companies to generate greater 
value from working together than they could from working apart (Goold and Campbell, 
1998 and Campbell and Luchs, 1998).  In 2003, as part of the HiCo strategy formation 
process, synergy was evaluated and identified for potential improvements.  Based on 
Goold and Campell (1998), synergy was analysed using six forms: Shared Know-How, 
Shared Tangible Resources, Vertical Integration, Pooled Negotiating Power, Combined 
Business Creation and Coordinated Strategies. 
The cross company team included participants from corporate and business units. 
Corporate representatives wanted to seek synergy between units to offer joint solutions, 
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combined business creation and coordinated strategies.  The business unit 
representatives showed willingness to cooperate to some degree in increasing shared 
know-how, shared tangible resources, and pooled negotiating power but resented the 
corporate goal to increase combined business creation and coordinated strategies 
claiming the effort was larger then the potential benefit.  Corporate management 
intervention during the research period gained relatively little success in these synergy 
areas. 
Insights: 
Businesses units will tend to dismiss synergy initiatives unless they are 
convinced of the direct short term benefits. 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
4.3.3 Emergent Strategy Formation Process 
Case 4: Competing and Underground Development   
At the beginning of 2004, the author was asked to support a cost reduction initiative in 
one of the business units.  When reviewing the customer support unit structure he was 
surprised to find that they were conducting a software development project, an activity 
that normally was the responsibility of the R&D unit.  It was discovered that the project 
had been initiated by the following scenario.  Field engineers working at the installation 
of products in the customer premises noticed a need for a specific solution that could 
potentially generate extra revenue for HiCo.  When the unit manager approached R&D 
to develop this feature he was told that it was not in the current technology roadmap and 
due to resource constraints they would not be able to develop it.  The unit manager 
persisted and approached his business unit’s CEO.  The business unit CEO was excited 
by the emerging idea and, although it was not in the main company scope, decided to 
grant the unit manager the highly unusual permission to develop and support the 
software feature.  Development was based on outsourcing, directly competing with the 
R&D units’ capabilities. 
Another example of product emergence was when R&D engineers, eager to experiment 
and expand their knowledge into new technologies, sometimes conducted 
“underground” research and development based on formal budget, for other purposes. If 
they managed to develop a solution attractive to marketing potential they made their 
findings public.  They knew that the sales and marketing managers, eager to increase 
sales would not challenge or investigate where or how these new and unplanned 
solutions had emerged.  This phenomenon was also identified in company L6 (multiple 
case studies). 
Insights: 
Emergence of innovation can originate not only in units formally defined as 
innovation oriented (Such as marketing and R&D). 
Internal competition that might seem inefficient can be supported by 
management. 
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“Underground” innovation and business development is conducted by units and 
gains visibility only upon successes, received gladly by management. 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
Case 5: Co-creating the Future with Customers 
In 2004, a marketing manager asked the author to assist him in a process that was 
launched the previous year and which he was encountering problems with.  The initial 
idea started through self-organisation between him, as a marketing department 
employee and an energetic pre-sale engineer.  The idea was to conduct a joint strategy 
process, with customers, analysing the end users needs and trends in order to generate 
new solutions and services.  The Telecom Company would share its gathered market 
knowledge with HiCo as a supplier, while HiCo would contribute its complementary 
knowledge of technology trends and market know-how, gained from working with a 
large global customer base.  There were no commitments attached to the deal. However, 
for HiCo it was a great opportunity for the emergence of new solutions and to 
substantially increase the chances of conducting business in the future with the specific 
customer.  One of the managers described the benefit of the output in the following 
way: 
“Although we were quite aware of some of the customer needs before, the interaction 
led to viewing priorities differently, learning of new ones and co-creating a solution 
that the customer or us would have never thought of before, innovative, surprising and 
not in the mainstream.” 
The author was asked to assist in building a two day generic strategic workshop to serve 
this purpose.  The concept was deployed successfully with two customers in two 
different countries and five other customers gave their consent for future workshops. 
However, although everyone in HiCo was highly excited and agreed on the benefits the 
project stumbled into budget constraints.  Regional sales offices, for example, were 
measured based on short-term (mainly quarterly) sales and profits.  Although the long-
term benefit was clear to them, when they needed to contribute resources they did it 
partially and not consistently. 
Insights: 
Self organisation at a low level can impact the course of strategy.  
Interaction with the customer can lead to emergent new services and products. 
Although all might agree on the “right thing to do”, resource allocation is not 
necessarily aligned. 
Constant stress between long term needs, such as new product development and 
new customer penetration, and short term revenue and profit targets impacts 
decisions. 
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Case 6: The Clown who Became King 
One of the insights of the author, as a strategy process facilitator, was with Mr X. 
Normally, while conducting a cross company activity; managers who have a new idea 
or non-mainstream vision see the process as a stage and an opportunity to promote their 
concepts. Mr X, whose name has been omitted for confidentiality reasons, was an 
experienced and open-minded engineer who served in several positions in the company 
and joined the business development unit (business unit level).  Mr X’s presentations 
were used to gain the audiences’ sympathy and laughter due to its non-conformist stand, 
consistency in pursuing a goal and his unique humoristic style.  Mr X’s vision was to 
take the company’s competencies and products in an existing market through minor 
adjustments, to penetrate a new market.  For a long period, Mr. X’s vision was 
constantly turned down by management, claiming it to be too risky and preferring to 
allocate R&D resources to increase the revenue in the existing market.  However, after 
constant persuasion, limited resources were finally allocated.  Within three years the 
new market accounted for over 40% of HiCo’s business unit sales. 
Insights: 
One man’s personal vision and internal marketing skills could have a 
substantial impact on strategy. 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
Many great ideas are not materialised due to lack of internal marketing skills of 
the originator. 
Managers find it hard to evaluate and decide on resource allocation for 
opportunities. Often they rely on intuition or personality. 
Case 7: Unexpected Strategy Formation Process Outcomes 
In late 2002, the author was called to assist in preparing and conducting an “Out of the 
Box” one-day workshop for one of HiCo’s business units.  The workshop aimed to 
identify new business opportunities to substantially increase sales.  A diversified team 
was chosen, composed of business unit managers, regional sales unit managers and 
external experts.  An out of office, scenic environment was chosen for the workshop and 
a process was defined based on a well-established opportunity idea generator model.  A 
unique musical and special effects e-mail invitation was sent to all participants, aimed at 
enthusing them and encouraging them to come to the event with an open mind.  The 
business unit CEO insisted, and stood by his commitment, to allow a totally emergent 
process without trying to impose a certain direction.  The process outcomes were quite 
unexpected.  The main conclusion was that the main opportunity was not to launch a 
new product or penetrate new market but rather to improve the customer focus within 
the business unit.  It was believed that a restructuring of the organisation for improved 
sales processes, addressing existing customers’ unique needs and raising customer 
satisfaction, would result in increased revenue within the existing customer base and 
market. 
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Insights: 
When management takes an enabler role, supporting an emergent process, 
surprising outcomes may arise.  Management should be willing to take the risk 
as well as the opportunity for unexpected outcomes. 
⇒ 
Case 8: Empowering Employees 
The following example represents a process integrating the concepts of complexity (the 
author was partially involved in the planning but did not participate in the workshop - 
however he was granted access to all the data and conducted interviews before and after 
with the process owner and participants).  The goal of the initiative (2004) was to 
generate a bottom up emergent strategy in order to improve the working environment 
and future success of one of the business units.  The process owner was the Human 
Resource (HR) manager, supported by a consultant.  The project’s first phase included a 
one month intensive internal communication effort (posters, meetings with all 
departments, and the forming of a cross-company committee).  Employees from all 
company functions were called to volunteer and take part in shaping the company by 
participating in a two day workshop event outside the company premises.  
Although quite cynical about the potential outcome, around a quarter of the business 
unit employees signed up representing all business units, management levels and 
departments and amounting to almost 200 participants.  The workshop was conducted 
as an open space of ideas.  The business unit’s CEO opened the first day with a personal 
commitment to respect and seriously consider any emerging initiative.  Later 
participants were asked to raise any issues on any subject and conduct a Hyde Park 
(where each participant can raise any issue and discuss it, and the audience can freely 
choose which discussion to join) type sessions in various rooms.  Over 50 issues were 
raised and discussed on a wide range of subjects such as: company vision, promoting a 
certain product, mutual respect, work from home, retention plan and the toilet 
conditions.  A concluding first day session was conducted with all participants 
summarising the outcomes and giving all an opportunity to comment.  On the second 
day, after clustering the issues overnight, parallel panels were conducted.  Action 
committees were launched and volunteering employees were appointed to lead the 
processes.  
In the feedback collected the following day, from managers and employees that had 
attended, all described an amazing process where trust and intimacy was reached 
between all participants at all company levels.  All shared a common desire to improve 
the company’s working environment and reach business success.  However the 
described process to reach this shared goal, between participants was described 
differently by managers and employees.  
A high rank manager described the conclusion in the following way: 
“We found out that 90% of the problems can be solved and the solution lies in our 
hands.  Employees should take responsibility and lead the change…” 
A project manager described his perspective of the next steps a bit differently: 
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“The formed cross company teams should progress in pushing the initiatives; however I 
am not sure if management will fully support the changes in terms of cooperation and 
resources”. 
While a production floor employee had quite a different perspective: 
“The workshop was good.  It was clear what bothered us as employees and how to 
improve motivation.  However I doubt if management will do any thing about it at all.” 
Insights: 
A good facilitated, out of the company, diversified and cross company process 
could have good outputs in terms of idea generation, shared goals and improved 
motivation.  However there is ‘The Day After’ effect, back in the company every 
day life, where implementing the perceived conclusion could be difficult. 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
The same conclusion could have a substantially different interpretation based on 
the stakeholder. 
There are cases where employee empowerment is granted and even expected but 
hardly realised by employees. 
4.4 Refining Mintzberg’s Model 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The previous section populated and validated Mintzberg (1987) model of intended and 
emergent strategy formation process by giving examples from the HiCo case.  However 
several important aspects of strategy formation process are neglected in the simplified 
model and worth discussing.  This section refines Mintzberg (1987) by adding three 
additional aspects (Figure 4-3).  These are constraints, business environment and 
blending intended and emergent strategy formation. 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) claim there are three conditions for deliberate strategies: 
strategy must encompass and address correctly all of the important details required to 
succeed, strategy should be communicated to all employees, collective intentions must 
be realised with little unanticipated influence from outside political, technological, or 
market forces.  Cases nine, ten and eleven (outlined below) generated from HiCo’s 
action research, offer examples of constraints causing the intended strategy not to be 
realised. 
The business environment can affect the strategy formation process. Courtney et. al. 
(1997) for example, perceives uncertainty, in an economic environment, as the manifest 
of the unfeasibility of defining possible outcomes due to a given situation in the present.  
Courtney et. al. (1997) illustrate how different levels of uncertainty derive different 
analytic tools and potential approaches for strategic decision making. Cases twelve and 
thirteen (outlined below) generated from HiCo’s action research give examples 
illustrating HiCo’s business environment characteristics. 
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Figure  4-3: Refined Mintzberg (1987) model of intended and emergent strategy formation process 
and distribution of cases 
Cases fourteen, fifteen and sixteen, generated from HiCo’s action research, describe and 
give insights from a strategy formation process in 2003 where intended and emergent 
oriented activities were deliberately blended. 
This section includes eight following cases, distributed in three subsections. 
Constraints in Realizing Intended Strategy 
Case 9 - The Gate Keeper 
Case 10 - Stakeholders influence on strategy realisation 
Case 11 - Pace of change  
Business Environment: 
Case 12 - Market characteristics 
Case 13- Unpredictable global events 
Blend of Intended and Emergent Strategy Formation Process: 
Case 14 - Planning vs. emergent process – first lesson 
Case 15 - Implementing preconditions for strategy emergence 
Case 16 - Self Diagnoses 
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4.4.2 Constraints in Realizing Strategy 
Case 9: The Gate Keeper 
The strategy formation process, in many cases, involves various levels of hierarchy.  
However recommendations for example of: geographical shift, new product 
development, or investments in infrastructure all depend on resource allocation.  The 
author encountered several cases where financial officers managed to postpone a 
decision, downsize it substantially or even ignore it.  
The financial department at the corporate level and at business unit levels in HiCo are 
not always involved in strategic processes due to the lack of resources and a high 
overload in reporting tasks.  The strategy is unfolded as a pattern of the past looking 
mainly at financial results.  This sometimes causes a lack of understanding of the 
dynamic overall picture and future directions.  The financial department is usually 
constrained to a well defined and approved short term budget by a higher authority (i.e. 
Board of Directors).  Trying to reduce unexpected changes and avoiding high-risk 
initiatives complicates budget changes and shifts, unless an initiative demanding budget 
is accompanied by a well defined source of finance (i.e. shutting down another activity).  
Yearly and quarterly periodical reporting also reduces resource allocation flexibility due 
to the natural tendency of the financial managers to try and fall within the predictions. 
Insights: 
Resource allocation processes and stakeholders tend to substantially influence 
strategy realisation. 
⇒ 
Case 10: Stakeholders Influence on Strategy Realisation 
Various stakeholders influence the strategy formation process in the decision and 
realisation phases, reflected frequently as an emergent outcome.  For example, yearly 
and quarterly revenues budgeting is a process that has to reflect the company’s long-
term strategy (i.e. products and customer penetration, pricing policy) integrated with the 
market forces (i.e. actual demand, competition in terms of prices and products) and 
short-term constraints (i.e. resources, personal availability).  However, various 
stakeholders tend to influence the process and its outcomes and represent, in many 
cases, opposing forces.  Sales executives, based on meeting quarterly or yearly targets, 
might prefer to downsize expectations, while regional business unit managers might 
increase estimations in order to have a larger budget allocated.  Financial officers tend 
sometimes to engage in a conservative position related to revenues, to avoid or reduce 
the pressure of approving spending requests.  Operation managers evaluated by on time 
delivery will tend to increase forecasts to allow purchasing of raw material, such as 
components, ahead of time and in adequate size, whilst financial executives, with high 
cash flow awareness, will tend to downsize predictions to avoid large inventories. 
Corporate management is very committed to the revenue estimation given to the board 
and announced to the stock market and are therefore focused on eliminating deviation as 
much as possible. 
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Other examples of stakeholder influence encountered by the author include: members of 
the Board of Directors keen on pursuing specific initiatives, managers that align a 
business activity to job promotion, personal rivalries, professional interest, and unit 
managers interfering in favour of their units’ interests. 
In many cases the encountered influence was not easily visible or the author learned of 
it in a later phase. 
Insights: 
Stakeholders influence strategy implementation and can serve as a constraint. ⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
Stakeholders’ effect and influence is not always visible and could be interpreted, 
by the objective observer, as irrational behaviour by the organisation but is in 
fact due to individualistic behaviour. 
Case 11: Pace of Change 
The duration of the strategy formation initiatives tended to vary from several weeks to 
several months.  In the course of the research the author witnessed, more then once, how 
basic assumptions rapidly changed within the time frame of the described process 
resulting in partial or no realisation of the outcomes. 
Since the strategy formation process was usually time consuming, managers were not 
eager to launch or participate in such processes, unless a specific threat or an 
opportunity was at stake demanding a review of the overall picture.  However, due to 
the pace of change caused by external and internal turbulence, by the time a decision 
was granted to launch a process for the output implementation phase, the initial cause 
for the process had often changed or more urgent threats or opportunities had arisen.  
Insights: 
The pace of change within the company’s external environment frequently 
outdates intended strategy plans causing them not to be realised. 
4.4.3 Business Environment  
Case 12: Market Characteristics 
At the beginning of 2001 the author, as a consultant, facilitated an intended strategy 
process in one of HiCo’s business units, aimed at re-shaping the four segments market 
portfolio.  A questionnaire based on over 40 parameters, split into three categories 
(Market Attractiveness, Relative Market Position and Technology) was distributed to 15 
top and middle managers from Management, Marketing, Sales and R&D departments.  
The collection and analysis of input was carried out over two weeks and culminated in a 
two days off site workshop. 
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Figure  4-4: Examples of markets (A-D) comparison 
Managers were asked to evaluate the parameters on a 1-5 (Low-High) scale.  As can be 
seen in Figure 4-4, the following examples of parameters representing market dynamics 
scored an average high: volatility of exchange rates/inflation/political situation, access 
to critical/special components, volatility of market demand, market profitability, market 
growth rate and rate of technological change.  The following examples represent high 
complexity in some markets: regulatory climate, market barriers to entry/exit and 
product differentiation.  
Analysis of the questionnaires revealed some of the parameters were evaluated by all 
participants with high consensuses (little variance), while others showed a large degree 
of disagreement between the same business unit managers.  Examples of high and low 
consensus are presented in the following table: 
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Table  4-1: Example of consensus spread between questionnaire parameters in a HiCo Business Unit 
(2001) 
High consensus Low consensus 
• Volatility of market demand 
• Customer bargaining power  
• Price elasticity  
• Customer brand loyalty  
• Market barriers to entry/exit  
• Access to critical/special components 
• Volatility of exchange rates/inflation/political 
situation 
• Relative market share  
• Company’s image as perceived by customers 
• Company’s prices relative to competitors 
• Relative cost position 
• Probability of technical success 
• Distribution network coverage  
• Technological competitive strength  
• Market growth rate 
• Market profitability 
• Regulatory climate 
• Rate of technological change 
• Technology/Innovation importance as 
perceived by customers 
• Level of competition after analysing the 
characteristics of competition 
• Threats by alternative solutions 
• Market share growth 
• Customer loyalty to our company 
• Marketing skills and strength 
• Probability of marketing plan success 
The volatility of market demand affected revenue predictions in some periods in a 
substantial manner.  In 2003, HiCo’s deviation from planned budget at the beginning of 
the year to actual budget at the end of the year was roughly 10% below the estimation. 
Further analysis shows that low deviation is due to the opposite and narrowing effect of 
two business units.  In one business unit the deviation was roughly 17% percent above 
the estimation while in another business unit it accounted for roughly 29% below the 
estimation. 
Figure 4-5 presents some of the market dynamics through a chart showing one of 
HiCo’s competitor’s revenues in a period of seven quarterly results. 
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Figure  4-5: HiCo competitor revenues relative to Q1/2002 
Insights: 
Perceived market and company characteristics can vary between managers. ⇒ 
⇒ Prediction ability is limited due to volatility of market demand. 
Case 13: Unpredictable Global Events  
In the course of the action research, the author participated in building and maintaining 
various financial business models at corporate and business levels.  The forecasted 
assumption always incorporated a level of uncertainty, due to the nature of market 
dynamics.  However aside from the residual uncertainty several global events had major 
effect on the telecom market and HiCo in particular.  Three examples in 2003 were the 
War in Iraq, the SARS disease and the strengthening Euro. 
The author experienced the effect the SARS disease was having on the strategy process 
in 2003, for example while assisting in building a business plan for HiCo’s activities in 
China.  The company was not new to the Chinese market however it re-assessed its 
activities due to the growing market on the one hand and decreasing profits caused by 
local competition on the other. 
When the SARS disease broke out in China in the first half of 2003, sales stopped 
completely and the level of uncertainty increased dramatically.  All HiCo employees 
were ordered to immediately stop flying to the Far East and China specifically.  HiCo’s 
Chinese employees had difficult times travelling within the country and the buying 
activities of customers reduced substantially.  After a few weeks, when one of the sales 
team volunteered to visit an unaffected region in China, he was later asked to stay two 
weeks at home to ensure no contamination.  Other functions of the company were 
affected as well, for example the R&D department had to shift its resource allocation 
spread due to changing marketing priorities and the legal department had difficulties in 
collecting payments from Chinese customers.  After several months, sales started to 
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increase.  The accumulative effect caused over 40% of revenue reduction in China 
versus the original 2003 budget, which resulted in substantial losses. 
Insights: 
Unpredictable global events can have major impacts  ⇒ 
4.4.4 Blending Intended Strategy and Emergent 
Following re-organisation in 2003, the Board of Directors and CEO of HiCo decided to 
launch a strategy formation process.  A cross company team of managers was formed 
called ‘Strategy Forum’ and were requested to report progress on a quarterly basis to 
HiCo’s Board of Directors.  The author was asked to support the process as an internal 
consultant.  Experienced by past strategy formation processes and inspired by new 
concepts of emergent strategy the author decided to try and integrate the intended 
strategy formation process with new aspects. 
The 2003 corporate strategy formation process consisted of sixteen full forum-meetings, 
three quarterly board presentations, eight supporting workshops and various related sub 
groups and personal meetings.  The duration of the initiative was nine months.  Figure 
4-6 describes the process roadmap.  The process consisted of three main phases: 
analysis, strategy building and implementation.  The strategy forum designed the 
strategy process as a vertical funnel.  The idea was to open up the process to a vast 
amount of ideas and opportunities at early stages and later focussing in on a practical 
implementation plan.  Only the first two phases of the process out of the three were 
realised. 
As can be seen, represented by the dotted line in Figure 4-6, the process was designed to 
include several bottom-up and several top-down interactions within several milestones 
stages along the process to foster discussion between the various stakeholders. 
Phase I, called Analysis, was designed to include the following parts: Business 
Environment and Trends, Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats analysis 
(SWOT), Time Frame, Opportunities Bank, Synergy/Parenting Role and Type of 
Customers.  This phase was fully realised.  A summary of findings was presented to 
HiCo’s Board of Directors for discussion. 
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Figure  4-6: HiCo strategy formation process  
Phase II was called Strategy Building and included the following parts: Corporate 
Strategy versus Business Units Strategy, Business Arenas, Type of Player, Mission, and 
Vision, Interfaces /Boundaries, Corporate Structure, Corporate Identity, Merger and 
Acquisitions and Alliances.  This phase was also fully realised.  The outputs included 
initial recommendations presented to the board for discussion. 
Phase III, called Implementation Plan, was designed to include the following parts: 
Financial /Investments, Geography Partitioning, Sales Strategy, Business Plan and 
Business Process.  Phase III was barely realised through the project. 
The strategy formation process started with high enthusiasm and involved a large 
number of middle managers’ contribution through workshops and meetings across the 
company business units and regional sales units.  Special emphasis was put on business 
opportunities, brainstorming and creating an opportunity bank.  However as the process 
progressed and decisions had to be made, enthusiasm was slowly replaced by internal 
politics and the conflicting interests of stakeholders.  Major internal changes were 
taking place at the time as well.  The process stopped after delivering initial 
recommendations to the board of directors. 
Although not proceeding to the final phase of building a formal implementation plan 
many of the process outcomes were implemented by management in various ways.  The 
process was perceived as contributing to building a common language, stressing the 
importance of a flat organisation structure, improving the understanding of the business 
geographical and technological trends, facing reality in what could and could not be 
done in terms of synergy, and generating guidelines for business development for 
alliances, merger and acquisitions.  Some of the more complicated issues took 
management another half a year to confront having to make some personal and 
organisational changes before implementation. 
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The following three cases will present insights from the described processes: 
Case 14: Planning versus Emergent Process – First Lesson 
The first task was to suggest a process plan, integrating lesson learned from previous 
processes and from acquired knowledge through the literature, the author designed a 
perceived best-fit process.  New concepts such as diversification, emergence, edge of 
chaos, turbulence and unpredictability were introduced.  
The new concepts were presented as a shift from assumptions of organisation as a 
machine where you cannot tolerate change to a business organisation that is seen as a 
living organism, or a complex-adaptive system, which is in continuous interaction with 
its environment.  
The author’s well detailed plan was presented in the second meeting of Strategy Forum 
and was not accepted well.  The senior managers who were well experienced in 
management in general and in previous strategy formation process in particular, had 
their own perception of a desired process.  
HiCo’s Chief of Technology (CTO) at that time was a very open minded and 
experienced senior manager.  Some of the main HiCo technological and business 
successes along the years were related to his actions and guidance.  In a private meeting 
with the author, after a long discussion about emergent and intended strategy and 
presenting supporting examples from the company history, he presented the following 
critique to the author: 
“I basically agree with your new strategy formation process themes.  However it seems 
you have not incorporated them yourself.  Instead of allowing a process to emerge from 
the diversified well competent team, allowing changes along the way, you tried to fully 
impose a process in an intended way…”  
Insights: 
New strategy formation themes should be incorporated initially by the facilitator 
and only later by the organisation. 
⇒ 
Case 15: Implementing Preconditions for Strategy Emergence  
Various scholars present preconditions for strategy emergence (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1998; Wood, 1999 and Hamel, 2001).  Hamel (2001) states that like all forms of 
complexity, strategy is poised on the border between perfect order and total chaos, 
between absolute efficiency and blind experimentation, between autocracy and 
complete ad-hocracy.  Hamel (2001) suggests five preconditions for the emergence of 
strategy. The preconditions are reviewed as literature benchmarks to some of the themes 
incorporated in HiCo’s 2003 strategy formation process. 
Precondition one:  New voices 
 82
Chapter 4 Strategy Formation in HiCo 
“Bringing new ‘genetic material’ into the strategy process always serves to illuminate 
unconventional strategies.  Top management must give up its monopoly on strategy 
creation, and previously underrepresented constituencies must be given a larger share 
of voice in the strategy creation process. Specifically, I believe that young people, 
newcomers, and those at the geographic periphery should get a larger share of voice” 
(Hamel, 2001, p.193). 
The Strategy Forum appointed as steering and operational committee of the process not 
only a senior corporate manager but also senior managers from the business units and 
regional sales units.  The process included more then a hundred other HiCo contributors 
participating in various workshops, conducted within the business units. Each workshop 
was based on a diversified team (i.e. sales, marketing, business development, R&D) of 
middle managers.  A special shadow forum was formed consisting of sixteen young 
managers from all of the different business units in order to work in parallel on some of 
the issues in an unbiased way.  At a certain stage the shadow forum representatives 
presented their outcomes to the Strategy Forum and later joined some of their 
discussions.  External technology experts were invited to join several of the Forums’ 
sessions. 
However, several obstacles had to be overcome in bringing the New Voices 
preconditions into being.  Some of the participants showed a level of suspicion as to 
managements’ true intentions and the probability of leveraging truly innovative ideas. 
Others regarded the activity as a unique personal opportunity to affect the company in 
new channels.  Another obstacle noticed was the need for a common language.  Various 
technological terms and market segments names were interpreted differently in the 
different business units.  Several preliminary sessions had to be held to create a 
common language. 
Precondition Two:  New conversations 
“Creating a dialogue about strategy that cuts across all the usual organizational and 
industry boundaries substantially increases the odds that new strategy insights will 
emerge. All too often, in large organizations, conversations become hardwired over 
time, with the same people talking to the same people about the same issues year after 
year, after a while, individuals have little left to learn from each other.”(Hamel, 2001, 
p.193). 
The strategy formation process incorporated new methods and tools for various issues 
such as: opportunities scanning, synergy analysis and mapping technology.  Mixing new 
voices, as mentioned, was one of the planned drivers to create new conversations. 
However the author noticed that in many cases a pattern of returning to old 
conversations with stakeholders taking the same old positions emerged.  This could be 
attributed either to old habits, or managers feeling more comfortable and reducing risks 
(as well as opportunities) by discussing familiar business areas. 
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Precondition Three:  New passions  
“Unleashing the deep sense, of discovery that resides in almost every human being, and 
focusing that sense of discovery on the search for new wealth-creating strategies, is 
another prerequisite … individuals will eagerly embrace change when given the chance 
to have a share of voice in inventing the future of their company. They will invest when 
there's a chance to create a unique and exciting future in which they can share...” 
(Hamel, 2001, p.193). 
Young managers in the strategy formation process were offered the chance to help 
shape the company’s future and were given an opportunity to be heard and a chance to 
participate and affect the strategy.  As mentioned, some readily embraced this 
opportunity while others were more pessimistic about the process.  
Precondition Four:  New perspectives 
“New conceptual lenses that allow individuals to preconceive their industry, their 
company's capabilities, customer needs, and so on substantially aid the process of 
strategy innovation. To increase the probability of strategy innovation, managers must 
become the merchants of new perspective. They must search constantly for new lenses 
that help companies preconceive themselves, their customers, then competitors, and 
thereby their opportunities”.  (Hamel, 2001, p.193). 
External experts experienced and specialising in different technologies and markets 
were brought to the process as a search for new lenses.  Several exercises were held 
trying to map the future industry and technology map from various new perspectives. 
Precondition Five:  New experiments 
“Launching a series of small, risk-avoiding experiments in the market serves to 
maximize a company's rate of learning about just, which new strategies will work and 
which won't. The insights that come from a broad-based strategy dialogue will never be 
perfect. While much traditional analysis can be done to refine those insights into viable 
strategies, there is much that can be learned only in the marketplace.”  (Hamel, 2001, 
p.193).  
The Strategy Forum recommended (however not brought to board approval) a new 
business process incorporating a new resource allocation methodology supporting new 
business ideas.  The process was shaped to increase trial and error by allocating, with 
out the need of providing a full business plan, limited amount of resources to new 
initiatives.  The process was meant to enhance risk taking and to evaluate, in an ongoing 
manner, running projects and the closing down of unpromising ones. 
Although the five mentioned preconditions and other themes were incorporated and 
various novel ideas emerged, the general impression was that conducting a one-time 
‘lab oriented’ initiative was not enough.  One executive stated that many ideas emerge 
in unexpected interaction in the corridor, coffee corner, gym, and customer site.  Due to 
the lack of ongoing scanning and a process to leverage opportunities many ideas stay 
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unrealised.  Even more worryingly, the corporate unit in many examples lacked the 
energy to leverage even ideas that were generated through a structured process. 
Insights: 
Implementing new perspectives for emergent strategy has to be accompanied by 
a true commitment by management and real belief by employees that the 
outcomes will be leveraged. 
⇒ 
⇒ 
⇒ 
Creating a common langue is essential for cross company interactions. 
The environment for emergence has to be created in an ongoing manner and not 
just in specific initiatives. 
Case 16: Self Diagnoses 
Olson and Eoyang (2001) offer a self-diagnosis questionnaire called an Organizational 
Change Framework, which evaluates how closely current system change practices 
match a complex adaptive perspective.  Since they regard strategic planning as one of 
the change methods the author, of this study, used the tool to compare his approach as 
participatory facilitator in two strategy formation processes at different periods.  
The first process was conducted in 2002 in business unit A.  The process duration was 
approximately half a year and it was designed in a linear way.  Stage one consisted of 
14 geographical strategy analysis groups, 3 segment analysis groups, and 5 overview 
analysis groups (i.e. post sale, profitability) working in parallel with pre given 
templates. The second stage included integration of information (Geography/Segment), 
business model and resource allocation model.  The author acted as the facilitator of the 
project.   
The second process was the HiCo 2003 strategy formation process, described at the 
beginning of this section, where new themes were incorporated and tested.  The self 
diagnosis (Appendix B) questionnaire contained twenty questions with four optional 
answers (a-d).  Olson and Eyong (2001) claim there is no best profile.  The approach of 
a change agent must fit the expectations and needs of the client systems.  If scores in the 
a and/or b columns are higher than scores in the c and d columns, the approach to work 
contains the inherent belief that organisation change is best accomplished by, clear, 
predictable means, using influences and position power to make change happen.  This 
may be very appropriate if control is needed to capitalise on what is working well in a 
particular situation.  Olson and Eyong (2001) relate traditional approaches to beliefs in 
top down control; efficiency in control and correct predictions.  Therefore, in strategy 
formation processes this can be related to the intended strategy formation process. 
Columns c and d represent a complex adaptive perspective to organisational change.  
This perspective is important for an organisational unit when it needs to be flexible and 
creative.  Olson and Eyong (2001) view the complex adaptive perspective as 
understanding that organisational change emerges from the evolution of individuals and 
small groups. In the strategy formation process, this can be related to incorporating a 
proactive emergent strategy. 
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As Figure 4-7 presents the strategy formation process in 2002 based on Olson and 
Eoyang’s (2001) questionnaire was a more intended process than in 2003.  Aggregated 
results of categories a - b and c - d were fifteen and five respectively in 2002, versus six 
and fourteen in 2003.  Therefore based on Olson and Eoyang’s (2001) interpretation of 
the self-diagnoses, the strategy formation in 2003 represents a more complex adaptive 
perspective about organisation change or a more emergent approach to strategy 
formation. 
 
Figure  4-7: Author as participant facilitator self diagnoses based on Olsen and Eoyang (2001) 
An interesting observation is that although there is a change in emphasis between the 
two strategy formation processes, both incorporate a blend of characteristics attributed 
to the intended strategy formation facilitation perspective as well as what is regarded by 
Olson and Eoyang (2001) as complex adaptive system change. 
Insights: 
Different strategy formation processes include different blends of intended and 
emergent perspectives. 
⇒ 
4.5 Research Limitations and Strengths 
The HiCo action research case faced several research limitations.  The first limitation 
was concerned with conducting the research in one company with specific external and 
internal contexts limiting, to some degree, the ability for generalisation.  Although the 
research was conducted over nineteen months and incorporated to some degrees 
previous experiences it represented only a specific time frame of the organisations 
evolution. 
The analysis of the case study was embedded due to the multiple units of analysis 
(corporate level and several business units) allowing triangulation of findings 
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concerning several processes.  In some of the processes (i.e. balanced scorecard) 
multiple methods were used in a complementary fashion. 
The author’s three years of experience, previous to the research, in HiCo allowed him to 
look at some patterns created in HiCo’s evolution and incorporate a deeper 
understanding of some events. However his previous involvement with stakeholders and 
responsibility to the results of past processes could have also caused some bias.  
Furthermore HiCo served as a source of income to the author raising the possibility that 
the author, in order to reduce risk of process failure, reduced to some degree the 
incorporation of radical new methods. 
Table 4-2 presents an analysis between several general important action research 
characteristics provide by Eden and Huxham (1996) to HiCo’s actual action research. 
4.6 Summary 
In this Chapter, through sixteen cases generated from a nineteen-month action research 
study in HiCo, Mintzberg’s (1987) model describing strategy formation as intended and 
emergent was populated and validated in a real world environment.  Long term 
planning, defining strategy objectives and trying to create synergy between units were 
provided as examples of intended strategy.  Two types of emergent strategy formation 
cases were discussed.  The first type consists of cases where strategy emerged bottom 
up without any management guidance, demonstrated in several cases like that of the 
underground development example and personal initiatives conducted by several middle 
managers.  The second type of emergent strategy examples described how management 
proactively tried to create an emergent process and its consequences (i.e. open space 
workshop in SBU A). 
 
Figure  4-8: Refined Mintzberg (1987) model of intended and emergent strategy formation process 
and distribution of cases 
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Table  4-2: General and specific characteristics of Action Research 
General Action research Characteristic HiCo Action research Characteristic 
• Action research demands an integral 
involvement by the researcher 
• The author was a participative observer in the 
company.  The author was granted a mandate 
as facilitator of the strategy formation process 
to integrate with management and process 
owner’s new themes as well as to test 
traditional ones.  Highly linked to the company 
success, the author endured the consequences 
of the process outputs. 
• As well as being useable in everyday life, 
action research demands valuing theory 
• The action research was conducted in parallel 
to literature exploration, multiple case studies 
and survey in other companies.  Initial 
outcomes were presented and reviewed on 
several occasions (i.e. conference papers and 
presentations, university progress review, 
supervisor meetings).  These allowed new 
perspectives to be incorporated beyond every 
day life and valuing theory. 
• Theory building, as a result of action research, 
will be incremental, moving through a cycle of 
developing theory to action to reflection to 
developing theory, from the particular to the 
general in small steps 
• The nineteen-month duration, multi-methods 
and multi units’ scope of the action research as 
well as the additional research conducted in 
parallel to the action research allowed theory 
building and incremental steps to some extent. 
• However, the actual emerging needs of HiCo 
in terms of strategy formation process and 
their timing on one hand confronted the author 
with unexpected insights but on the other 
eliminated some times the opportunity to 
incorporate a cycle of theory to action to 
reflection to developing theory. 
• For action research, the processes of 
exploration of the data – rather than the 
collection of the data – in the detecting of 
emerging theories and development of existing 
theories must either be replicable or, at least, 
capable of being explained to others 
• The author had high access to data information 
of documentation, templates and outcomes. 
Furthermore a dairy and notes have been 
collected.  However, client confidentiality will 
allow limited data publication in terms of 
business content. 
• Action research requires that the theory 
development which is of general value is 
disseminated in such a way as to be of interest 
to an audience wider than that involved with 
the action and/or with the research 
• The author tried to disseminate the outcomes 
in multiple ways such as graphical 
representation and story telling techniques to 
interest the audience 
Mintzberg’s (1987) simplistic model describing strategy formation as intended and 
emergent was later refined (Figure 4-8) to include three additional aspects affecting the 
strategy formation process.  The first demonstrated constraints such as resource 
allocations and stakeholders’ interests in realising intended strategy formation 
outcomes.  The second aspect presented the business environment as incorporating 
unpredictability and as sometimes perceived differently by managers.  The third aspect 
reflected HiCo and the author’s personal experience in attempting to incorporate a 
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blend of intended strategy formation process with preconditions for strategy 
emergence. 
Several interesting questions arise from the action research, which were investigated 
further in other parts of the author’s research: 
• What is the management role in relation to the intended and emergent strategy 
formation process? 
• What is the relation between the environment and the blend of intended and 
emergent strategy formation process? 
• Would differences be found in different companies (of different size and/or 
operating in different business environments)? 
• Would companies blend of intended and emergent strategy formation change with 
time or business environment? 
To overcome the limitations of the action research being conducted in only one 
company, the questions were to be investigated in the context of sixteen other 
companies, through multiple case studies and a survey (see Chapters 6 and 7).  
However, first, a theoretical framework incorporating the relationships between 
management role and strategy formation was developed, as described in Chapter 5. 
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5 Strategy Formation Matrix 
This Chapter aims to introduce and theoretically investigate the Strategy Formation 
Matrix developed by the author.  The Chapter will then go on to outline the different 
School of Thoughts within the strategy literature relevant to this research and map the 
various schools onto the matrix. The Chapter will conclude with a review of Complexity 
approaches to management and a summary. 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the literature review (Chapter 2), various approaches were introduced to strategy 
formation of companies confronting uncertainties and turbulence.  While some 
approaches confront uncertainty with analytical tools such as real options, scenarios 
planning etc., new approaches link chaos and complexity studies to strategic 
management based on concepts such as self-organisation, emergence, complex adaptive 
systems and edge of chaos.  Some of the main implications these new approaches claim 
are:  
• Strategy formation is predominantly an emergent and not an intended process. 
• The role of management is different as suggested by orthodox management theories. 
In the previous chapter, based on HiCo’s action research study, real world cases were 
described representing the blend of emergent and intended strategy formation process. 
From the cases described, it was evident that the role of management was not limited to 
intended strategy formation but also included setting processes and preconditions for 
emergent strategy as well.  This chapter will offer a theoretical investigation of the 
relationship between the role of management and the strategy formation process in 
existing theories.  To do this, the author designed a Strategy Formation Matrix, which 
has two dimensions; type of strategy formation process (reactive versus proactive) and 
management role (intended versus emergent).  This matrix was then used to project and 
categorise different strategic schools from within the literature.   In subsequent chapters 
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this matrix will be evaluated in real world companies and later will set the ground, as 
part of an extended model, to investigate the relationships between the business 
environment and the strategy formation process.  
5.2 Design of the Strategy Formation Matrix 
Mintzberg (1987) perceives the definition of strategy as a plan, as a consciously 
intended course of action.  Intended strategy tends to be either unrealised or turns into a 
deliberate strategy when strategic plans that existed previously are realised.  Emergent 
strategies are patterns developed in the absence of plans and intentions, or despite them 
(those that go unrealised).  Christensen and Raynor (2003) claim emergent strategy 
bubbles up from within the organisation in the cumulative effect of day-to-day 
prioritisation and investment decisions made by middle managers, engineers, 
salespeople, and financial staff.  These tend to be tactical, day-to-day operating 
decisions that are made by people who are not of a visionary, futuristic, or strategic state 
of mind. 
Management role in an intended strategy formation process is relatively clearly defined.  
The management role of senior management is often described as looking at and 
analysing the organisations bigger picture and setting strategy.  The CEO is sometimes 
considered the strategist responsible for the control and consciousness of the 
organisation (Mintzberg et al., 1998).  Porter (1980), for example, suggests that 
management role is to analyse the environment, choose a best-fit strategy from a 
defined set of generic strategies and to evaluate and define goals (based on four 
categories of questions: internal consistency, environmental fit, resource fit, 
communication and implementation). 
Management role in an emergent strategy formation process is less obvious however, as 
seen in the HiCo action research study (Chapter 4) and in literature.  It can exist in 
different forms.  HiCo’s management role, in intended strategy formation, included 
proactive roles such as long term planning, setting goals and choosing the portfolio of 
markets and products.  Several cases from HiCo reflected how management reacted to a 
bottom up emergent initiative or to market trends.  It also showed how management 
proactively tried to set some preconditions for emergence (i.e. diversification, bottom up 
ideas generating, employee empowerment). 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) claim that although strategy should be unpredictable, 
uncontrolled, inefficient, continuous and diverse, management should not be passively 
watching for the occasional discontinuity or waiting for other firms to move before 
taking actions.  They state that management should try to anticipate, where possible, and 
lead the change.  Ambrossini and Bowman (2002) claim routines might be a source of 
advantage; therefore what causes success in an organisation is idiosyncratic to each 
organisation.  They suggest that the role of the manager and of the strategist and their 
vocabulary should change.  This suggests that perhaps one needs to start to understand 
strategy as recognising organisation routines and maybe the word manage needs to be 
replaced by words such as protect, nurture and leverage rather than control, monitor and 
plan (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1997).  
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Various scholars present preconditions for strategy emergence (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1998; Wood, 1999; Hamel, 2001 and Olson and Eoyang, 2001). Hamel (2001) for 
example states that like all forms of complexity, strategy is poised on the border 
between perfect order and total chaos, between absolute efficiency and blind 
experimentation, between autocracy and complete ad hocracy.  Hamel (2001) believes 
that there are five preconditions for the emergence of strategy these are encouraging 
new voices, new conversations, new passions, new perspectives and new experiments.  
Olson and Eoyang (2001) suggest that the role of management is to help identify 
significant differences, to establish transforming exchanges that will make the 
differences generative, and to articulate the self-organising patterns that emerge. 
Weick (2000) suggests that to support the properties of sense making in the 
organisation, decision management must encourage conversation, give people a distinct 
stable sense of who they are and what they represent, preserve elapsed data and 
legitimatise the use of those data, enhance the visibility of cues, enable people to be 
resilient in the face of interruptions, encourage people to accumulate and exchange 
plausible accounts, and encourage action. 
The Strategy Formation Matrix is designed to serve as a framework to support further 
theoretical and real world research in two ways.  Firstly between the blend of intended 
and emergent strategy formation process and secondly between the management role 
characteristic in the strategy formation process in terms of proactive and reactive 
characteristics.  The Strategy Formation Matrix (Figure 5-1) consists of two dimensions, 
creating four quadrants.  The vertical dimension represents the type of strategy 
formation process, intended versus emergent, while the horizontal dimension represents 
the management role in strategy formation, which can be reactive or proactive. 
 
Figure  5-1: Strategy Formation Matrix (developed by the author) 
Building on this matrix the author has identified four characteristics for the quadrants of 
the matrix.  These are named, by the author as the Navigator, Enabler, Environmental 
and Collective quadrants (Figure 5-2): 
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• Navigator - where management role is characterised as mainly proactive in a 
predominantly intended strategy formation process. 
• Collective - where management role is characterised as mainly reactive in a 
predominantly intended strategy formation process. 
• Environmental – where management role is characterised as mainly reactive in a 
predominantly emergent strategy formation process. 
• Enabler – where management role is characterised as mainly proactive in a 
predominantly emergent strategy formation process. 
 
Figure  5-2: Strategy Formation Matrix Quadrants (developed by the author) 
5.3 Schools of Thought 
Strategy management can be categorised into various schools of thought.  The schools 
and their projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix are investigated in the next 
sections through the Navigator, Collective, Environmental and Enabler quadrants.  The 
investigation is based on examples from three main sources, chosen for their well-
established and complimentary position in strategic management research. 
Mintzberg et al. (1998) offers a critical, penetrating look at the contributions and 
limitations of ten dominant schools of strategic thought. Mintzberg et al. (1998) create a 
comprehensive and illuminating tour through the fields of strategic management, 
shaping each of ten different approaches into a coherent school of strategy formation.  
The ten different schools for strategy formation are: Design, Planning, Positioning, 
Entrepreneurial, Cognitive, Learning, Power, Cultural, Environmental and 
Configuration.  Figure 5-3 describes the projection of nine of the schools onto the 
Strategy Formation Matrix.  The Configuration School is not mapped due to the fact 
that the premises of the configuration school encompass those of the other schools, but 
each in a well-defined context.  This issue will be discussed in further length in the 
summary section. 
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Figure  5-3: Mintzberg et al. (1998) School’s projection on to the strategy formation matrix 
The second source is based on Stacey (2000) who focuses on a radically different 
approach to strategic management.  The central tenets of this approach are concerned 
with unpredictability and the limitations of control, and argue against the rational 
models of planning and control covered in other strategy textbooks.  
 
Figure  5-4: Stacey (2000) School’s projection on to the strategy formation matrix 
Five theories are presented and investigated: Strategic Choice, Learning Organisation, 
Open System and the radical perspective of Complexity that includes two sub categories 
- Objective Observer and Complex Responsive Processes. Figure 5-4 represents the 
schools of thoughts projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix. 
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The third source, Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999) present the logical foundations 
shaping three prominent streams of strategic management thought: Capability Logic, 
Guerrilla Logic and Complexity Logic.  The three streams are summarised, compared 
and contrasted proving they provide alternate and competing explanations for effective 
strategy actions.  
Figure 5-5 represents Lengnick-Hall and Wolff’s (1999) strategic streams, and their 
positions on the Strategy Formation Matrix. 
 
Figure  5-5: Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999) School’s projection on to the strategy formation matrix 
Since complexity oriented theories are of special interest to the research, several 
additional sources will be discussed.  These sources include Kauffman (1995a), Zohar 
(1997), Brown and Eisenhardt (1998), Wood (1999), and Beinhocker (1998). 
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5.4 Schools within the Navigator Quadrant 
The Navigator quadrant is positioned in the bottom left side of the Strategy Formation 
Matrix (Figure 5-6) and is defined as a process where management role is characterised 
as mainly proactive in a predominantly intended strategy formation process.  The 
following schools can be projected onto this quadrant: 
• Mintzberg et al. (1998): Design, Planning, 
Positioning and Entrepreneurial (Figure 5-3). 
• Stacey (2000): Strategic Choice (Figure  5-4)  
• Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999): Capability 
Logic and Guerrilla Logic (Figure 5-5).   
Mintzberg et al. (1998) offer four different 
schools that can be related to the Navigator 
classification.  The Design School, first 
presented in the 1960’s, is based on strategy 
formation as a process of conception.  Strategy 
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Figure 5-6: Navigator quadrantormation should be a deliberate process of conscious thought.  The CEO is considered 
he strategist responsible for the control and consciousness of the organisation.  The 
odel of strategy formation must be kept simple and informal; strategies should be one 
f a kind: the best ones result from a process of individualised design – creative act to 
uild on distinctive competence.  The leadership style is described as dominant and 
udgemental.  The school offers little room for instrumentalist views or emergent 
trategies, which allow formulation to continue during and after implementation.  The 
rojection (Figure 5-3) of the Design School on the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore 
epresents an intended strategy formation process where the management role is 
haracterised as proactive. 
he Planning School (Mintzberg et al., 1998), which peaked during the 1970’s, is based 
n Strategy making as a more detached and systematic process of formal planning. The 
odel is the same as the design school, but its execution was prescribed to be highly 
ormal.  Strategies result from a controlled, conscious process of formal planning, 
omposed of distinct steps, each delineated by checklists and supported by techniques. 
esponsibility for the overall process rests with the chief executive in principle; 
esponsibility for its execution rests with staff planners in practice.  The leadership style 
s said to be responsive to procedures.  Strategies appear from this process fully 
eveloped, and made explicit so that they can then be implemented through detailed 
ttention to objectives, budgets, programs, and operating plans of various kinds.  The 
rojection (Figure 5-3) of the Planning School on the strategy formation matrix 
herefore represents an intended strategy formation process where the management role 
s characterised as proactive in the strategy formation process. 
he Positioning School (Mintzberg et al., 1998) is less concerned with the process of 
trategy formation than with the actual content of strategies.  Most notable in this school 
as been one simple and revolutionary idea, for better and for worse.  Both the planning 
nd design schools put no limits on the strategies that were possible in any given 
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situation.  The positioning school, in contrast, argued that only a few key strategies—as 
positions in the economic marketplace—are desirable in any given industry: ones that 
can be defended against existing and future competitors.  Porter (1980) suggested that 
an effective competitive strategy takes offensive or defensive action in order to create a 
defensible position against five competitive forces: threat of new entrants, bargaining 
power of firm’s suppliers, bargaining power of firm’s customers, threat of substitute 
products and intensity of rivalry among competing firms.  Porter suggests three generic 
strategies in coping with the five competitive forces in order to out perform competitors 
in the industry: overall cost leadership, differentiation and focus.  The positioning 
school includes the various corporate portfolio models such as BCG, GE/McKinsey, 
Shell/DPM, Product-Market evolution model, ADL and risk-return (Segev, 1995). 
Management’s role is to choose a generic strategy based on quantitative data analysis 
and leadership style is said to be responsive to analysis.  The projection (Figure 5-3) of 
the Positioning School on the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore represents an 
intended strategy formation process where the management role is characterised as 
proactive in the strategy formation process. 
The most central concept of the Entrepreneurial School (Mintzberg et al.’s, 1998) is 
vision: a mental representation of strategy created or at least expressed in the head of 
the leader.  The process of strategy formation is semi-conscious at best, rooted in the 
experience and intuition of the leader.  The entrepreneurial mode is characterised by 
dramatic leaps forward in the face of uncertainty where growth is the dominant goal of 
the organisation.  Entrepreneurial strategy tends to be deliberate and emergent—
deliberate in overall vision and emergent in how the details of the vision unfold.  The 
leadership in the entrepreneurial school is described as dominant and intuitive.  The 
entrepreneurial approach is risky, hinging on the health and whims of individuals 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). Collins and Porras (1995) suggested that it is better to build a 
visionary organisation than to rely on a leader with mere vision.  The projection (Figure 
5-3) of the Entrepreneurial School on the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore 
represents a blend of the intended and emergent strategy formation processes where the 
management role is characterised as mix of proactive and reactive in the strategy 
formation process. 
Stacey (2000, pg. 134) states that the primary focus of Strategic Choice theory is on 
intention and control, it prescribes a role for managers in terms of making choices and 
staying in control as individuals.   It emphasises the installation of large numbers of 
negative feedback control systems relating to information, actions and behaviour. It 
depicts leadership as the function of directing, inspiring and choosing the shape, 
position and strategic direction of whole organisations.  It focuses attention on stability, 
consistency and harmony.  The projection (Figure 5-4) of the Strategic Choice School 
on the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore represents an intended strategy formation 
process where the management role is characterised as proactive in the strategy 
formation process. 
Lengnick-Hall and Wolff’s (1999) Capability Logic school of thought rests on the 
selection, development, enhancement and exploitation of a deliberately chosen set of 
elemental, building-block competencies and assets that are isolated from imitation and 
appropriation by competitors.  Structures and systems are designed to nurture, protect 
and exploit these key capabilities and resources in ways that enable a firm to create a 
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deliberate, path-dependent future to achieve a sustained competitive advantage. 
Resources and capabilities can originate from different areas of the company and it is 
the task of strategists to identify those that can be used to differentiate the organisation 
from its competitors (Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1995).  Top management real 
responsibility is a strategic architecture that guides competence building (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990).  The projection (Figure 5-5) of the Capability Logic on the Strategy 
Formation Matrix therefore represents a mix of an intended and emergent strategy 
formation process where the management role is characterised as proactive in the 
strategy formation process.  
Guerrilla Logic (Lengnick-Hall and Wolff, 1999) concentrates on destabilising the 
current reality so that a series of temporary, and often incompatible, advantages lead to 
high performance.  Guerrilla logic relies upon inventive, uncommon and often 
unconventional means.  Strategies based on guerrilla logic deliberately create 
disequilibrium and foster radical, unprecedented and unpredictable changes in tactics 
and direction over and over again.  Individual initiative is coupled with organisational 
mechanisms that repeatedly disintegrate and reintegrate activities over time and across 
projects.  The projection (Figure 5-5) of the Guerrilla logic on the Strategy Formation 
Matrix therefore represents an intended strategy formation process where management 
role is characterised as mix of proactive and reactive, mainly to the environment, in the 
strategy formation process.  
5.5 Schools within the Collective Quadrant 
The Collective quadrant (Figure 5-7) is positioned on the bottom right side of the 
Strategy Formation Matrix and is defined as a 
process where the management role is characterised 
as mainly reactive in a predominantly intended 
strategy formation process.  The following schools 
can be projected onto this quadrant: 
• Mintzberg et al. (1998): Cultural School (Figure 
5-3). 
In the Cultural School, strategy formation is 
described as a collective process.  Mintzberg et al. 
(1998) describe the cultural school as concerning 
itself largely with the influence of culture in 
ve
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Figure  5-7: Collective quadrantmaintaining strategic stability, sometimes in actively resisting strategic change.  Culture 
was discovered in management in the 1980s, largely due to the success of Japanese 
corporations.  Strategy formation is a collective process of social interaction, based on 
the beliefs and understandings shared by the members of an organisation, with a 
symbolic style of leadership.  Stacey (2000) defines culture as a set of assumptions 
people simply accept without question as they interact with each other.  The projection 
(Figure 5-3) of the Cultural School on the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore 
represents an intended strategy formation process where the management role is mainly 
reactive to the collective intentions. 
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5.6 Schools within the Environmental Quadrant 
The Environmental quadrant is positioned on the upper right side of the Strategy 
Formation Matrix (Figure 5-8) and is defined as a process where the management role is 
characterised as mainly reactive in a predominantly emergent strategy formation 
process.  The following schools can be projected 
onto this quadrant: 
• Mintzberg et al. (1998): Power, Cognitive 
and Environmental Schools (Figure 5-3). 
• Stacey (2000): Strategic Choice Theory 
(Figure  5-4). 
The Power School, described by Mintzberg et al. 
(1998), characterises strategy formation as an 
overt process of influence, emphasising the use 
of power and politics to negotiate strategies 
favourable to particular interests.  Power 
relations surround organisations; they can also infuse them.  Mintzberg et al. (1998) 
made a distinction between two branches of this school.  Micro power deals with the 
play of politics—of illegitimate and legitimate power—inside an organisation.  Macro 
power concerns the use of power by the organisation.  Strategies tend to be more 
emergent than deliberate and more likely in the form of position than perspective.  To 
have arrived at a strategy politically usually means to have done so step-by-step through 
processes of bargaining. Mintzberg et al., (1998) describe the leadership style here as 
weak (micro) and unspecified (macro).  The projection (Figure 5-3) of the Power School 
on the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore represents an emergent strategy formation 
process where the management role is mainly reactive to the various internal or external 
interests and bargaining power of stakeholders. 
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Figure  5-8: Environmental quadrant
The Cognitive School, described by Mintzberg et al. (1998), is an evolving school of 
thought on strategy formation.  Cognitivists assume that the brain processes symbols 
(electrochemical pulses) in a sequential manner to form representations of internal 
templates that are more or less accurate pictures of the world (Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
This means that the brain is assumed to act as passive mirror of reality (Stacey, 2000). 
Strategy formation is a cognitive process that takes place in the mind of the strategist. 
Strategies thus emerge as perspectives—in the form of concepts, maps, schema, and 
frames—that shape how people deal with inputs from the environment.  These inputs 
(according to the objective wing of this school) flow through all sorts of distorting 
filters before they are decoded by the cognitive maps, or else (according to the 
subjective wing) are merely interpretations of a world that exists only in terms of how it 
is perceived.  The seen world, in other words, can be modelled, framed, and constructed. 
Concepts and strategies are difficult to attain in the first place, considerably less than 
optimal when actually attained and subsequently difficult to change when no longer 
viable (Mintzberg et al., 1998).  The projection (Figure 5-3) of the Cognitive School on 
the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore represents an emergent strategy formation 
process where the management role is mainly reactive, although it might not be 
perceived as such by managers. 
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The Environmental School describes strategy formation as a reactive process 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998).  The environment, presenting itself to the organisation as a set 
of general forces, is the central actor in the strategy-making process.  The organisation 
must respond to these forces, or else be selected out.  Leadership thus becomes a 
passive and powerless element for purposes of reading the environment and ensuring 
proper adaptation by the organisation.  Organisations end up clustering together in 
distinct ecological-type niches, positions where they remain until resources become 
scarce or conditions too hostile, and unless they adapt, they die.  The Environmental 
School has its roots in contingency theory, based on the common-sense realisation that 
different situations give rise to different behaviours.  Some of the dimensions of the 
environment responsible for the differences one observes in organisations are stability, 
complexity, market diversity and hostility.  The projection (Figure 5-3) of the 
Environmental School on the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore represents an 
emergent strategy formation process where the management role is mainly reactive to 
the environment. 
Stacey’s (2000) Open System is based on the concept that organisms, as well as human 
organisations and societies, are open systems.  They are systems because they consist of 
a number of component subsystems that are interrelated and interdependent on each 
other.  They are open because they are connected to the environment, or super-systems, 
of which they are a part.  As the environment becomes more complex and as 
organisations grow in size, companies differentiate into functions.  Research shows that 
the more unpredictable the environment becomes, the more decentralised the 
organisation becomes, pushing the focus of decision making down the hierarchy.  The 
Open System concept is similar in many ways to the Environmental School, and is 
projected (Figure 5-4) on the Strategy Formation Matrix as an emergent strategy 
formation process where the management role is mainly reactive to the environment. 
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5.7 Schools within the Enabler Quadrant  
The Enabler quadrant is positioned on the upper left side of the Strategy Formation 
Matrix (Figure 5-9) and is defined as a process where the management role is 
characterised as mainly proactive in an emergent strategy formation process.  The 
following schools can be projected onto this quadrant: 
• Mintzberg et al. (1998): Learning School 
(Figure 5-3). 
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Figure  5-9: Enabler quadrant 
• Stacey (2000): Learning Organisation and 
Complexity theories (Figure  5-4). 
• Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999): Complexity 
Logic (Figure 5-5). 
• Additional complexity oriented theories: 
Kauffman (1995a); Zohar (1997); Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1998); Wood (1999) and 
Beinhocker (1998). 
 
Mintzberg et al.’s (1998) Learning School and Stacey’s (2000) Learning Organisation 
are characterised quite similarly.  Stacey (2000) emphasises the double-loop learning 
process.  Single-loops of organisational learning take the form of negative feedback 
loops in which groups of people review and learn from actions they have just 
undertaken.  Double-loop learning is partly the negative feedback learning about the 
consequences of actions, but also partly an amplifying, positive feedback loop of 
questioning the underlying assumptions.  Mintzberg et al. (1998) states that “This 
learning proceeds in an emergent fashion, through behaviour that stimulates thinking 
retrospectively, so that sense can be made of action … the successful initiative creates 
streams of experiences that can converge into patterns that become emergent strategies 
… The role of leadership thus becomes not to preconceive deliberate strategies, but to 
manage the process of strategic learning, whereby novel strategies can emerge. 
Ultimately, then, strategic management involves crafting the subtlety between thoughts 
and actions, control and learning, stability and change” (pg, 196).  De Geus (1997) 
claims the only sustainable competitive advantage may be the ability to learn faster then 
your competitors. 
The projection of Mintzberg et al.’s (1998) Learning School (Figure 5-3) and Stacey’s 
(2000) Learning Organisation (Figure 5-4) on the Strategy Formation Matrix therefore 
represents emergent strategy formation processes where the management role is 
proactive in managing the process of strategic learning.  Although the Learning School 
is presented independently from Complexity, there are some that view complexity as a 
niche within the learning school (for example Mintzberg et al. (1998) and Stacey (2000) 
– relating to the objective observer view of complexity). 
Diversification is one of the major building blocks of complexity studies.  Therefore it 
is not surprising that one witnesses a wide variety of interpretations.  Due to the 
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researcher’s specific interest in complexity, several additional sources (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1998; Wood, 1999; Beinhocker, 1998; Kauffman, 1995a and Zohar, 1997) 
are investigated and projected onto the Strategy Formation Matrix.  As Figure 5-10 
presents, from the Strategy Formation Matrix three main interpretation categories are 
identified: a totally emergent interpretation, a blend of emergent and intended 
interpretations and a blend of proactive and reactive interpretations of complexity.  
 
Figure  5-10: Projection of complexity views on Enabler Quadrant 
5.7.1 Blend of Emergent and Intended Interpretations of Complexity 
Some complexity management perspectives can be categorised based on their tendency 
to incorporate a blend of emergent and intended strategy formation processes where the 
management role is proactive.  These theories are projected onto the Strategy Formation 
Matrix between the Navigator and Enabler quadrants (Figure 5-10).  
Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) conceive management role as to produce “Strategy as 
structured chaos”. They claim that the strategy formation methodology is unpredictable, 
uncontrollable, often inefficient, yet a singularly effective one in the era driven by 
change.  Organisations should continuously allow a flow of competitive advantages to 
emerge that form a semi coherent direction.  By linking the practical concerns of 
business managers to complexity and evolution they recommend a strategy that 
harnesses the dynamic nature of change to create a continuous flow of competitive 
advantages.  “The strategic challenge … is to manage change by reacting when 
necessary, anticipating wherever possible, and leading change when the circumstances 
are right” (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998, pg 7).  Management is specifically called to 
take a proactive role. 
Wood (1999) proposed the following definition of strategy based on complexity: “The 
process by which an organisation generates, develops, and maintains a robust business 
design capable of both exploiting its current distinctive capabilities (its fitness function) 
on or near its current fitness peak (and) exploring its strategic landscape and business 
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ecosystem for entrepreneurial opportunities beyond the lifecycle of its current business 
design (its sustainability function) away from its current peak” (pg 5).  The 
management has a proactive role as enabler to set the direction that is bounded by the 
rules (both written and unwritten), by which a firm exploits and explores the landscape 
and business ecosystems.  Exploitation rules are what must be done to be economically 
viable and politically legitimate with stakeholders.  Exploration rules define how to 
search the strategic landscape and business ecosystems and what is being looked for 
(scanning) for economic survival. 
Beinhocker (1998) predicts that as a complexity-based view of economics develops, 
new tools will be devised to help managers fashion better-evolving companies.  Some of 
these tools will be analytical, for example options theory and evolutionary modelling to 
help develop robust strategies.  Others will be conceptual, for example new 
organisational forms that help avert complexity catastrophes, or practices that promote a 
rich fund of ideas. 
5.7.2 Totally Emergent Interpretation of Complexity 
Some complexity scholars tend to interpret complexity as an emergent strategy 
formation process.  These theories are projected on the Enabler Quadrant, where the 
management role is characterised as mainly proactive in an emergent oriented strategy 
formation process (Figure 5-10).  
Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999) state that as an organisation becomes more complex, 
emergent strategies will overtake intended strategies.  Complexity core logic means that 
firms and units can generate intelligent, effective responses to the need for change 
without externally imposed plans or directions.  Complexity logic concentrates on 
designing and maintaining integrated, but non-linear, system-wide processes with the 
expectation that they will yield a variety of useful results.  The complexity perspective 
is community-based, emergent, non-linear, unpredictable, culture bound, and requires 
substantial investment in human capital and process management techniques.  
Kauffman (1995b) explains the potential of breaking a company into patches to balance 
order and chaos, and claims that each patch attempts to optimise solely for its own 
selfish benefit and can lead, as if by an invisible hand, to the greater welfare of the 
whole organisation.  Zohar (1997) compares between the old management paradigm 
(Newtonian) and the new management paradigm (Quantum).  Some of its main themes 
are: uncertainty, unpredictability, rapid change, non-hierarchical networks, 
multifunctional effort, interacting centres, responsive and flexible structures and 
bottom-up experimental operation. 
5.7.3 Blend of Proactive and Reactive Interpretation of Complexity 
Stacey (2000) refers to the above interpretations (totally emergent interpretation, blend 
of emergent and intended interpretation) as retaining the assumptions of the 
autonomous, even heroic, individual and prescription of the manager as the objective 
observer and of the organisation as a system.  Furthermore, he argues that the result is 
the re-presentation of strategic choice and learning organisation theory in a different 
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vocabulary.  The interpretation of complexity thus remains within the orthodox view of 
management and organisational theory. 
Stacey (2000) adopts a more radical perspective to strategy formation based on 
complexity that he calls Complex Responsive Process (CRP).  Intention emerges in the 
self-organising process of ordinary conversation between people.  Change occurs in 
novel ways through the presence of sufficient diversity in organising themes.  This is 
expressed in free-flowing conversation in which shadow themes test the boundaries of 
the legitimate.  Managers cannot think of themselves in terms of organisational 
designers but rather as active participants in a complex process.  The projection (Figure 
5-10) of the Complex Responsive Process complexity perspective on the Strategy 
Formation Matrix therefore represents an emergent strategy formation process where 
management role is characterised as a blend of proactive and reactive participation in 
the process. 
5.8 Summary 
The various projections on the Strategy Formation Matrix reflected how different 
strategy schools incorporate different blends of intended and emergent strategy 
formation processes and how the management role in strategy formation varies in its 
level of proactive involvement.  In the Learning School, for example, strategy is mainly 
emergent while in the Strategic Choice School it is mainly intended.  The Capability 
School tends to incorporate a blend of intended as well as emergent strategy formation 
process.  The Environmental School is an example of management reacting to the 
environment, while in the Planning School; management allocates great effort to 
proactively planning the company’s future actions. 
Complexity studies can be categorised into several groups representing different views 
on management’s role in the strategy formation process and the blend of intended and 
emergent strategy.  Wood (1999) calls for continued exploitation and exploration. 
Hamel (2000) thinks strategy is mainly about variety.  He also points out that in most 
companies there is no distinction between a conversation about business concept 
innovation and a conversation about how to improve the operational performance of an 
existing business. The need for a mix of strategy could be related to the complexity 
concept of the Edge of Chaos.  In the natural world the richest forms of life exist on the 
edges, between sea and land, forest and field etc therefore “Selecting the right degree of 
configuration is a complex balancing act.  Managers must avoid the baldness or chaos 
of too little configuration while skirting the obsession of too much.  Excellent wines 
have complexity and nuance, blending together different tastes into harmonious 
balance” (Miller, 1996; in Mintzberg et. al., 1998, pg 346).   
Several scholars pursue the idea that during an organisational life-cycle, management 
should endure different best-fit strategies at different times. Mintzberg et al.’s (1998) 
Configuration School encompasses those of the other schools, but each in a well-
defined context.  They state that “Most of the time, an organization can be described in 
terms of some kind of stable configuration of its characteristics… for a distinguishable 
period of time, it adopts a particular form of structure matched to a particular type of 
context which causes it to engage in particular behaviours that give rise to a particular 
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set of strategies…These periods of stability are interrupted occasionally by some 
process of transformation—a quantum leap to another configuration” (pg 305). 
Figure 5-11 illustrates Mintzberg et al.’s (1998) nine schools projected on the Strategy 
Formation Project and arrows representing quantum leaps from one strategy to another. 
 
Figure  5-11: Illustrations of potential quantum leaps (based on Mintzberg et al., 1998) 
Mintzberg et al., (1998) explain that these successive states of configuration and periods 
of transformation may order themselves over time into patterned sequences, for example 
describing life cycles of organisations. They state “The key to strategic management, 
therefore, is to sustain stability or at least adaptable strategic change most of the time, 
but periodically to recognize the need for transformation and be able to manage that 
disruptive process without destroying the organization” (pg 346).  
Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999) claim that effective strategy formulation and 
implementation requires a coherent and logically consistent strategy frame.  A look at 
the many contradictory premises across the three paradigms they analyse (Complexity, 
Capability and Guerrilla Logic) makes it clear that a strategy derived from more than 
one core logic at a single point in time violates this requirement.  At best the results of 
such cross-fertilisation might be confusion and efforts applied at cross-purposes.  More 
likely, a strategy that relies concurrently on more than one of these core logics offers a 
high probability for dysfunction within the firm and ultimate failure of the firm’s 
activity in the marketplace.  
HiCo’s action research study (Chapter 4) suggests the company endured different 
blends of strategy formation at different times.  In 2003, for example, the strategy 
formation process was less intended than the strategy formation in one of its business 
units in 2002.  Management role in the strategy formation process shifted with time to a 
more proactive role.  Chapter 6 will investigate, from a sample of companies of 
different sizes and from different industries, how managers perceive and project their 
position on the Strategy Formation Matrix, and whether the position differs between 
companies and within companies over time.  
 106
  
 
 
 
6 Organisations and Strategy 
Formation 
The aim of this Chapter is to investigate the strategy formation process in six 
organisations in relation to the Strategy Formation Matrix.  The Chapter describes the 
multiple-cases investigation, outlines the limitations and strengths of the research 
approach adopted and summarises the outcomes of the investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter (Chapter 5) introduced and theoretically investigated the Strategy 
Formation Matrix.  The aim was to offer a model representing the blend of intended and 
emergent strategy formation process on one side and the type of management role on 
the other.  This chapter, using multiple-case studies, conducts an empirical inquiry that 
investigates the strategy formation process in different companies within their real-life 
contexts.  Companies project their perceived position on the Strategy Formation Matrix 
which is presented and investigated here, validating the model as a basis for further 
expansion. 
The research method adopted for this part of the study involved a multiple case study 
approach.  As outlined in Chapter 3, a case study is an inquiry that investigates within a 
real-life context and relies on multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994).  Yin (1994) 
states that “Any use of multiple-case designs should follow a replication, not a 
sampling, logic, and an investigator must choose each case carefully.  The cases should 
serve in a manner similar to multiple experiments, with similar results (a literal 
replication) or contrasting results (a theoretical replication) predicted explicitly at the 
outset of the investigation” (pg 51).  Hartley (1994) claims that case studies are 
‘meaningful’ and ‘rich’ compared with the sometimes ‘dustbowl’ empiricism of 
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quantitative techniques.  Within this multiple cases approach, the researcher did not act 
as participant observer but rather as an investigator with prior development and 
theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. 
For confidentiality reasons the company information of the participants in the multiple 
cases study are anonymous.  However their identities were not turned to fictitious ones 
like suggested in some research cases (Yin 1994 pg144).  All relevant information 
concerning background, type of products, strategic challenges, strategy formation 
process and chronological events are presented accurately.  A serial number and a letter 
representing the company size replace the actual name (for example L5 corresponds to 
researched company number five, classified as a large company).  Small size companies 
were defined as employing less then fifty employees, medium size as employing more 
than fifty and less then two hundred and fifty employees while large companies employ 
more then two hundred and fifty employees. 
The six companies in the multiple-cases study, presented in Table 6-1, were chosen 
based on their diversified characteristics in terms of size, line of business and 
geographical origin (all European based).  A section is dedicated to each individual case 
study report. 
Table  6-1: List of researched companies within the multiple cases study 
Company Size Short Name Section 
Multinational Design and Manufacturing 
Company 
Large L5 6.2 
Global Financial Company Large L7 6.3 
Industrial Design Company Medium M2  6.4 
Software Company Medium M3 6.5 
High Precision Parts Manufacture Company Small S3 6.6 
Biotechnology Company Small S5 6.7 
Data collection began in June 2002 and ended in February 2004, consisting of multiple 
sources such as workshops, interviews, surveys, internal documents and external 
documents – for example newspapers and Internet sites.  Data collection included an 
initial background survey (Appendix C), Management role Environment Networking 
Importance (MENI) Analysis (Appendix E), strategy formation process workshop 
analysis (Appendix F), context analysis workshop (Appendix G) and an industry 
structure analysis (Appendix H).  Along the course of the research, several discussions 
were held with company managers for clarification and sense making. 
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6.2 Multinational Conception and Manufacturing Company (L5) – 
Case Study 
6.2.1 Background 
L5 is a multinational leader in the design and manufacture of interior automotive 
components and modular systems.  L5 started as a small family business over half a 
decade ago.  The company strategy and organisational structure shifted in the last half-
century several times, supporting entrance into new markets, growth and geographical 
expansion.  L5 accompanied its customers all over the world, locating technical-
commercial offices near the most important decision centres of the automotive industry. 
The company has global presence in over 17 countries with over 50 technical-
commercial, production and logistics centres.  L5 has witnessed substantial growth for 
the last decade.  Its future long-term business plan incorporates plans to expand its 
product line and geographical distribution in order to reach an average yearly growth 
rate of over 15% until 2007.  L5’s sales channels are through Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) or major integrators.  The market is relatively competitive and 
includes several major players as well as the risk of some newcomers.  Technology 
trends could be substantial in the next few years shifting to new materials and 
production techniques.  
L5 has a matrix organisational structure, where along with geographical territory 
managers there are cross-territories project managers.  The company relies partially on 
strategic alliances and networked suppliers for several technologies and services such as 
electronics, stamping parts and synthetic fibres.  One of the main risks and 
complications the company endures is having a dual-relationship with some of the 
suppliers that are also market competitors or have the potential of becoming a 
competitor. 
6.2.2 Strategic Challenges 
Precise definition of policies and strategies has driven L5 to occupy a leading position 
in the market, based on important strengths that include industrial presence worldwide, 
technical and commercial offices in countries where clients make their key decisions, 
and an industrial organisation based around small-scale, flexible production centres with 
a highly participative workforce.  The following dilemmas and strategic challenges were 
identified in February 2004: maintaining growth, far-east penetration (a specific 
country), cheaper products, confronting security issues (improvements, regulations, 
etc.), innovation and new products, and new technologies and materials (for example 
electronics, magnesium). 
6.2.3 Strategy Formation Process 
Table 6-2 represents examples of the perceived blend of intended and emergent 
activities taken by management (April 2003).  Intended activities were defined as 
proactive initiatives taken by management in an intended strategy formation process. 
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Enabler activities were defined as proactive initiatives taken by management to support 
an emergent strategy formation process.  
Table  6-2: L5 examples of Intended and Enabler management activities 
Intended Activities Enabler Activities 
• Strategic objectives management 
• Master Strategic Plan: Business plan + R&D 
plan  
• Promote and improve internal procedures. 
• Six - Sigma: quality tool & management 
procedure 
• Develop projects “inside” customer 
organisation. (Tech. Teams working within 
customer teams) 
• Promote indirect processes 
• Support trial and error and risk taking 
initiatives of new product development  
In terms of strategic objectives management, the company implemented the Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2000) a well-known approach to strategic 
management developed in the early 1990's by Kaplan and Norton.  The Balanced 
Scorecard approach provides a clear prescription as to what companies should measure 
in order to balance the financial perspective.  The Balanced Scorecard suggests viewing 
the organisation from four perspectives (learning and growth, internal business process, 
customer and financial).  The strategy map is a generic architecture for describing how 
an organisation intends to create sustained value for its shareholders (Kaplan and 
Norton, 2004). The map is founded on the idea that “each measure of the Balanced 
Scorecard becomes embedded in a chain of cause-and-effect logic that connects the 
desired outcomes from the strategy with the drivers that will lead to the strategic 
outcomes” (pg 69).  
L5’s value chain of cause and effect is communicated through a Strategy Map (Figure 
6-2) presenting the chain of effects from achieving human resources targets to 
improving financial perspectives.  Some of the goals included are employee motivation 
and productivity, innovation, customer support, new market penetration and growth. 
Emergent strategy exists in L5 in various forms.  Several examples of how new business 
and products emerged were collected (June 2003).  One example of a bottom up 
initiative is of a research team that dared to use a new unconventional material, resulting 
in a first to market new generation of products (lower weight, lower price).  Other 
sources of emerging business ideas included a project consisting of a diversified team 
from different departments and technical teams working at customer premises. 
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Figure  6-1: Illustration of the L5 Strategy Map (actual targets are not provided to the reader and 
illustration is slightly changed from the source, for company privacy) 
Several examples reflecting the business environment characteristics were also collected 
(June 2003).  One example is how the influence of fluctuating values of primary 
materials, such as polypropylene and oil, affect technological and financial decisions.  
Another example is the Argentina political scenario introducing turbulence into the 
company business in terms of production parameters, project budgets and revenues.  
Some of the business turbulence originates from suppliers, for example a two year 
working relationship with a supplier, on an advanced technological project, was 
terminated unexpectedly due to a competitor suddenly taking over the supplier.  
Figure 6-2 presents L5’s projection on the Management Role Matrix.  The perception of 
strategy formation was collected in 2003.  At that time, L5 was positioned between the 
Navigator and Enabler quadrant, with a blend of intended and emergent strategy 
formation processes.  Management is characterised as playing a proactive role in 
strategy formation.  This position is aligned with the examples given of intended 
measures such as implementing the Balanced Scorecard method and Six Sigma as well 
as examples of an enabling environment of trial and error in new product development. 
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Figure  6-2: L5 perceived projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix (April 2003) 
The perceived projection of L5 strategy formation processes in 2001 (recorded in 2003) 
was different from its 2003 position.  Due to increased effort and support in innovation 
and penetration of new markets, management were perceived as more proactive two 
years earlier.  The strategy formation process was characterised by a blend mainly 
dominated by emergent, positioned in the Enabler Quadrant of the Strategy Formation 
Matrix. 
6.3 Global Financial Company (L7) – Case study 
6.3.1 Background 
L7 helps its customers meet their long-term savings financial needs by offering flexible, 
custom-tailored solutions that incorporate a wide array of products and services.  The 
company’s competitive edge derives from the packaging of its products and its ability to 
build long-term relationships with its customers.  L7’s products are adapted to local 
markets and local needs.  Long-term savings products differ from country to country 
since each product is market specific and subject to rules, taxes and other local market 
conditions.  L7’s strategy in 2000 was categorised by a newspaper article as a virtual 
organisation that used partnerships, networks, shared resources, and visions to handle 
turbulent markets and flexible production.  The company was regarded as client-driven 
and a knowledge-intensive enterprise exploiting the relationship revolution that modern 
IT enables.  The leader provided a shared vision, a strong brand, and a high-trust 
culture.  Prior to 2001, L7 had witnessed geographical expansion and revenue growth 
for several subsequent years, resulting in high profits. 
However, since September 11, 2001 (approximately) L7, along with other life insurers, 
has seen its profits eroded by plummeting stock markets and rising benefit costs.  The 
company has been especially vulnerable to the economic downturn losing more than 
90% of its value from a 2000 peak. 
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In 2003 a newspaper reported, “Over the past year, L7 reputation has been badly 
damaged by a disastrous share price performance, the failure of a costly expansion 
into… sustained criticism…over [management action]…” (The Financial Times 
Limited, 2003).  One of the managers claimed at that time L7 was implementing “tighter 
policies, stronger follow-up routines and improved clarity".  
A market analyst suggested in 2003 that “L7’s strategy of rewrapping other companies' 
equity-linked products and selling them through independent financial advisers and 
broker-dealers, leaving the company with almost no overhead, served it well in a bull 
market, … The company now needs to become "a producer and distributor, rather than 
a packager," he said. "That will make it less vulnerable to the effects of falling equity 
markets."  
The company is structured as a federative virtual network organisation of independent, 
yet interdependent, local business units and multiple centres of competence and 
innovation.  In this type of organisation, the network replaces the traditional Head 
Office allowing each unit to adapt quickly to local environmental changes, yet still be 
able to draw upon the resources and knowledge of the global entity. 
6.3.2 Vision and Strategic Challenges 
L7’s main vision themes include the following statements (October 2002) “To be the 
leading provider of savings solutions”, “to be the best company to work for” and “to 
have a reputation as an innovative leader”.  These themes were clearly communicated 
internally and externally.  The company witnessed several strategic challenges 
(collected October 2002).  One of the substantial challenges was “how to continually 
balance offering products and services that meet the constantly changing local market’s 
customers' needs with global market perspectives in such a way that the result is a 
strong value-added benefit to the company”.  Other challenges included offering 
innovative new products and services in established markets, identifying and developing 
new markets both in terms of location (new countries) and new businesses, forecasting 
customer changing demands, continually developing staff to meet the changing 
demands and developing new strategic relationships with external partners. 
However, L7 had to overcome some barriers and constraints to meet its strategic 
challenges.  At the beginning of 2003, the company suffered from increased financial 
problems.  Some of the identified problems in the strategy formation process included 
lack of resources, financial and share pressure placing emphasis on short-term issues, 
management turbulence distracting the company from identifying and addressing global 
problems and independence of local units reducing the ability of the global parent to 
directly affect the behaviour of local units. 
6.3.3 Strategy Formation Process 
Table 6-3 represents examples of the perceived blend of intended and enabler activities 
taken by management (recorded in February 2003).  Intended activities were defined as 
proactive initiatives taken by management in an intended strategy formation process. 
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Enabler activities were defined as proactive initiatives taken by management to support 
an emergent strategy formation process.  
Table  6-3: L7 examples of Intended and Enabler management activities 
Intended Activities Enabler Activities 
• Business plan emphasis on profitability 
• Tighter business plan control from central 
office (concentration on profitability of current 
products, divesting non-profitable business 
units and non-core products) 
• Senior management “shake-up” 
• Enhanced corporate governance 
• Increased emphasis on global networking 
• Create small futurist unit 
• Further develop strategic planning process 
• Experiment with position in value-chain 
• Develop (through exploration) a specific 
market 
• Allow a degree of freedom to local business 
units 
• Enable knowledge transfer between units 
In the past the company implemented a multi-level Balanced Scorecard based 
measurement system supported by unique self developed software.  The company 
invested extensive resources in supporting knowledge management and innovation 
initiatives.  However, as the company endured some financial and management 
difficulties, many of the knowledge management and innovation initiatives were 
reduced or stopped. 
Figure 6-3 presents L7’s projection on the Management Role Matrix.  The perception of 
strategy formation was collected in 2003.  At that time, management role endured a 
blend of proactive and reactive actions while the strategy formation process was mainly 
intended oriented.  L7 was positioned in the Navigator quadrant.  This position was 
aligned with challenges and constraints identified such as “financial and share pressure 
placing emphasis on short-term issues” and “management turbulence distracting the 
company from identifying and addressing global problems”.  An example of Intended 
strategy formation was enhanced corporate governance and tighter business control, 
while experimenting with their position in the value chain was given as an example of 
enabler activity. 
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Figure  6-3: L7 perceived projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix (March, 2003) 
The perceived projection of L7’s strategy formation processes in 1999 (recorded in 
2003) was different from its 2003 position.  Management were perceived as more 
proactive.  The strategy formation process is characterised by a blend of more emergent 
than intended, positioned in the Enabler rather than the Navigator quadrant of the 
Strategy Formation Matrix. 
6.4 Industrial Design Company (M2) – Case study 
6.4.1 Background 
M2 was founded over 20 years ago as a small industrial design studio with 2 designers. 
Over the years, M2 evolved to a company with three divisions and offices located in 
three different countries.  The company specialise in industrial design and product 
development.  M2 has more than doubled its size and turnover in the five years prior to 
2001. 
M2’s services cover the whole chain of product development starting from innovation 
strategy and management, to concept development, concept and detailed design, 
engineering, prototyping, and finally mould manufacturing coordination and 
subcontracting.  Covering the whole chain, M2 offers a complete and integrated product 
development service, which requires a highly intensive cooperation and communication 
between M2 and its clients.  M2 has created a strong relationship with its clients and 
gained a rich and broad experience and know how on product development for 
industrial companies. 
In its ten years of existence, M2 has carried out over 500 projects for more then 70 
different industrial companies from a high variety of sectors such as furniture, toys, 
electronics, white goods, informatics (computers and printers), hobby and professional 
tools, banking (pay dispensers and cash machines), ticketing devices, health/hospitals 
(information poles), machinery, bathrooms and toilets, mass products, and machine 
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control devices.  M2 makes at least 35 products a year and advises its clients in services 
that range from design, engineering, innovation, or re-design to cost.  
M2 main identity themes, as perceived by employees (June 2003) are: adaptability and 
flexibility, diversified capabilities, knowledge integration of service, and client focus. 
6.4.2 Vision and Strategic Challenges 
M2’s vision (August 2002) incorporates two main trends. The first assumption is that 
the market will demand a complete “end to end solution”.   The second is the belief that 
the company will have to be “global in every sense”.  Aligned with the business 
dynamics, identified challenges (August 2002) include being able to construct a very 
adaptive business plan, managing people in a highly changeable environment and 
identifying technology, society, and economic trends.  Defining the company’s values is 
one way to cope with the challenges.  As one executive explained; “corporate 
philosophy is the most important thing – since a new M2 evolves every three years – but 
the dilemma is making this transformation while working with the same people and 
making them change with you.” 
In February 2003 new challenges were identified shifting form previous emphasis to 
new ones.  The company management increased control trying to achieve more with 
fewer resources.  The transformation included a shift to more hierarchy, “fitting people 
to boxes”, which meant less empowerment and self-organisation.  This trend continued 
in June 2003, where the following challenges were identified: clear target company, 
strict targets and resource allocation, quality control and progress reports.  Management 
wanted to change old habits such as management mainly by intuition and decision-
making based on personal relations.  However several long-term goals were also 
identified such as investment in human capital competence to ensure the future and 
partnering in an effective way to support growth. 
6.4.3 Strategy Formation Process 
M2’s culture and working environment endures teamwork and flexibility.  In some 
projects the roles were not well defined, which added flexibility to the structure, and 
allowed the exchange of experiences and knowledge.  One employee described it in the 
following way “Roles are not formalised, but when teams are built, people rely on the 
team members, everyone assumes a role (the executor, the devil’s advocate, the ‘out of 
the box’ thinker), depending on the kind of project that they are going to face”.  
Very often M2’s type of business results in facing complicated challenges that has to be 
resolved in a short period.  The working environment was defined as friendly, fun, with 
a young spirit, dynamic and enthusiastic (June 2003).  Open thinking and emerging 
ideas were encouraged.  Informal relationships existed and are described in the 
following quotes: “We can say that M2 can be defined as a meritocracy, where freedom 
of thinking and expression is encouraged.  The perception is of a ‘flat organization’, 
despite the fact that a hierarchy exists…”; “M2 is in general a small enough company 
to have more of a feeling of belonging as you can see the results of your ideas”. 
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Table 6-4 represents examples of the perceived blend of intended and emergent 
activities taken by management (recorded on April 2003).  Intended activities were 
defined as proactive initiatives taken by management in an intended strategy formation 
process.  Enabler activities were defined as proactive initiatives taken by management 
to support an emergent strategy formation process.  
Table  6-4: M2 examples of Intended and Enabler management activities 
Intended Activities Enabler Activities 
• Find larger clients / international clients / 
revisiting old clients. 
• Improved definitions of services. 
• New credentials documents. 
• Improve proposals of collaborative 
relationships with clients. 
• New internal management measures. 
• Setting sales targets. 
• Setting policies and procedures. 
• New compensation and performance terms. 
• New definition of responsibilities. 
• Establishing office days / rumours e-mail. 
• Nurturing internal proposals of all kind 
(Servicing, Social, etc). 
• Recruiting new profiles of people. 
• Scanning for new markets. 
• Expansion through new knowledge areas / 
sectors. 
• Flat informal relation, freedom of expression. 
M2’s client interface usually consisted of one to three consultants from M2.  This meant 
that the employee had the responsibility to represent the company, effect the project 
outcome and most importantly to scan for future business with the customer and within 
his market.  Company policy was to hire unique blends of talents and strengths.  The 
diversification was believed to allow interesting synergies resulting in innovative ideas.  
M2 was affected by the general economic cycle and also by seasonal cycles of the 
market. A proactive reaction of M2 management was to gather more diversified and 
bigger clients, communicate its value more effectively and thus be in a position to 
charge more for it. 
Although M2’s strategy formation was flexible, empowered and emergent, in 2003 after 
witnessing several years of consecutive growth intended measures were implemented.  
An overall strategy plan defining a clear customer base and focusing on building 
distinct capabilities was formed to improve profitability and reduce business cycle 
effects.  A manager in M2 claimed that the company was good at organisational change 
when needed, however these changes were launched on a case-by-case initiative and not 
as part of an overall long-term plan. 
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Figure  6-4: M2 projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix 
The following goals were identified in June 2003: efficiency (time and profits), to be 
rigorous (keep on informing), internal homogeneity (same perception), and knowledge 
expansion (gathering knowledge).  The company planned to take the following action to 
achieve the goals: consolidate business (bigger clients, delivering more benefits, having 
more profits and amplify the market presence), implement a process that allows 
constant and sustainable growth (new knowledge areas, always offering a service taking 
into account future needs and being proactive), duplicate the business model (new 
markets, new clients) and create a knowledge network. 
Figure 6-4 presents M2’s projection on the Management Role Matrix.  The perception 
of strategy formation was collected in 2003.  At that time, M2 was positioned in the 
Navigator quadrant, with a blend of mainly intended strategy formation process where 
management was characterised as proactive.  This position is aligned with the examples 
given of intended measures such as setting targets, compensation and performance 
evolutions as well as examples of an enabling action such as nurturing internal 
proposals of all kind. 
The perceived projection of M2 strategy formation processes in 2002 (recorded in 2002) 
is different from its 2003 position.  Management is perceived as less proactive.  The 
strategy formation process is characterised by a more balanced blend of both emergent 
and intended strategy, positioned between the Enabler and Navigator quadrants of the 
Strategy Formation Matrix. 
6.5 Software Company (M3) – Case study 
6.5.1 Background 
M3 is a global software vendor with over 200 large company clients.  M3 develops and 
designs solutions that enable corporations to better plan and optimise the human side of 
their business.  M3’s market strategy is based on alliances with consultants and systems 
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integrators.  M3 addresses medium and large organisations, businesses as well as non-
profit or government agencies, which need to improve their management and planning 
of Human Capital.  The market is segmented by company size: small (less than 500 
employees) medium (between 500 and 5,000 employees) and large (more than 5,000 
employees). Geography also plays a role in segmenting the market, because Human 
Capital issues in many respects differ in different countries.  Competition includes both 
large international players and local players active in one or two countries.  In some 
local markets there are many local players, typically of a small or medium size.  They 
normally have a background, and a solid market presence, based on payroll, benefits 
and time and attendance products.  Their strength is typically coming from a strong 
relationship with their loyal customer base and competitive fees.  Although in many 
cases these companies compete with M3, often they can be excellent candidates for a 
strategic partnership.  The company was reborn as a spin-off several years ago. 
6.5.2 Vision and Strategic Challenges 
M3’s vision (June 2003) was that it would be a major player globally in the domain of 
Human Capital Management and Planning software solutions, contributing to 
improving the performance of thousands of organisations worldwide.  Some of M3’s 
strategic challenges (June 2003) included shifts in identity.  For example moving from 
analytical applications provider to highly focussed Human Capital software solutions 
provider, from local based company to worldwide vendor and from Software 
development competencies to business development competencies. 
6.5.3 Strategy Formation Process 
As a people-driven company, M3 regarded its employees as the key resource for 
achieving its business goals.  Employees were considered and rewarded for their 
professional skills and attention to providing outstanding customer service.  The 
organisation was quite flexible and a high internal job rotation was encouraged as one of 
the most important professional growth approaches.  The management, both the top and 
the middle, were directly involved in the operations.  An implemented employee 
investment plan and stock award plan strongly encouraged a deep participation of all the 
employees in the strategy formation process and the future plans of the company. 
Table 6-5 represents examples of the perceived blend of intended and enabler activities 
taken by management (February 2003).  Intended activities were defined as proactive 
initiatives taken by management in an intended strategy formation process.  Enabler 
activities were defined as proactive initiatives taken by management to support an 
emergent strategy formation process.  
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Table  6-5: M3 examples of Intended and Enabler management activities 
Intended Activities Enabler Activities 
• Follow business plans  
• Financial targets/goals 
• New approaches (customers as partners) 
• Involve people in new activities 
• Increasing de-centralisation – people involved 
in more activities /networking 
• Direct contact with customers, more proactive 
to final market 
• High internal rotation 
• Products strongly linked to customers evolving 
needs (emergence strategy) 
In order to achieve its mission, at the same time of its conception, M3’s management 
team launched a program, based on the idea of the Balanced Scorecard that was called 
M3 Strategy Map.  The key Strategic Themes for the success of M3 in the first two 
years included building overseas market presence, growing local presence, developing 
the right product, building the ability to deliver solution, accelerating speed to market 
and treating people as strategic assets.  Each of these Strategic Themes had an 
associated operation plan, containing goals in the four perspectives of the Balanced 
Scorecard (Financial Perspective, Customer Perspective, Internal Process Perspective 
and Learning and Growth Perspective).  These eight plans were the main pillars in the 
Strategy Map of M3.  Several enabler themes were incorporated in the strategy plan 
such as “empowerment and trust prevails over command and control”, “Everybody is a 
Shareholder” with full rights to play the role of the Shareholder regardless of the 
quantity of stock owned and “Fulfilment of personal goals such as to allow people to 
build competencies that support their personal goals, respect people’s personal and 
family time.” 
Figure 6-5 presents M3’s projection on the Management Role Matrix.  The perception 
of strategy formation was collected in 2003.  At that time, Management role endured a 
blend of proactive and reactive orientation.  The strategy formation process consisted of 
a blend of intended and emergent strategy.  M3’s position is unique and falls between 
all quadrants.  Management is reactive to its customer and general market trends on the 
one hand while trying to implement a long-term plan and set an enabling environment 
on the other. 
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Figure  6-5: M3 perceived projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix 
The perceived projection of M3’s strategy formation processes in 2001 (recorded in 
2003) is different from its 2003 position.  Management is perceived as more proactive. 
The strategy formation process is characterised as predominantly intended, positioned in 
the Navigator quadrant of the Strategy formation Matrix. 
6.6 High Precision Parts Manufacture (S3) – Case study 
6.6.1 Background 
For over 25 years, S3 has been a partner for the design, tooling manufacture and high 
volume production of punching and bending parts in various sizes, as well as for the 
production and delivery of plastic moulded and plastic assembled metal components.  
The parts and components developed by S3 and its customers are deployed in various 
industry sectors such as: automotive industry, metrology and control technique industry, 
electrical and electronics industry, communication industry, medical industry, 
aeronautical industry and optical industry.  S3’s core products can be described as small 
parts mostly made of non-iron metal, which are manufactured at high volume (up to 600 
per minute) and high precision (tolerance scale is often in microns).  S3 does not only 
manufacture those products but also provides the necessary tooling for them.  Tooling is 
increasingly made out of aluminium.  
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Figure  6-6: S3 products 
The customer co-operation starts during the development phase of new products and 
continues through to prototyping and high volume manufacture of the products.  A very 
important service S3 delivers to the customer is the detailed development of the part 
itself.  A typical customer request starts with a function scheme and then, together with 
the customer, the part is finally shaped and is geometrically frozen.  This constellation is 
considered a key competitive advantage since after having been involved in such a joint 
development process the entrance barrier or knowledge gap for competitors (who want 
to manufacture the part at high volume) is often too high.  
The market for this type of product is extremely large.  Each automotive OEM and all 
the big first-tier suppliers are potential customers.  S3 is an extremely small player in 
this market.  There are very stable customer-supplier relationships and for newcomers it 
is extremely difficult to enter this market.  S3 makes around 40% turnover from 
overseas business.  Emerging markets are the Eastern European Countries and South 
East Asia. USA is still regarded as a difficult market since the automotive industry has 
not entirely recovered from the events of September 11, 2001 yet.  S3 is family oriented 
and its structure is Matrix based.  It has three SBUs (Tooling, Bending Manufacture and 
Punching Manufacture) and cross company functions such as development, sales, 
purchasing, quality and logistics.  The company has managed to grow in a very sound, 
sustainable and organic way in the last three decades.  The management workshop 
conducted in S3 revealed the perceived image of the company (March 2003) as a small 
and flexible organisation, competent at finding solutions (many customers do not come 
to S3 with a clear idea about the parts to be produced but only rough guidelines), 
customer and service oriented, with a strong corporate culture. 
6.6.2 Vision and Strategic Challenges 
The vision (August 2002) of S3 was to be a world-class manufacturer of high precision 
metal parts.  The marketplace was witnessing an increasing trend of plastic parts 
replacing non-iron metal parts.  Since S3 is an expert in high precision metal pieces the 
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main dilemma was whether S3 should enter new markets where the value of high 
precision metal pieces is recognised (for example medical market or aeronautics).  
In a later period (February 2003) other strategic challenges were recognised.  The main 
risk was that the company strongly relied on one main customer and one main executive 
figure, which was the founder and acting CEO.  The company needed to explore new 
business opportunities to reduce the dependency on one main customer, but only had 
limited resources to do this.  They also needed to improve knowledge management 
processes so as to reduce the dependency on the CEO.  Management decided to increase 
robustness by three areas of activities: building sales, managing and distributing 
knowledge and finding new partners. 
6.6.3 Strategy Formation Process 
S3 has retained some of its family owned management orientation.  Some special 
characteristics of this mentality are a very informal relationship between the employees 
and also with the management.  This is also shown by the employees’ willingness to 
work overtime even at the weekend and at very short notice.  The family feeling is also 
encouraged by a company vacation trip twice a year.   These vacations are generally 
planned and organised by the employees themselves. S3 employees endure high loyalty 
evident in the fact that fluctuation of the key-personal was close to zero in the last two 
years. 
Table 6-6 represents examples of the perceived blend of intended and enabler activities 
taken by management (February 2003).  Intended activities were defined as proactive 
initiatives taken by management in an intended strategy formation process.  Enabler 
activities were defined as proactive initiatives taken by management to support an 
emergent strategy formation process.  
Table  6-6: S3 examples of Intended and Enabler Management activities 
Intended Activities Enabler Activities 
• Setting internal quality standards 
• Strategic investments 
• Old economy – hierarchy – family business 
• Next year better then last year (profit) 
• Networking with suppliers 
• Common patents with customers 
(process/technology) 
• Strengthening competence image 
• Exploration for new markets, networks and 
process  
• Involve people in new activities 
• Direct contact with customers 
• Adaptive to customer demand 
S3 is dominated by a hierarchical structure and the limits are clear and accepted in the 
majority of cases.  Most employees are specialists with long experience.  Ideas for 
improvements mainly come from the management side, due to the very hierarchical 
culture.  In the past, this has resulted in employees not feeling responsible enough to 
give ideas for improvements.  
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Figure  6-7: S3 perceived projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix 
S3 works closely with its main customers, and adapts itself in terms of new products, 
technology and investments to their evolving needs.  The company customer relations 
are based on individual’s relationships.  In a management workshop (April 2003), the 
desired future identity and position consisted of: high quality standards, building brand 
name, growing network, increasing proactive role in the market, building competence to 
solutions, enduring diversified corporate culture and investing in specialists with 
flexible roles. 
Figure 6-7 presents S3’s projection on the Management Role Matrix.  The perception of 
strategy formation was collected in 2003.  At that time, S3 endured a rather reactive 
strategy formation process, mainly to its customer’s emerging needs. S3 perceived 
position was in the Environmental quadrant.  The perceived projection of S3’s strategy 
formation processes in 2001 (recorded in 2003) differs only slightly from its 2003 
position.  Management is perceived as a bit more reactive and the strategy formation is 
perceived as more emergent.  The position is located in the Environmental quadrant of 
the strategy formation matrix. 
6.7 Biotechnology Company (S5) – Case study 
6.7.1 Background 
S5 started as a spin-off from a University a decade ago.  The launch of a commercial 
product, initially developed at the University, allowed rapid set up production of 
customised micro-fluidic systems for a large customer.  Using the momentum created 
by these customised products, the company initiated a wide market analysis.  This 
resulted in the definition and development of a generic product range using proprietary 
developments and technology strongholds.  The first activities of the company 
concentrated on the development and the manufacturing of micro-fluidic subsystems for 
a number of customers.  Having set up a network of sub-contractors, the company 
focused on Research and Development (R&D) for new products or technologies, 
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product adaptation/integration on customer platforms, system final assembly and quality 
assurance.  The company’s growth relies on building partnerships with worldwide 
renowned instrument manufacturers.  The position of S5 in the supply chain is usually 
several positions before the end-user.  S5’s customers propose and deliver complete 
instruments to the pharmaceutical industry.  The company’s core product is a sensor 
controlled micro-liquid handling system.  Its main market is automated laboratory 
equipment to research and develop new drugs.   
6.7.2 Vision and Strategic Challenges 
In August 2002, a company manager described S5 vision the following way: “Because 
of the versatile nature of S5 technology, the vision is to diversify into other areas such 
as the manufacturing of specialised products, hoping that S5’s products will be widely 
used throughout pharmaceutical research laboratories in the world”.  The strategic 
challenges collected in August 2002, focused on orientating future product development 
and internal capabilities around the capture of relevant information from new 
technologies and the market environment.  Since the company forecasts that their 
products will be widely used throughout pharmaceutical research laboratories in the 
world, it is keen to leverage its future customer base and diversify into other areas such 
as the manufacturing of specialised products.  The strategic challenges identified in 
February 2003 reflected a shift in management attention. Management was mainly 
focused on overcoming short-term fluctuations in customer demand and reallocations of 
resources. 
6.7.3 Strategy Formation Process 
Table 6-7 represents examples of the perceived blend of intended and enabler activities 
taken by management (April 2003).  Intended activities were defined as proactive 
initiatives taken by management in an intended strategy formation process.  Enabler 
activities were defined as proactive initiatives taken by management to support an 
emergent strategy formation process.  
Table  6-7: S5 examples of Intended and Enabler management activities 
Intended Activities Enabler Activities 
• Setting up production systems, Quality 
systems 
• Structuring organisation 
• Maintain / reinforce partnerships 
• Build new partnerships 
• Customise products 
• Internal R&D 
• Technical presentations / publications 
S5 has a small number of employees; most of them have been with the company since 
its launch.  Informal relations, coffee corner chats and individual actions play a major 
role in the company’s actual realised strategy.  Business development is perceived as a 
major task.  S5 collects inputs from a variety of sources in order to define short, mid and 
long-term products, developments or advanced research.  Typical inputs come from 
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discussion with customers and end-users, inputs from the Scientific Advisory Board and 
participation in conferences.  The inputs are evaluated against existing capabilities, the 
potential business relevance and associated risks, as well as possible sources of funding 
in case of development or research when required.  In specific cases, an external analyst 
outsourced market analysis.  S5’s main concern is how to move from engineering to 
manufacturing in an efficient way (previously manufacturing was outsourced).  This 
requires an intended plan and implementation. 
 
Figure  6-8: S5 perceived projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix 
Figure 6-8 presents S5’s projection on the Management Role Matrix (February 2003).  
S5’s management is rather proactive, incorporating a blend of intended and emergent 
strategy formation process where the intended aspect is more dominant.  The company 
is positioned in the Navigator quadrant.  The position corresponds to management focus 
on building efficient production and distribution functions.  The perceived projection of 
S5 strategy formation processes in 2001 (recorded in 2003) is different from its 2003 
position.  Management is perceived as less proactive.  The strategy formation process is 
characterised as mainly emergent, positioned between the Enabler and Environmental 
quadrants of the Strategy Formation Matrix. 
6.8 Research Limitations and Strengths 
Several limitations and strengths can be identified to the presented multiple-case study 
approach.  One of the main strengths is that the sample of companies represents a 
diversity of companies in terms of size and industry.  This contributes unique insights 
concerning strategy formation process.  For example, while S3 and L7 are both 
concerned with finding investment criteria, S3 is also concerned about how to overcome 
some aspects of the family oriented company culture.  And L7 is concerned with trying 
to please various stakeholders such as stock owners.  An additional strength was the 
author’s accessibility to the companies allowing frequent contact with the companies 
over the research period for the purposes of gathering additional data, validating data 
interpretations and for general research inquiries. 
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While most of the data collection relied on several participants in each company as a 
source, the projection to the Strategy Formation Matrix relied on one or two managers 
from each of the researched companies.  Managers seemed to understand the Strategy 
Formation Matrix and found it easy to relate and project their perceived company 
position.  However, a research weakness is that the projection represents the managers’ 
personal perceptions.  These perceptions are based on individual assumptions, 
expectations, knowledge and information about the world of other people and 
relationships with them, as well as about the non-human world in which the individual 
lives and acts (Stacey, 2001).  Strategies emerge as perspectives in the form of concepts, 
maps, schema, and frames that shape how people deal with inputs from the 
environment.  Minztberg et. al. (1998) claim that these inputs, according to the 
subjective wing of the Cognitive School, are merely interpretations of a world that 
exists only in terms of how it is perceived.  Some of the values and beliefs of the 
individual may be shared with others and some of them may be unique to the individual 
(Stacey, 2001).  However, the researcher tried to overcome this limitation by collecting 
data from a number of sources such as surveys, workshops, interviews, documentation 
and external sources which enabled the generation of background information on the 
company and its market in general and description of strategy formation process in 
specific, thus validating the managers’ perceptions.  Each company case study within 
the multiple-case studies allowed triangulation of sources against the cases where the 
projection was done based on one manager’s perspective. 
Managers were also asked to reflect the earlier time position, in most cases two years, 
on the Strategy Formation Matrix.  This reflection on their past performance was not 
based on data, but mainly memory and perception.  Triangulation with other sources of 
data in most cases was low since the data collected reflected mainly the research period. 
However several cases show a substantial shift in the company projection on the 
Strategy Formation Matrix.  Although the position might not be completely accurate, it 
is believed that those movements represent a true change in the strategy formation 
process and management role.  The form and path of movement from one point in the 
Strategy Formation Matrix to another could in many ways generate major research 
implications; however no substantial data was collected on this movement. 
Another limitation can be found in the fact that the projection on the Strategy Formation 
Matrix represents a snapshot in time and not a longitudinal study.  Although several 
shifts in the strategy emphasis were reported within the course of research and each case 
offers one additional pre-research era projection point on the Strategy Formation 
Matrix, the research is still lacking a broader data collection time-line representing the 
company’s long-term evolution.  
6.9 Summary 
The multiple-case study described six companies including information on their 
background, strategy and strategy formation process.  The sample was diversified in 
terms of size, industry and location.  The perceived company projection on the Strategy 
Formation Matrix varied between the Navigator, Enabler, Environmental and Collective 
quadrants.  No direct link was found between the company size and its position on the 
Strategy Formation Matrix.   
 127
Chapter 6 Organisations and Strategy Formation 
In the previous Chapter the theory behind the Strategy Formation Matrix was validated 
theoretically by investigating the projection of various strategy schools of thoughts.  
The multiple-case study contributed to validating the matrix by real-world examples. 
Managers testified that the matrix was easily understood and reflected real life situation 
of a blend of intended and emergent strategy formation processes as well as 
management role that was characterised with proactive and reactive involvement.  
Additional data collection contributed to understanding the type of strategy formation 
activities and the company background for validating the perceived projection. 
Companies engage in different strategies and different strategy formation processes at 
different time periods.  Mintzberg et al. (1998) explain when describing the 
Configuration School that “most of the time, an organization can be described in terms 
of some kind of stable configuration of its characteristics… for a distinguishable period 
of time, it adopts a particular form of structure matched to a particular type of context 
which causes it to engage in particular behaviours that give rise to a particular set of 
strategies… These periods of stability are interrupted occasionally by some process of 
transformation—a quantum leap to another configuration” (pg 305).  The multiple case 
study reflected how strategy and strategy formation processes changed between 
different points of time in all of the companies.  
Although it appears that different companies, and the same company in different times, 
endure different positions on the matrix the context and reason for their position is not 
clear.  The companies’ business environment investigation suggests it differed between 
companies and within companies along time.  De Geus (1997) claims continuous, 
fundamental changes in the external world – a turbulent business environment –require 
continuous management for change in the company.  The derived uncertainty from 
turbulence also effects in the decision making process.  Although the business 
environment is different for each company, and this may effect its position on the 
matrix, no clear relation to the link between business environment and strategy 
formation process was presented.  Chapter seven investigates this link by extending the 
Strategy Formation Matrix Model to incorporate the business environment and 
researches it using a sample of seventeen companies. 
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7 Business Environment and Strategy 
Formation 
This Chapter aims to investigate the Strategy Formation Matrix in relation to the 
business environment.  It presents the Business Environment Matrix, and investigates 
the position of the 17 researched companies in relation to the two Matrices.  The 
Chapter outlines these investigations based on companies’ projection by quadrant and 
companies’ projection by size.  The Chapter concludes by outlining the limitations and 
strengths of the research methods. 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The theoretical investigation (Chapter 5) of the Strategy Formation Matrix (Figure 7-1) 
reflected the various strategy schools and 
their projection in relation to the different 
Quadrants of the Matrix.  Chapter 6 
presented a multiple-case study of 
companies, validating the existence of 
strategy formation as a blend of emergent 
and intended strategy and its relation to 
management role in six diversified 
companies.  Furthermore the investigation 
showed companies were aware of strategy 
formation process changes over time.  
In this Chapter a further analysis will be 
conducted to investigate how the business 
environment is related to the companies’ 
perceived strategy formation process. 
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De Geus (1997) claims that continuous, fundamental changes in the external world – a 
turbulent business environment – require continuous management of change in the 
company.  Courtney et. al. (1997) states that the derived uncertainty from turbulence 
also effects, in various ways, the decision making process and strategy formation 
process.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) claims that to be able to meet unexpected and new 
situations, organisations need to be loosely coupled, self-designing systems.  Some of 
the characteristics needed for such systems include, for example continuous 
experimenting rather then searching for final solutions, valuing improvisation more then 
forecasts, inventing solutions rather then borrowing them, and encouraging doubts 
rather than removing them (Stacey, 2000). 
Many managers and analysts argue that over the last two decades the environments they 
face have become more turbulent.  As a result, there has been recognition of an 
overwhelming increase in uncertainty concerning many decision-making processes.  
Courtney et al. (1997) claim making systematically sound strategic decisions under 
uncertainty requires a different approach.  Buchner et al.’s (1998) turbulence model was 
used to extend the Strategy Formation Matrix model as a way of taking into account the 
organisation’s business environment.  In the suggested model turbulence is represented 
as the result of two main influences – complexity and dynamics, where: 
• Dynamics – is defined as the frequency of change in the factors in decisive business 
areas, the degree of radicalism these changes exhibit and the regularity of their 
occurrence. 
• Complexity – is defined as the number of external factors that have to be considered 
during the decision making process, the disparity of these factors and their 
distribution across the various business areas. 
The two dimensions are illustrated in Figure 7-2 as a matrix.  The author decided to call 
this model the Business Environment Matrix simplifying Buchner et al.’s (1998) 
turbulence portfolio model.  Four quadrants were generated within the matrix these are; 
Dynamic, Static, Complex and Turbulent.  The Dynamic quadrant represents medium to 
high dynamics and low to medium complexity.  The Static quadrant represents low to 
medium dynamics and low to medium complexity. The Complex quadrant represents 
low to medium dynamics and medium to high complexity.  The Turbulent quadrant 
represents medium to high dynamics and medium to high complexity.  Therefore, high 
dynamics or high complexity alone does not define turbulence. 
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Figure  7-2: The Business Environment Matrix (based on Buchner et al., 1998) 
Buchner and Weigand (2001) link uncertainty to the turbulence portfolio (based on 
Courtney et al.,’s (1997) definition) in the following manner:  
• Low complexity and low dynamic situations are characterised by a very low level of 
uncertainty (level 1 situation: a clear enough future). 
• High complexity and medium dynamic situations are characterised by a low level of 
uncertainty (level 2 situation: alternative futures).  
• Low complexity and high dynamic situations have a high degree of uncertainty 
(level 3: a range of futures). 
• High complexity and high dynamic situations (turbulent situations) are marked by a 
very high level of uncertainty (level 4: true ambiguity). 
Data collection began in June 2002 and ended in February 2004, consisting of multiple 
sources of data collection such as workshops, interviews, surveys, internal documents 
and external documents (such as newspapers and the Internet).  Data collection included 
an initial background survey (Appendix C), Management role Environment Networking 
(MENI) Analysis (Appendix D and E), Strategy formation process workshop analysis 
(Appendix F), context analysis workshop (Appendix G) and an industry structure 
analysis (Appendix H).  Along the course of the research several discussions were held 
with managers from the companies for clarification and sense making.  17 companies 
participated, varying from small to large in size, operating in 12 different industries, and 
based in 8 countries.  
The company projection was investigated based on the position in the Business 
Environment Matrix quadrants (Dynamic, Static, Complex and Turbulent) and based on 
size. 
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Figure  7-3: Projection of the 17 researched companies 
Figure 7-3 presents the projection of the 17 researched companies on the Strategy 
Formation Matrix (left) and the projection on the Business Environment matrix (right).  
As can be observed little can be implied without additional analysis.   
7.2 Companies Projection by Quadrant 
This section describes the researched companies’ background and their perceived 
projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix and Business Environment Matrix.  The 
companies are presented in four subsections categorised based on their position on one 
of the Business Environment quadrants (Dynamic, Static, Complex and Turbulent).  
7.2.1 Dynamic Quadrant 
Two companies from a sample of seventeen, perceived themselves to be in the Dynamic 
quadrant of the Business Environment Matrix (Figure 7-4).  The Dynamic quadrant 
characterises the business environment of the companies as being relatively high in 
dynamics and low / medium complexity.  Both of the companies, L1 and L2, are large 
and perceive their management to play a proactive role in a rather emergent strategy 
formation process, positioned in the Strategy Formation Matrix‘s Enabler Quadrant. 
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Figure  7-4: Analysis of companies operating in Dynamic quadrant 
L1 is a leading European telecommunications services provider.  Its principal activities 
include local, national and international telecommunications services, higher-value 
broadband, Internet services, and IT solutions.  L1’s environment is influenced by high 
dynamics, driven by technology and frequent changes in regulations, as well as lack of 
market clarity.  Complexity is growing in terms of number of contacts, variety of 
products and co-opetition1 relations with competitors.  L1 perceived its position, in the 
Management Role Matrix, in the Enabler quadrant (Figure 7-4).  The company strategy 
formation in the past was mainly intended, where efficiency was a main theme. 
However, in recent years the strategy formation is perceived to be more emergent, in 
order to confront the business environment in a positive way.  Enabler activities, for 
strategy emergence, are perceived to be increasing awareness and anticipation of the 
future by exploration, diversification and enhanced internal communication. 
L2 is one of the world’s leading research-based pharmaceutical and healthcare 
companies.  The company perceives its position as very dynamic due to various changes 
in demands and substantial competition in the 38 countries it operates in.  Although L2 
has a large number of products and confronts various regulations, the complexity level 
is still perceived to be low to medium.  L2’s perceived position, in the Management 
Role Matrix, is in the Enabler quadrant (Figure 7-4).  Management role in strategy 
formation is proactive in setting vision and guidelines but mainly as an Enabler.  A 
regional manager in charge of Germany and East Europe referred to the manager’s role 
as a coach and that “asking what the situation is, reflecting and helping” are important 
characteristics.  He claims that in order to operate in a dynamic environment quick 
reactions are essential and it would take top managers too long to understand the 
situation fully.  Therefore, empowering middle mangers to make their own decisions is 
essential. 
                                                 
1 Co-opetition – based on Brandenburg and Nalebuff’s (1996) theory relating to a combination of 
competition and cooperation 
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Based on the above the following observation is made (Figure 7-4): 
Observation 1: Companies perceived to be operating in the Dynamic quadrant of the 
Business Environment Matrix tend to be large and are positioned in the Enabler 
quadrant of the Strategy Formation Matrix.  They perceive themselves to have an 
emergent oriented strategy formation process with management playing a pro-active 
role. 
7.2.2 Static Quadrant  
Three companies, from a sample of seventeen, perceived themselves to be in the Static 
quadrant of the Business Environment Matrix (Figure 7-5).  The Static quadrant 
characterises the business environment of the companies as being low / medium in 
dynamics and low / medium complexity.  Interestingly all of the companies, S1, S2 and 
S3, are small and perceive themselves as having a rather emergent strategy formation 
process, positioned in the Strategy Formation Matrix‘s Enabler and Environmental 
Quadrant.  S2’s management is perceived as proactive, while S1 and S2’s are perceived 
as reactive to the strategy formation process. 
S1 is a new product introduction (NPI) service supplier, offering a variety of technology 
services to hi-tech companies (for example design of Printed Circuit Boards, 
Compliance laboratories, and Quality).  Over 80% of S1’s income is generated from 
two major customers.  S1’s business environment is perceived as static, since it acts as 
an almost single supplier to its major customers in essential parts of new product 
development.  Although there are some business fluctuations, derived from the 
customer’s turbulent environment, most of them have a year’s delay and therefore are 
relatively easy to foresee.  Complexity is derived from the expertise needed in several 
standards and in a number of different services offered but is still regarded as relativity 
low.  S1’s perceived position in the Strategy Formation Matrix is in the Environmental 
quadrant (Figure 7-5).  Management role is perceived as reactive to its main customers 
evolving needs.  The strategy formation process is relatively more emergent than 
intended.  This characteristic is caused by the organisations rather flat hierarchy of 
experts, in different fields, self-organising to meet the changing customer needs. 
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Figure  7-5: Analysis of companies operating in Static quadrant 
S2 is a very small consulting firm specialising in a specific niche of psycho-strategic 
consulting for individuals, teams and organisations.  S2 benefits from long-term 
relationships with its customers and operates in a rather stable business environment. 
However, S2 is engaged in various professional and business relationships with 
universities, consulting enterprises and some partnerships at the national and 
international level, which results in a medium level of complexity, due to the structure 
and number of these interfaces.  S2’s perceived position in the Strategy Formation 
Matrix is in the Enabler quadrant (Figure 7-5).  S2 tries to maintain its competence by 
investing in research and retaining its flexible and innovative characteristic.  Close 
relationships with customers enhance the emergence of services and tools when 
confronted with new or changing needs.  Management is perceived as proactive by 
trying to create long-term competitive advantage and by being selective in customer 
requests, which are away from the main line of business. 
S3 is a small high precision parts manufacturer (analysed in the multiple-case study 
section 6.6).  S3 is a family oriented developer and manufacturer of punching and 
bending parts.  S3’s substantial portion of sales has been based on serving, for over 
twenty years, a big automotive first-tier supplier.  Although S2 is an extremely small 
player in a worldwide market, the business environment can be categorised as Static 
since it is dominated by a long-term relationship, serving as a barrier for possible new 
entrants.  S3’s perceived position in the Strategy Formation Matrix is in the 
Environmental quadrant (Figure 7-5).  S3 business evolution is closely correlated to its 
major customer, explaining the nature of its re-active and emergent strategy formation 
process.  
Based on the above the following observation is made (Figure 7-5): 
• Observation 2: Companies perceived to be operating in the Static quadrant of the 
Business Environment Matrix tend to be small and endure an emergent strategy 
formation process (upper half of the Strategy Formation Matrix). 
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7.2.3 Complex Quadrant 
Four companies, from a sample of seventeen, perceived themselves to be in the 
Complex quadrant of the Business Environment Matrix (Figure 7-6).  The Complex 
quadrant characterises the business environment of the companies as enduring relative 
high complexity and low / medium dynamics.  The four companies range in size 
consisting of one large sized company (L3), one medium sized company (M1) and two 
small companies (S4 and S5).  All of the companies perceive themselves as having 
proactive management in an intended strategy formation process, positioned in the 
Strategy Formation Matrix‘s Navigator quadrant.  Three of the companies positioned in 
the Complex quadrant are technology oriented (S5, L3 and S4). 
S5 is a biotechnology company specialising in niche micro fluidic controllers (analysed 
in the multiple-case study section 6.7).  Since marketing is via partnering with large 
customers and suppliers to the pharmaceutical industry, the dynamics is low; however 
complexity regarding technology, regulation and specific needs is high.  S3’s perceived 
position in the Strategy Formation Matrix is in the Navigator quadrant (Figure 7-6).  
S5’s main concern is how to move from engineering to manufacturing in an efficient 
way (previously manufacturing was outsourced).  This requires an intended plan and 
implementation.  Some of the management activities include setting up production and 
quality systems, maintaining and reinforcing partnerships, building new partnerships 
and customizing products.  Enabler activities include acquiring new ideas by 
participating in various conferences as well as encouraging Research and Development 
ideas and innovations. 
 
Figure  7-6: Analysis of companies operating in the Complex quadrant 
L3 is a state Aerospace Research Centre assigned by the Government to define and 
pursue the National Aerospace Research Program, which collects the needs expressed 
by the industrial and research arena.  This involves taking into account the perspectives 
in the field of aviations and space on a world-wide scale.  Due to the long-term 
characteristics, funding system and stakeholders’ involvement, the environment is 
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mainly complex and less dynamic.  L3’s perceived position in the Strategy Formation 
Matrix is in the Navigator quadrant (Figure 7-6).  Management is described as pro-
active in terms of scientific and organisational contributions; however it is not 
completely independent, due to various government and public stakeholders.  Strategy 
is derived mainly from long-term plans. 
S4 is a regional competence and innovation centre for fuel-cell technology that aims at 
maintaining the region’s existing advantage in this technology by combining and 
networking knowledge of development and application from different sources (vehicle 
construction, energy production and consumer electronics).  The environment is mainly 
complex due to the different consumer niche, the need of technology integration, 
legislation and patents.  S3’s perceived position on the Strategy Formation Matrix is in 
the Navigator quadrant (Figure 7-6).  S4’s strategy is to assist in co-ordination and 
promotion of market penetration for disruptive innovation technology.  The scope of 
strategy planning is several years in advance, therefore the strategy formation process is 
pro active and intended.  
A non-technology example is, M1, a middle sized insurance and financial company 
specialising in a unique niche.  M1 was formed as a mainly specific professional 
association.  The complex environment is due to culture and geography (obliged to 
support different regions with three national languages) and complexity of social 
insurance system due to heavy regulation.  Various legislation activities could increase 
the dynamics of the market.  M1’s perceived position in the Strategy Formation Matrix 
is in the Navigator quadrant (Figure 7-6).  Management role is perceived as proactive in 
implementing a focused strategy of quality and efficiency improvements as well as a 
gradual increase in the portfolio of offered services. 
Based on the above the following observation is made (Figure 7-6): 
• Observation 3: Companies perceived to be operating in the Complex quadrant of 
the Business Environment Matrix are positioned in the Navigator quadrant of the 
Strategy Formation Matrix and are primarily highly specialised companies.  They 
are perceived to have a pro-active management role in an intended strategy 
formation process. 
7.2.4 Turbulent Quadrant 
Eight companies from a sample of seventeen, perceived their business environment as 
turbulent (Figure 7-7).  The Turbulent quadrant characterises the business environment 
of the companies as enduring relative high complexity as well as high dynamics.  The 
eight companies range in size consisting of four large sized companies (L4, L5, L6 and 
L7), two medium sized companies (M3 and M2) and two small companies (S6 and S7). 
The four large companies (L4, L5, L6 and L7) are positioned in the Navigator quadrant 
of the strategy Formation Matrix.  Their management is believed to be proactive in an 
intended oriented strategy formation process.  The medium size companies (M3 and 
M2) incorporate a blend of emergent and intended strategy formation process.  M2’s 
management role is rather proactive while M3’s management incorporates a blend of 
proactive and intended roles in the strategy formation process.  The two small 
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companies (S6 and S7) are both perceived to be positioned in the Environmental 
quadrant of the strategy formation process, where management is reactive in an 
emergent strategy formation process.  It can be observed that the companies are 
positioned by size (small, medium, large) in a diagonal way from the upper right of the 
Strategy Formation Matrix to the bottom left.  In general, the larger the company size 
the greater the tendency is to have a more proactive management role with a more 
intended strategy formation process. 
 
Figure  7-7: Analysis of companies operating in Turbulent quadrant 
Four of the companies positioned in the turbulence quadrant are large (L4, L5, L6 and 
L7).  L4 is one of the world’s largest manufactures of site dumper trucks, forklift and 
concrete trucks.  Its market includes over 60 countries with subsidiary companies in 
Europe, China and USA.  The company’s strategy led it from an expensive car industry, 
over four decades ago, to specialise in a niche of small dumpers trucks.  Analysis of the 
company reveals a business environment with low dynamics and high complexity. 
While the high complexity can be explained by the unique needs of various segments, 
the lower dynamics is explained due to two balancing economic cycles.  The company 
has observed, over the years, that every time the home construction market decreases, 
the civil construction market starts to increase.  The company perceives future socio-
demographic effects on market dynamic, which will result in increased turbulence.  L4’s 
perceived position on the Strategy Formation Matrix is in the Navigator quadrant 
(Figure 7-7).  The company’s management is increasing its proactive role in strategy 
formation in a blend of intended process (for example forecasting, external experts, 
clients needs) and emergent process (for example cross functional teams, reduced 
centralised family owned culture and rules, scanning new business areas).  Anticipation 
for change is regarded as a fundamental company success factor for robustness, as one 
manager stated: “every person, from the directors to the ordinary workers, focus very 
strongly on being constantly prepared for anything that may happen”.  
L5 is a multinational leader in the conception and manufacture of interior automotive 
components and modular systems (analysed in the multiple-case study section 6.2).  
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L5’s business environment is complex due to the introduction of new technology 
demanding specialisation in various materials as well as electronics.  Complexity is also 
owed to a large diversity of products, customisation, and high safety regulations.  L5’s 
perceived position in the Strategy Formation Matrix is in the Navigator quadrant (Figure 
7-7).  L5 has a balanced blend between intended and emergent strategy process.  The 
company has witnessed extensive growth in the previous years and is focused on the 
one hand on introducing quality and efficiency improvements, while increasing 
innovation on the other.  The company’s management is using the Balance Scorecard 
method as a means of strategy implementation. 
L6 is a telecom vendor that provides advanced telecommunications solutions to leading 
carriers and service providers, worldwide.  L6 is also referred to as HiCo in the action 
research (Chapter four) where further information is offered.  The company’s business 
environment was perceived as turbulent due to frequent fluctuations in market demand, 
entry of new competitors as well as the exit of others.  The technological roadmap of the 
market was also unclear concerning direction and pace of change.  L6’s perceived 
position in the Strategy Formation Matrix was in the Navigator quadrant (Figure 7-7). 
L6 witnessed a high turbulence era, which resulted in a decline in sales, decrease in 
profit margins, resulting in major cash flow problems.  To survive as a business, 
management had to take harsh intended measures (for example closing activities, 
focusing on its core business and generally cutting costs).  However, since some 
reduction in turbulence is forecasted for the near future (for the market in general and 
L6 in particular), the CEO plans to increase emergent strategy in order to leverage new 
opportunities needed for its long-term sustainability.  
L7 is a global financial services company operating mainly in Europe and the U.S.A 
(analysed in the multiple-case study section 6.3).  The company witnessed several years 
of fast growth in the past but recently encountered turbulence and cash flow problems, 
generated from increased dynamics.  The complexity of the environment is due to the 
portfolio of products and the unique local regulation and legislation concerning 
insurance pensions, savings etc.  L7 has implemented a pro-active emergent strategy in 
the previous half decade (for example large investments in Knowledge Management, 
self organisation and innovation).  However, due to the financial problems the company 
has encountered, the company intends to retain a high pro-active management role 
while also transforming it to be more intended (central control, focus on core activities, 
and a closure of unprofitable activities). 
Two of the companies positioned in the Turbulent quadrant are medium sized (M2 and 
M3).  M2 is a consulting firm operating in several European countries offering new 
product development advice from the concept definition phase to cost optimisations 
(analysed in the multiple-case study section 6.4).  The firm is exposed to business 
cycles, technology changes, and frequent shifts of workload between customers, which 
causes high dynamics.  Complexity is structured in the diversity of skills and knowledge 
needed to support customers from all types of industries.  M2’s perceived position in the 
Strategy Formation Matrix is between the Navigator quadrant and the Enabler quadrant 
(Figure 7-7).  Until now the firm has been faster in operating and acting in advance of 
the competitors in identifying customer’s future needs, as seen in its proactive position 
in the Strategy Formation Matrix.  However, due to growing competition, management 
would like to increase its proactive role in the future and search for new business 
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models.  The strategy formation process is both intended (i.e. concrete financial goals 
and milestones per project) and emergent (enabling creativity and new business ideas 
generation). 
M3 is a global software vendor deploying a market strategy based on alliances with 
consultants and system integrators (analysed in the multiple-case study section 6.5).  
The business environment M3 is operating in includes various dynamic drivers such as 
currency fluctuations, new market entrants, local regulation changes and customer 
crises.  M3’s complexity is caused by the need to customise several features for local 
needs, based on regulations and legislation on one hand, while building an 
interoperability architecture and interface for various Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) programmes on the other.  M3’s perceived position in the Strategy Formation 
Matrix is between the Navigator quadrant and the Enabler quadrant (Figure 7-7).  M3’s 
management role is balanced between reactive and proactive, due to its dependent 
nature on market and customer demand on one side (mainly in Europe), and trying to 
generate innovative features and penetrate new markets (U.S.A and Far-East) on the 
other.  Strategy formation is intended as it defines concrete financial, customers, 
internal business process, and learning and growth goals (based on the Balanced 
Scorecard method).  Emergent strategy is perceived in scanning for new business 
opportunities and networking through research projects, allowing a degree of trail and 
error in innovation development and bottom up emergence of ideas. 
Two of the companies positioned in the Turbulent quadrant are small (S6 and S7).  S7 is 
a service and marketing company for a European state local association of technology 
centres, supporting business incubators and responsible for a network of 65 technology 
centres.  S7’s functions include active and systematic networking, fostering innovation 
and a variety of services  Due to its unique status it has no direct competitors, however 
it is strongly affected by the various government and other public and private 
stakeholders.  Revenues and regular cash flow has made the business environment 
dynamic as the company depends on the fluctuating trends of the government budgeting 
system.  S7’s perceived position on the Strategy Formation Matrix is in the 
Environmental quadrant (Figure 7-7).  Although the company was set to pursue several 
intended goals, in reality it is positioned in the Environmental strategy formation 
quadrant due to its reactive and emergent nature of serving its various stakeholders and 
customers in the short term.  
S6 is as a service oriented company serving as a joint platform for software 
development and related activities containing twenty-five members.  The twenty-five 
Software companies’ various market needs result in high complexity and the instability 
of the worldwide market in technology and the Software field results in high dynamics.  
S7’s perceived position in the Strategy Formation Matrix is in the Environmental 
quadrant (Figure 7-7).  The company is reactive to its emerging customers needs and 
constantly adjusts itself to change accordingly. 
Based on the above the following observation is made (Figure 7-7): 
• Observation 4: Companies perceived to be operating in the Turbulence quadrant of 
the Business Environment Matrix vary in the strategy formation process based on 
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their size.  In general, the larger the company size, the greater the tendency to have a 
more proactive management role with a more intended strategy formation process. 
7.3 Companies Projection by Size  
The researched sample consists of seventeen companies categorised by size, based on 
number of employees.  Small size companies were defined as employing less then fifty 
employees, medium size as employing more then fifty and less then two hundred and 
fifty employees, while large companies employ more then two hundred and fifty 
employees.  Seven of the companies are small, three of the companies are medium size 
and seven of the companies are large. 
This section describes the seventeen companies’ projection, by size, on the Business 
Environment Matrix and on the Strategy Formation Matrix.  Due to the relative small 
number of medium sized companies and their similar characteristic to small companies 
the two have been grouped and therefore two categories are used in this section, large 
companies and SMEs (small medium enterprises). 
7.3.1 Projection of Large Companies 
Figure 7-8 presents the perceived position of seven large size companies (L1 to L7) on 
the Business Environment Matrix.  As can be seen all large companies except one are 
operating in the upper half of the matrix.  L3, the only company operating in a perceived 
Complex environment is a state Aerospace Research Centre assigned by the 
Government to define and pursue the National Aerospace Research Program, which 
collects the needs expressed by the industrial and research arena, taking into account the 
perspectives in the field of aviation and space on a world-wide scale.  L3 is mainly 
owned by government agencies, and is the smallest of the large companies in this 
research sample.  The remainder of the large companies are publicly or privately owned.   
 
Figure  7-8: Large companies perceived projection on Business Environment Matrix 
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Figure 7-9 presents the perceived position of seven large size companies (L1 to L7) on 
the Strategy Formation Matrix.  Four of the large companies are positioned in the 
Navigator quadrant, two in the Enabler quadrant and one in between the Navigator and 
the Enabler quadrants of the Strategy Formation Matrix.  No large company is 
positioned on the Collective or Environmental quadrants of the Strategy Formation 
Matrix.  
Observing the large companies pattern on the Strategy Formation Matrix (Figure 7-9) a 
linear diagonal pattern seems to exist.  This implies a relation where an increase in 
management proactive role is identified in general with a more emergent strategy 
formation process (or vice-versa). 
 
Figure  7-9: Large companies perceived projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix 
Based on the above, the following observation for large companies is made (Figures 7-
8, 7-9): 
• Observation 5: Large companies tend to be positioned in the upper half of the 
Business Environment Matrix. Hence, operate in a relatively high dynamic business 
environment. 
• Observation 6: In large companies, the management role in the strategy formation 
process is perceived as proactive. 
• Observation 7: In large companies, increase in management proactive role is 
identified in general with a more emergent strategy formation (or vice-versa). 
7.3.2 Projection of SMEs 
Figure 7-10 plots the perceived position of ten small and medium size companies 
(SMEs) on the Business Environment Matrix.  None of the companies are positioned in 
the Dynamic quadrant.  Three of the companies are positioned in the Static quadrant, 
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three in the Complex quadrant and four in the Turbulent quadrant of the Business 
Environment Matrix.  An interesting observation is that except for two of the companies 
from the eleven SMEs, all are position on the diagonal bottom half of the Business 
Environment matrix, hence the complexity of the business environments for each of 
those companies tends to be perceived as relatively higher than its dynamics. 
 
Figure  7-10: SMEs perceived projection on the Business Environment Matrix 
Figure 7-11 plots the perceived position of the small and medium size companies 
(SMEs) on the Strategy Formation Matrix.  Four SMEs perceive themselves to be in the 
Environmental quadrant, three SMEs in the Navigator quadrant, two SMEs in between 
the Navigator quadrant and the Enabler and one SME perceived itself to be in the 
Enabler quadrant.  None of the SMEs projected themselves on to the Collective 
quadrant of the Strategy Formation Matrix.  
From observing the pattern of the SMEs projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix, a 
general pattern seems to exist from the scattered projections.  As the management role 
grows more proactive, the more intended the strategy formation becomes or vice-versa. 
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Figure  7-11: SMEs perceived projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix 
Based on the above the following observation for SMEs is made (Figures 7-10 and7-
11): 
• Observation 8: SMEs tend to be positioned in the bottom half diagonal of the 
Business Environment Matrix.  Hence the complexity of the business environments 
of each company tends to be perceived as relatively higher than its dynamics. 
• Observation 9: In SMEs the opposite pattern to the large companies seems to exist; 
as management role grows proactive the strategy formation process becomes more 
intended. 
7.4 Research Limitations 
The researched projections included data collection from seventeen companies, 
diversified by size, industry and geographical location.  The sample of companies is still 
relatively small to conduct a statistical analysis.  However, qualitative description and 
tentative relationships have been described. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the projection on the model consisting of the Business 
Environment Matrix and Strategy Formation Matrix is based on the perception of one or 
two managers from each company.  This perception is based on individuals’ 
assumptions, expectations, knowledge and information about the world of other people 
and relationships with them, as well as about the non-social world in which the 
individual lives and acts (Stacey, 2001).  However, as mentioned, in some cases the 
projection is based on a consensus position between more then one manager.  In all 
cases, the triangulation with other sources of data is conducted and examples are asked. 
Several sources that did not meet this request were not included in the research findings. 
The perceptions of the companies were positioned in a qualitative manner.  Managers 
positioned their company’s projection directly on both Matrices.  An alternative 
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approach would have been to define parameters for each dimension, quantify output and 
generate the projection mathematically.  However the advantage of direct projection on 
the Matrix is that you do not risk choosing wrong parameters or using wrong weights. 
The direct positioning allows further investigation with the interviewed manager and 
helps to deepen the understanding in real time, where needed. 
The accumulated information on the seventeen companies was based on different data 
collection methods and tools.  Some of the perceived projected positions were collected 
by interview, while others through workshops. 
One of the research weaknesses is that data collection and companies perceived 
projections were collected in a period of about two years.  As a result, different times 
are represented in different positions.  However, as observed in the previous Chapter, 
companies change positions over time in the Strategy Formation Matrix.  If the strategy 
formation is related or even derived partially from the business environment, as 
observation testifies, then each position on both Matrices is context specific.  
Conducting the sample at the same period is therefore not a substantial limitation. 
7.5 Summary 
In this chapter the relationships between business environment, strategy formation 
process and management role were investigated based on a sample of seventeen 
diversified companies.  Two matrices were used.  The Business Environment Matrix 
represents dynamics and complexity (based on Buchner et. al., 1998) of the business 
environment.  The strategy formation process and the management role within the 
process were represented using the Strategy Formation Matrix (generated and validated 
in Chapters 5 and 6).  The results were investigated based on the position in the 
Business Environment Matrix quadrants (Dynamic, Static, Complex and Turbulent) and 
based on size. 
As noticed in the multiple-case study and in the action research, managers perceive 
companies as incorporating a blend of emergent and intended strategy formation 
processes.  The definitions and the model were clearly understood by managers, as 
claimed by them and as evident in the examples and descriptions given in the 
interviews, workshops, surveys and other data collection sources.  The logic of the two 
dimensions of the Business Environment, dynamics and complexity, are well 
understood by managers. 
Figure 7-12 presents the researched companies’ perceived projection on the Business 
Environment Matrix and Strategy Formation Matrix, classified by type of turbulence, 
presented next to each other (starting from Dynamic quadrant, Static quadrant, Complex 
and Turbulent quadrant). The following observations were made in this Chapter: 
• Observation 1: Companies perceived to be operating in the Dynamic quadrant of 
the Business Environment Matrix tend to be large and are positioned in the Enabler 
quadrant of the Strategy Formation Matrix.  They perceive themselves to have an 
emergent oriented strategy formation process with management playing a pro-active 
role (Figure 7-12 and Section 7.2.1). 
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• Observation 2: Companies perceived to be operating in the Static quadrant of the 
Business Environment Matrix tend to be small and endure an emergent strategy 
formation process (upper half of the Strategy Formation Matrix) (Figure 7-12, and 
section 7.2.2). 
• Observation 3: Companies perceived to be operating in Complex quadrant of the 
Business Environment Matrix are positioned in the Navigator quadrant of the 
Strategy Formation Matrix and are primarily highly specialised companies.  They 
are perceived to have a pro-active management role in an intended strategy 
formation process (Figure 7-12 and Section 7.2.3). 
• Observation 4: Companies perceived to be operating in the Turbulent quadrant of 
the Business Environment Matrix vary in the strategy formation process based on 
their size.  In general, the larger the company size the greater the tendency to have a 
more proactive management role with a more intended oriented strategy formation 
process (Figure 6-12 and Section 7.2.4). 
Observation based on company’s size: 
• Observation 5: Large companies tend to be positioned in the upper half of the 
Business Environment Matrix. Hence, operate in a relative high dynamic business 
environment (Figure 7-8). 
• Observation 6: In large companies management role, in the strategy formation 
process, is perceived as proactive (Figure 7-9). 
• Observation 7: In large companies, increase in management proactive role is 
identified in general with a more emergent strategy formation (or vice-versa) 
(Figure 7-9). 
• Observation 8: SMEs tend to be positioned in the bottom half diagonal of the 
Business Environment Matrix.  Hence the complexity of the business environments 
of each company tends to be perceived as relatively higher then its dynamics (Figure 
7-10). 
• Observation 9: In SMEs the opposite pattern to the large companies seems to exist; 
as management role grows proactive the strategy formation process becomes more 
intended (Figure 7-11). 
An additional observation can be made: 
Observation 10: None of the companies projected themselves on the Strategy 
Formation Matrix Collective quadrant (Figure 7-12). 
Chapters 4, 6 and 7 have presented findings from diverse companies using multiple 
research methods.  Chapter 8 will discuss these findings and review the theoretical and 
practical implications. 
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Figure  7-12: Overview of researched company’s projection on the Business Environment Matrix 
and the Strategy Formation Matrix 
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8 Discussion 
The aim of this Chapter is to provide the reader with the findings of the Model 
Development and Validation phases which are discussed and expanded upon.  Useful 
insights on substantive literatures and current thinking within the field of strategy 
management are used to enhance this discussion 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Strategy Formation Process Representation 
Mintzberg (1987) was one of the first to point out that that the realized strategy of an 
organisation can strongly differ from the intended strategy.  The extent to which an 
intended strategy can be realized is closely related to the strategic processes that exist 
within the organisation (Feurer and Chaharbaghi, 1995).  Figure 8-1 presents the 
commonly used representation of the strategy formation process.  The plan is labelled as 
intended and the pattern as realized strategy, distinguishing deliberate strategies, where 
intentions that existed previously were realised, from emergent strategies, where 
patterns developed in the absence of intentions, or despite them. 
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Figure  8-1: Model of intended and emergent strategy formation process (Mintzberg, 1987) 
The findings from this research suggest that although this representation includes 
emergent strategy, a few aspects are lacking, and the model needs refinement, to more 
accurately portray what happens in the strategy formation processes of companies. 
8.1.1 Intended Strategy 
The multiple case study (Chapter 6) conducted on a sample of six diversified companies 
shows that all managers perceive that they are executing some level of intended 
strategy.  Examples include formulating a business plan, searching for synergy, making 
strategic investments, building partnerships, customising products, setting goals and 
objectives and launching quality and efficiency initiatives, such as six sigma.  Even S3, 
a high precision parts manufacturer (section 6.6), that was projected on the Strategy 
Formation Matrix in the Environmental quadrant as having a highly emergent strategy, 
where the management role is mainly reactive to one of its big customers, reported 
significant intended strategy realisation, such as strengthening its competence image, 
making strategic investments and networking with suppliers. 
However, from the action research conducted in HiCo (Chapter 4), it can be seen that 
the formulation of intended strategy is not a totally rational process.  Stakeholders 
influence the process for example, members of the Board of Directors are keen to 
pursue specific initiatives, managers align business activities to job promotion, also 
there exists personal rivalries, professional interests, and unit managers interfering in 
favour of their unit’s interests.  Networking and partnering are also composed of 
intended and emergent characteristics.  As one manager of L1, a leading 
telecommunications services provider admitted: “we might decide there is an area we 
would like to explore…so there’s a bit of planning going on but there’s also some 
emergence as well [for example suddenly being approached by another company]…Do 
you plan friendships?.. There has to be some degree of trust.” 
Intended strategy formation incorporates emergent influences 
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8.1.2 Enabling Emergent Strategy 
Johnson and Scholes (1988) regard emergent strategies as strategies that come about 
without the explicit intention of managers but which result from the flow of more 
operational, day to day decisions.  Several examples of emergent cases were presented 
in the HiCo action research study (Chapter 4) and the multiple case study (Chapter 6). 
A major debate exists within the literature as to whether management can set enabling 
preconditions to enhance and support even partially bottom up, emergent strategy. 
Mitleton-Kelly (2003) argues that when enabling conditions permit an organisation to 
explore its space of possibilities; the organisation can take risks and try new ideas. 
Several authors suggest a defined set of preconditions (for example Wood, 1999; 
Hamel, 2001 and Olson and Eoyang, 2001).  In the Strategy Formation Matrix (Figure 
5-1), the Enabler quadrant is characterised by emergent strategy formation with 
management playing a proactive role.  Several strategy schools such as the Learning 
school and Complexity logic (Chapter 5) and companies such as L1, L2 and S2 
(Chapter 6 and 7) are projected in the Enabler quadrant.  
Although no data in the research is presented relating to cause and effect or efficiency 
of management role as enabler, a wide variety of examples suggest that such activities 
indeed take place.  The HiCo action research (Chapter 4), the multiple case study 
(Chapter 6) and the additional company investigations (Chapter 7) present examples of 
various enabling activities such as: employee empowerment, encouraging new voices, 
diversification, supporting trial and error and risk taking initiatives, conducting various 
workshops to enhance bottom up ideas such as “open space” and brainstorming with 
clients.  Furthermore, the HiCo action research (section 4.4.4) presents a large scale 
cross company strategy formation process where management consciously blended 
intended and emergent strategy. 
Enabling emergent strategy is defined as a stream of action aiming to set preconditions 
for emergence.  In Mintzberg’s (1987) representation, an enabling strategy is not 
presented. Since literature in the last decade has strongly occupied itself with the 
precondition for emergence, as well as the research data supporting the existence of 
such a strategy, the representation of the strategy formation process should be revised to 
incorporate the enabling of emergent strategy. 
Enabling emergent strategy is defined (by the author) as a stream of action aimed at 
setting and supporting preconditions for emergence 
8.1.3 Business Environment 
The investigation of all the seventeen researched companies revealed links between the 
business environment of the organisation and the characteristics of the strategy 
formation process.  In HiCo (Chapter 4) for example, some of the effects of the business 
environment included that the pace of change frequently outdates strategy plans, there 
are periods of low forecasting ability, unpredictable global events impact strategy and 
even the duration of the phrase “long term” changed over time and context.  The 
researched companies’ projection on the developed Strategy Formation Matrix and 
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Business Environment Matrix (Chapter 7) clearly showed patterns and links between 
the two.  For example, companies perceived to be operating in the complex business 
environment experienced an intended strategy formation process (Figure 7-12 and 
Section 7.2.3). 
The organisation’s strategy formation process is influenced by the business 
environment 
8.1.4 Refined Representation of the Strategy Formation Process 
By integrating these discussion points and research insights concerning the 
representation of the strategy formation process, a refined model is presented in Figure 
8-2.  Similar to Mintzberg’s (1987) strategy formation process, it includes realized 
strategy consisting of inputs from both intended and emergent strategies.  Some of the 
emergent as well as intended strategy is unrealised.  However two additional aspects 
distinguish the new representation from Mintzberg.  
 
Figure  8-2: Refined representation of the strategy formation process 
Enabling emergent strategy is added to represent a driving force and infrastructure for 
management activities and behaviours that help encourage emergent strategy.  This by 
no means implies it to be the only force or the major one.  As the business environment 
has also been shown to affect the strategy formation process (Chapter 6 and 7), it is also 
added to the model.  The author has removed terms that were in the original model for 
simplification.  Unrealized strategy has been omitted from this revised model as it was 
felt that this was an inherent part of the strategy formation process and did not need to 
be emphasised in this model.  The author also chose to omit deliberate strategy from this 
model as deliberate strategy is intended strategy that had been realized and therefore 
there is little need to include this in the model.   
Mitleton-Kelly (2003) argues: “Complex systems are not ‘designed’ in great detail. 
They are made up of interacting agents, whose interactions create emergent properties, 
qualities, and patterns of behaviour.  It is the actions of individual agents and immense 
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variety of those actions that constantly influence and create emergent macro patterns or 
structures” (pg 46-47).  This argument is supported by the research finding of 
stakeholders’ influence.  The refined representation of the strategy formation process is 
in some sense messier than reflected in Mintzberg’s (1987) model. The intended and 
enabling strategy in Figure 8-2 is open to emergent influence that is scattered all over 
the strategy formation process and does not just emerge from bottom up, as originally 
implied in Mintzberg’s (1987) model. 
8.2 The Strategy Formation Process in Different Types of 
Organisations 
The strategy formation process differs between different types of organisation.  The 
structured analysis based on the Strategy Formation Matrix, the Business Environment 
Matrix and the complementing data collection, casts new light on the schools of 
thought, management role and relationship between business environment and the 
strategy formation process. 
8.2.1 Schools of Thought 
Chapter 5 introduced and theoretically investigated the Strategy Formation Matrix and 
various strategic management schools segmentation (Mintzberg et al., 1998; Stacey, 
2000 and Lengnick-Hall and Wolff ,1999) and projection.  Figure 8-3 presents a 
summary of the schools’ projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix (Chapter 5) and 
Figure 8-4 presents the researched companies’ projection (Chapter 7).  Mintzberg and 
Lampel (2001) point to a range of variants that cut across the schools and blend them 
together.  Common characteristics can be found between researched companies’ 
strategy formation and these schools of thoughts. 
 
Figure  8-3: Schools’ projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix 
For example, two large companies and one small company perceived their position in 
the Enabler quadrant of the Strategy Formation Matrix (Figure 8-4).  L1 is a leading 
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European telecommunications services provider while L2 is one of the world’s leading 
research-based pharmaceutical and healthcare companies.  The Learning school 
(Mintzberg et. al., 1998 and Stacey, 2000) and Complexity - Objective Observer 
(Stacey, 2000 and Lengnick-Hall and Wolff, 1999) are examples of schools positioned 
in the Enabler quadrant (section 5.7) and resemble some of L1’s and L2’s strategy 
formation characteristics, such as increasing awareness and anticipation of the future by 
exploration, diversification, enhanced internal communication and middle management 
empowerment.  S2 is a very small consulting firm specialising in a specific niche of 
psycho-strategic consulting for individuals, teams and organisations.  The company’s 
two partners are dominant and also serve as the main resource.  The strategy formation 
somewhat resembles Stacey’s (2000) complex responsive process (Section 5.7) where 
intention emerges in ordinary conversation between people and managers cannot think 
of themselves in terms of organisational designers but rather as active participants in a 
complex process. 
In the Environmental quadrant of the Strategy Formation Matrix only small companies 
operate (Figure 8-4).  The characteristics of the researched companies resemble 
Mintzberg et. al’s. (1998) Environmental school and Stacey’s (2000) Open System 
school because of their reactive nature to changes in the environment, usually 
originating from their main customers.  
As can be seen in Figure 8-4, companies of various sizes operate in the Navigator 
quadrant of the Strategy Formation Matrix.  The SMEs for example, include S5 which is 
a biotechnology company specialising in niche micro fluidic controllers, S4 which is a 
regional competence and innovation centre for fuel-cell technology and M1 which is an 
insurance and financial company specialising in a unique niche.  The complex business 
of all of the companies demand them to acquire knowledge and expertise through long 
term intended investments.  Some of the schools related to the Navigator quadrant such 
as Mintzberg et. al’s. (1998) Planning school and Stacey’s (2000) Strategic Choice 
theory resembles, to some extent, the companies’ strategy formation process that is 
rather controlled, conscious and formal. 
 
Figure  8-4: Researched companies projection on the Strategy Formation Matrix  
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No companies from the seventeen-researched sample perceived their position in the 
Collective quadrant of the Strategy Formation Matrix.  The Cultural school is the only 
school projected in this quadrant.  In the Cultural School, strategy formation is 
described as a collective process.   Mintzberg et. al. (1998) describe the Cultural school 
as concerning itself largely with the influence of culture in maintaining strategic 
stability, sometimes in actively resisting strategic change.  Culture was discovered in 
management in the 1980s, largely due to the success of Japanese corporations and 
probably relates mainly to Far East organisations.  Since the research was conducted in 
European companies it is not surprising that no companies related to this strategy 
formation characteristic. 
Several scholars pursue the idea that during an organisational life-cycle, management 
should endure different best-fit strategies at different times.  Mintzberg et al.’s (1998) 
Configuration school encompasses those of the other schools, but each in a well-defined 
context.  They state that “Most of the time, an organization can be described in terms of 
some kind of stable configuration of its characteristics… for a distinguishable period of 
time, it adopts a particular form of structure matched to a particular type of context 
which causes it to engage in particular behaviours that give rise to a particular set of 
strategies…These periods of stability are interrupted occasionally by some process of 
transformation—a quantum leap to another configuration” (pg 305).  This statement is 
aligned with the multiple case study (Chapter 6), where all companies experienced 
different strategy formation types and management roles at different times.  Following 
the analysis in Chapter 7 it can be seen that these changes are linked to some degree to 
changes in the business environment. 
8.2.2 Management Role 
It has been seen that management role in strategy formation differs by company size.  
Whilst management role in SMEs varied between blends of proactive and reactive 
involvement, the large companies’ management role in the strategy formation process 
was perceived, in all cases, as proactive. (observation 6, section 7.3.1).  This 
observation is not surprising since the managers of large companies are less involved in 
the every day business life that could be regarded as reactive.  The corporate level 
strategy involves deciding what business to be in and determining how to segment 
environments and the organisation such that different parts of the organisation can 
address opportunities with maximum overall results (Hatch, 1997).  The strategy 
formation process at HiCo (Chapter 4), for example included, aspects such as Synergy 
and Mergers and Acquisitions that are less substantial in SMEs’ strategy. 
A rather interesting observation relates to the link between management’s proactive role 
and the perceived strategy formation type.  While in SMEs, the general tendency is to 
relate an increased proactive role to a more intended strategy formation process 
(Observation 9, section 7.3.2), in large companies, an increase in management’s 
proactive role is linked to a more emergent strategy (Observation 6, section 7.3.1).  
M2’s managers, for example, experienced a blend of emergent and intended strategy in 
2002, positioned between the Enabler and Navigator quadrant of the Strategy Formation 
Matrix (Figure 8-5).  The company at the time was reactive to its customer’s needs and 
proactive in leveraging emerging opportunities.  In 2003, management, usually 
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occupied by professional aspects on the one hand and fire fighting on the other, decided 
to take more control and become proactive.  Management increased its proactive role in 
setting strategy for improving profit and to penetrate large customer segments.  New 
intended activities were structured, such as improved definitions of services, setting 
sales targets, defining policies and procedures, new compensation plans and a clearer 
definition of responsibilities. 
 
Figure  8-5: SME example of changes in management role 
As mentioned, in the large companies, a more proactive management role is linked to 
greater emergent strategy.  Supporting evidence can be found in L7, a global financial 
company.  L7’s perceived positioned on the Strategy Formation Matrix in 1999 was in 
the Enabler quadrant (Figure 8-6).  The company at that time was well positioned in the 
global market, and showed Enabler characteristics as claimed by its management “L7 
accomplished this feat by developing and implementing new organisational and 
technological structures to maximise the sharing of knowledge among its local business 
units and its partners …with the success of its virtual business model, L7 realised that 
the sum of its networked operations were more valuable than the individual parts.  [L7 
developed] a management model, to provide a more balanced, truer picture of 
operations – a balance between the past, the present and the future”. However, in 2003, 
the perceived position reflects a dramatic shift to the Navigator quadrant.  This position 
is aligned with challenges and constraints identified such as “financial and share 
pressure placing emphasis on short-term issues” and “management turbulence 
distracting the company from identifying and addressing global problems”.  The 
management role became substantially more reactive than before in the strategy 
formation process (Figure 8-6) focusing on intended activities such as enhanced 
corporate governance and tighter business control. 
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Figure  8-6: Large company example of changes in management role 
8.2.3 Strategy Formation and Business Environment 
A recent advance in technology, coupled with a global political climate that is 
favourable to free markets has caused some industries to be more turbulent 
(Chakravarthy, 1997).  Hamel and Valikangas (2003) claim the world is becoming 
turbulent faster than organisations are becoming resilient.  There is a general tendency 
in literature to claim that in turbulent environments companies should implement a 
radical or organic natured strategy formation process.  Stacey for example (2000) claims 
the more unpredictable the environment becomes the more decentralised the 
organisation becomes, pushing the focus decision down the hierarchy.  Hatch (1997) 
claims that in turbulent situations strategy is used as a sensemaking device to allow 
organisational members to act and thereby to produce order out of chaotic experiences.  
Mintzberg and Lampel (2001) claim the more unpredictable and confusing the external 
world is the more ‘natural’ (versus rational) the internal processes should be.  Lissack 
(1999) argues traditional models, based on hierarchical command and control and 
centralisation of power, are not adequate for turbulent environments and suggest using 
models from new science (complexity theory).  Courtney et al. (1997) suggest pattern 
recognition and non-linear dynamic models, while Duncan (1972) argues that as the 
environment becomes more dynamic and complex it is only organic (rather than 
mechanistic) organisational systems that will survive - those with flexible, political, 
intuitive modes of making decisions. 
The research findings however suggest otherwise (section 7.2.4).  Large companies for 
example, perceived to be operating in a turbulent environment, incorporate a more 
controlling and directive rather than emergent and organic strategy formation process. 
L7 for example, when it encountered turbulence, retained a high pro-active management 
role while also transforming it to be more intended (central control, focus on core 
activities, and a closure of unprofitable activities).  Small companies perceived to be 
operating in the turbulent environment are mainly reactive to their customers.  Medium 
sized companies seem to incorporate some of the characteristics of the large and small 
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companies.  Learning and complexity oriented strategy formation do exist in companies 
operating in a dynamic business environment (section 7.2.1).  High dynamics with 
middle to low complexity led companies like L1 and L2 to incorporate more organic 
strategy to confront the fast rate of change. 
One explanation to the deviation of the empirical finding from the literature could be 
explained through L7, a global financial company (section 6.3).  In 2001, the company 
witnessed emergent strategy leading to growth and management invested in efforts as an 
enabler.  However, as the environment became more turbulent, survival became the 
main management concern, leading to clear intended measures.  This phenomenon 
could also be relevant to other large companies from the research sample.  
Another explanation, in some cases, could be attributed to the non-unified interpretation 
of turbulence.  De Geus (1997) for example, claims that continuous, fundamental 
changes in the external world – a turbulent business environment – require continuous 
management of change in the company.  The interpretation he gives is aligned with the 
dynamic rather then turbulent (medium-high complexity + dynamics) definition adopted 
by this research. 
 
Figure  8-7: Relation between size, strategy formation and business environment 
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Figure  8-8: Relation between size, strategy formation and business environment 
Figure 8-7 and 8-8 present a summary of the relation between size, strategy formation 
and business environment.  Figure 8-7 presents the large companies and Figure 8-8 
presents SME’s.  
Another contradictory finding in relation to the literature is the tendency to link 
traditional rational tools such as planning to companies operating in a static 
environment (for example Courtney et al., 1997; Hatch, 1997 and Mintzberg and 
Lampel, 2001). The companies who perceived themselves (section 7.2.2) to be 
operating in a static environment did not invest management effort in a strategy 
formation process.  Strategy was mainly emergent and reactive to the customers or 
major market shifts, whilst the management of companies operating in a perceived 
complex environment (section 7.2.3) were the ones who prepared long term plans and 
used rational analytical tools. 
8.3 Managers Perception and Quantification of Turbulence 
Turbulence, a main aviation hazard caused by sudden change of wind speed or 
direction, holds a variety of interpretations when used as a phrase within the economic 
and business context.  In the research, a common approach was adopted to define 
turbulence as the result of two main influences – complexity and dynamics (Duncan, 
1972; Mintzberg et. al., 1998 and Buchner et al., 1998).  Complexity is the number of 
external factors that have to be considered during the decision making process, the 
disparity of these factors and their distribution across the various business areas.  
Dynamics is the frequency of change in the factors in decisive business areas, the 
degree of radicalism these changes exhibit and the regularity of their occurrence.  As 
can be seen on the Business Environment Matrix (Figure 7-2), only situations that 
combine high complexity and high dynamics lead to what is referred to as a turbulent 
environment. 
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Based on the workshops and interviews conducted, it seems that a simplification of the 
term turbulence can be misleading.  From the gathered experience, it seems when 
managers were confronted with the general question of how to describe their 
environment they tend to “carelessly” use the phrase turbulent.  The projection of the 
researched companies on the Business Environment Matrix (Figure 7-3) shows that 
when managers are asked to define their companies’ business environment in a 
systematic way the result might differ from their initial intuitive response.  The 
seventeen researched companies’ projection on the Business Environment matrix 
(Figure 7-3) is composed of two companies operating in the Dynamic quadrant, three in 
the Static quadrant, four in the Complex quadrant and eight in the Turbulent quadrant.   
A one-dimensional representation of the environment such as uncertainty level 
(Courtney et. al., 1997), cause and effect (Stacey, 2000) or unpredictable/confusing vs. 
comprehensible/controllable (Mintzberg et. al., 1998) limits the ability to distinguish 
between the companies and fully understand the link to the strategy formation process.  
The comprehensive definition of the business environment, based on dynamics and 
complexity, allows improved understanding.  For example, some companies, although 
operating in high uncertainty, are positioned differently in the Dynamic and Turbulent 
quadrants of the Business Environment Matrix (Chapter 7) and have different strategy 
formation processes.  
8.4 Company Size and Business Environment 
The research included seven large companies and ten SMEs.  Six of the seven large 
companies (except L3 that holds unique characteristics in terms of size and occupation, 
discussed in section 7.4.1) can be categorised as corporations since they have a multi-
industry or multi-product-market and compete indirectly through their business units 
(Segev, 1997). 
 
Figure  8-9: Perceived business environment by company size 
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Large companies tend to be positioned in the upper half of the Business Environment 
Matrix (Observation 5, section 7.3.1).  Hence, they operate in a medium to highly 
dynamic business environment.  A proposal that can be made is that large companies 
are not static because economically they are vulnerable to small company attacks.  
SMEs have a relative advantage in a static environment due to their greater flexibility 
and reduced overhead costs.  However, they cannot compete with large companies in a 
dynamic environment in terms of the resources needed.  SMEs tend (Observation 8, 
section 7.3.2) to be positioned in the bottom half diagonal of the Business Environment 
Matrix.  Hence the complexity of the business environments of each SME company 
tends to be perceived as relatively higher then its dynamics.  This can be attributed to 
the fact that higher complexity calls for expertise.  SMEs generate value and operate in 
markets where the need to specialise is greater in general than the pace of change.  
8.5 Summary 
Several key research findings and insights were identified that reduced some of the gaps 
identified in the literature review (Chapter 2).  The action research study (Chapter 4) 
and multiple case study (Chapter 6) increased the knowledge on strategy formation in 
general and the blend of intended and emergent in particular.  The theoretical 
investigation of the Strategy Formation Matrix added a new dimension to existing 
knowledge by comparing existing theories based on the strategy formation type versus 
management role in the strategy formation process. 
The initial aim of the research of providing an investigation of the theoretical and 
empirical relations between strategy formation, management role and business 
environment within different organisations and at different times was met, generating 
various findings regarding the links and the differentiation of size.  These finding 
contributed to creating new knowledge as well as challenging existing models 
representing the relations between business environment and the strategy formation 
process.  
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9 Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
9.1 Research Objectives  
The initial aim of the research was to provide an investigation of the theoretical and 
empirical relations between strategy formation, management role and business 
environment within different organisations and at different times.  The following section 
discusses how the research objectives were met and identifies specific conclusions that 
have been drawn. 
9.1.1 Research Objective 1 
Objective 1:  
To contextualise the different types of strategy theory that exist with relation to the 
strategy formation process. 
A deep understanding of strategy theory with relation to strategy formation was 
obtained by a extensive literature review, as presented mainly in chapters two and five. 
An abundance of literature available within the field of strategy management has led to 
an array of perspectives on the subject and the publication of overlapping and 
competing conceptual models.  The author has therefore chosen to focus on the 
framework and theories that segment the field to different paradigms offered by 
Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999), Stacey (2000) and Mintzberg et. al. (1998).  This 
helped to establish a common understanding of the field, from a holistic perspective, 
and gave the author a language to discuss the strategy literature within the context of the 
whole thesis.   
In chapter five, the Strategy Formation Matrix was developed in order to investigate the 
relation between the strategy formation type (intended versus emergent) in relation to 
the management role in strategy formation process (proactive versus reactive).  The 
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theoretical projections on the Strategy Formation Matrix reflected how different strategy 
schools incorporate different blends of intended and emergent strategy formation 
processes and how the management role in strategy formation varies in its level of 
proactive involvement.  It was seen that a recent literature trend, inspired by complexity 
studies, concentrated on a variety of strategy formation blends that are mainly emergent 
oriented and usually regard management as proactive in the strategy formation process. 
The review of the literatures surrounding the strategy formation process, the role of 
management and the business environment of organisations within this process has led 
to several conclusions and acted as a basis for the research study.  Firstly it was 
concluded that within the literature surrounding intended strategy formation, the role 
that management plays is well documented and clear.  Whereas, from the review of the 
literature surrounding emergent strategy formation, the role of management is less well 
defined and there appeared to be great debate about what this role should involve.  
Secondly, there is now a firm recognition that organisations face business environments 
that are not only stable and static but also turbulent and dynamic.  Historically, literature 
within the field of strategy management focussed upon the former business environment 
condition but increasingly focus is being applied to the latter.  This allowed for a link to 
be established within theory which stated that organisations facing a turbulent business 
environment tend to adopt a more emergent strategy formation process.  Finally it was 
concluded that scant attention has been paid to, within literature, organisational type and 
size when discussing strategy formation, especially in the context of emergent strategy 
formation.  It was concluded that discussions very often focus around large, 
multinational organisations and smaller organisations have been somewhat ignored. 
9.1.2 Research Objective 2 
Objective 2:  
To investigate the relationships between the strategy formation process, the 
management role within this process, the organisation type and the business 
environment that the organisation operates in.  . 
The relationship between the type of organisation, the environment within which the 
company operates and the strategy formation process was investigated by doing an in 
depth action research study in a large high-tech company (Chapter 4) and a survey and 
case studies in 16 additional small, medium and large companies (Chapters 6 and 7).  
The key findings were that: 
• The business environment influences the strategy formation process within 
organisations and in terms of the management role.   
• The size of the organisation affects its strategic characteristics. 
• Large companies, in the form of corporations tend to operate in a dynamic or 
turbulent business environment. 
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• SMEs tend to operate in an environment dominated by higher complexity than 
dynamics. 
• Management role in the strategy formation process in large companies is regarded 
generally as proactive. 
• In SMEs, the management role in the strategy formation process consists of a wide 
range of blends from almost purely reactive to proactive.  
• A different perception of the managements’ role in strategy formation exists in 
different business organisation types.  While in the SMEs a more proactive approach 
is related with planning and control, in large organisations it is more associated with 
setting the infrastructure and preconditions for enabling emergent strategy.  
• Similarities can be found for example between the Learning, Complexity, Capability 
Logic and Strategic Choice Schools and the strategy formation process in large 
corporate companies.  In SME the strategy formation varies for example between 
the Environmental and Strategic Choice Schools. 
• Only SMEs operate in a static business environment, experiencing a blend of mainly 
emergent strategy and a management role that is predominantly reactive to the 
business environment.   
• Companies operating in a complex business environment were shown to be 
implementing an intended strategy formation process, while companies operating in 
a dynamic business environment were identified as large and as having a more 
organic strategy process.   
• Companies operating in a turbulent environment differed based on size.  Whilst 
large companies incorporated a controlling and directive rather than emergent and 
organic strategy formation process, small companies were mainly reactive to the 
business environment. 
9.1.3 Research Objective 3 
Objective 3:  
To develop a model to describe and explain the relationships between the strategy 
formation process, the management role within this process, the organisation type and 
the business environment that the organisation operates in.   
In Chapter 4 (HiCo action research) Mintzberg’s (1987) model of strategy formation 
was investigated, validated and extended through 16 cases.  Based on further findings 
the representation was discussed in Chapter 8 and an alternative representation, 
incorporating the research insight was offered.  Some of the changes include 
stakeholders influence on intended strategy, and additional dimensions to the strategy 
formation process of the business environment and enabling emergent strategy (defined 
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by the author as a stream of action aimed at setting and supporting preconditions for 
emergence). 
In Chapter 5, the Strategy Formation Matrix was developed in order to investigate the 
relation between the strategy formation type (intended versus emergent) in relation to 
the management role in the strategy formation process (proactive versus reactive).  The 
Strategy Formation Matrix was validated theoretically in relation to existing strategy 
theories in Chapter 5 and in relation to a sample of companies in Chapter 6. 
The model was extended to incorporate the business environment in Chapter 7 based on 
Buchner et al.’s (1998) turbulence portfolio.  Empirical investigation was conducted on 
the extended model supported by data collection from the seventeen researched 
companies. 
Results were discussed and compared to existing models in Chapter 8.  For example, 
strategy literature has a propensity to link greater turbulence with a more emergent 
strategy formation process and a static business environment with a more intended 
strategy.  However, the research found evidence to the contrary.  It was seen that SMEs 
operate in a static business environment, experiencing a blend of mainly emergent 
strategy and a management role that was predominantly reactive to the business 
environment. Companies operating in a complex business environment were shown to 
be implementing an intended strategy formation process, while companies operating in 
a dynamic business environment were identified as having a more organic strategy 
process.  Companies operating in a turbulent environment differed based on size.  
Whilst large companies incorporated a controlling and directive rather than emergent 
and organic strategy formation process, small companies were mainly reactive to the 
business environment. 
9.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
The contribution to knowledge was made in the field of strategy formation.  This 
involved the testing and refinement of Mintzberg’s (1987) model, based on empirical 
evidence from a diversified sample of seventeen companies.   
The empirical research showed that Mintzberg’s (1987) strategy formation process 
should be refined to include the influence of the business environment and to add 
Enabling Emergent Strategy.  The Enabling Emergent Strategy aims at setting and 
supporting the preconditions for emergence.  Emergent strategy was found not to come 
from just the bottom of the organisation, as implied by Mintzberg’s (1987) model, but 
also it blends with intended strategy and is scattered all over the strategy formation 
process. 
In general, the larger companies have a more proactive management role than the 
SMEs, positioning themselves in the Enabler and Navigator quadrants of the Strategy 
Formation Matrix.  For example, this relates to the Learning School, the Complexity – 
Objective Observer Schools and the Planning and Strategic Choice Schools.  The 
Environmental quadrant is dominated by SMEs and resembles, for example, the 
Environmental Schools and Stacey’s (1999) Open System Schools. 
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In SMEs, an increased proactive management role is related to a more intended strategy 
formation process, related to more planning and control.  However, in larger companies 
it is related to a more emergent strategy formation process, where the pre-conditions and 
infrastructure for emergence are set. 
Previous research has suggested that as an organisations environment becomes more 
turbulent, an organisations strategy should become more organic.  However, this 
research found evidence to the contrary.  It was seen that SMEs, operating in a static 
business environment, experienced a blend of mainly emergent strategy.  Companies 
operating in a complex business environment were shown to be implementing an 
intended strategy formation process, while companies operating in a dynamic business 
environment were identified as having a more emergent strategy process. 
In conclusion, it was noted that there were differences drawn regarding the company 
type and the business environment they perceived themselves to be operating in.  Large 
companies tended to be positioned in the upper half of the Business Environment 
Matrix (Observation 5, section 7.3.1).  Hence, they saw themselves as operating in a 
medium to highly dynamic business environment.   SMEs tended (Observation 8, 
section 7.3.2) to position themselves in the bottom half diagonal of the Business 
Environment Matrix.  Hence, the complexity of the business environment of each SME 
company tended to be perceived as higher than the dynamics of the business 
environment.   
9.3 Research Limitations  
9.3.1 HiCo Action Research 
The HiCo action research case faced several research limitations.  The first limitation 
was concerned with conducting the research in one company with specific external and 
internal contexts limiting, to some degree, the ability for generalisation.  Although the 
research was conducted over nineteen months and incorporated to some degrees 
previous experiences it represented only a specific time frame of the organisation’s 
evolution. 
9.3.2 Sample of Companies 
The researched projections included data collection from seventeen companies, 
diversified by size, industry and geographical location.  The sample of companies is still 
relatively small to conduct a statistical analysis.  However, qualitative description and 
tentative relationships have been described. 
9.3.3 Qualitative Data 
The projection on the model consisting of the Business Environment Matrix and 
Strategy Formation Matrix is based on the perception of one or two managers from each 
company.  This perception is based on individuals’ assumptions, expectations, 
knowledge and information about the world of other people and relationships with 
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them, as well as about the non-social world in which the individual lives and acts 
(Stacey, 2001).  However, as mentioned, in some cases the projection is based on a 
consensus position between more then one manager.  In all cases, the triangulation with 
other sources of data is conducted and examples are asked.  Several sources that did not 
meet this request were not included in the research findings. 
The perceptions of the companies were positioned in a qualitative manner.  Managers 
positioned their company’s projection directly on both Matrices.  An alternative 
approach would have been to define parameters for each dimension, quantify output and 
generate the projection mathematically.  However the advantage of direct projection on 
the Matrix is that you do not risk choosing the wrong parameters or using the wrong 
weightings. The direct positioning allows further investigation with the interviewed 
manager and helps to deepen the understanding in real time, where needed. 
The accumulated information on the seventeen companies was based on different data 
collection methods and tools.  Some of the perceived projected positions were collected 
by interview, while others through workshops. 
9.4 Further Work 
The research findings generate an array of future research opportunities of several types.  
9.4.1 Larger Sample 
First, due to the research limitations, several further investigations can help validate the 
research findings and add more insight into the relationship between the strategy 
formation process, management role and the business environment.  A substantially 
larger sample of companies, diversified by size, can clarify and validate some of the 
findings by statistical significance.  Other future research, based on the findings, could 
be to extend the diversification dimension to investigate different relationships in 
different industries. 
9.4.2 Quantitative Validation 
Other aspects to be investigated are to conduct the projection not in a qualitative form 
but by offering various parameters and weights to quantify the dimensions.  The 
quantification could be based on questionnaires of a large sample of managers and 
integrated with objective data concerning the business environment and the company 
performance measurements. 
9.4.3 Alternative/ Additional Business Dimensions 
A model based on two dimensions, dynamics and complexity represented the business 
environment in the research.  However other forms might be offered (i.e. number of 
alternatives versus predictability of outcome) that could complement the findings 
concerning the relations between the strategy formation, management role and business 
environment.  Furthermore the economic forces leading to the findings concerning the 
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micro as well as the macro implication and the relationship to existing economic 
theories should be further investigated.  
9.4.4 Longitudinal Study 
While some of the companies in the research were investigated as a snapshot in time, 
others were investigated in more then one snapshot in a time frame that did not exceed 
two years.  The managers’ perspective of past positions in the multiple case study was 
problematic due to its retrospective nature.  A longitudinal study is recommended by 
researching a company, or set of companies, and their change over time in strategy 
formation characteristics and the business environment within which the company 
operates. 
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Appendix A - Action Research in 
HiCo – Chronological Diary 
 
 
 
 
 
The following table includes a chronological dairy of substantial events, data collection 
and themes recorded by the author between 8/2002 and 2/2004 (19 months).  Most of 
the events mentioned include various preliminary work meetings with managers at all 
levels, which are not presented.  All meetings and dates are recorded on the calendar 
Software used by the author. 
Since the aim of the table was to serve as a working tool to the author, the themes are 
mentioned as key words to remind the author of interesting findings in each event. 
The 8/2002 marks the beginning of the action research based on literature on the 
essence of action research and the recommended data collection process.  In several 
cases some of the events mentioned and analysed in the thesis are prior to this date. 
They are presented to represent a unique case or to serve as a benchmark to an activity 
in a later phase in the action research. 
HiCo consists of several, SBU’s, RBU’s and subsidiaries.  The SBU’s (strategic 
businesses units) are in charge of marketing, R&D, production, customer support and 
overall sales.  The RBU’s (Regional Business Units) are located in various regions 
around the world and are in charge of the direct contact with the customers and local 
sales.  The corporate manages of the SBU’s and RBU’s, define the overall strategy and 
resource allocation and provide various services. 
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Date Level Event Description Data Collection Themes  
2/2002   SBU A Balanced
Scorecard 
workshop with
management 
 
One (2 hr) workshop 
meeting defining the 
goals 
One (2 hr) meeting 
with SBU CEO setting 
measurements and 
targets for 2002 
SBU Management 
meeting to approve 
goals  
 
Templates used, 
Presentation of
output 
 
• Dependency on external support 
+ Notes 
• Short tem vs. long term 
• Employee motivation 
• Different perspectives on priorities 
2/2002  SBU D BSC workshop
with COO and 
CEO 
 One (2 hr) workshop 
meeting defining the 
goals 
One (2 hr) meeting 
with SBU CEO setting 
measurements and 
targets for 2002 
Templates used, 
Presentation of
output 
 
• Sustainability (Old product as cash 
cow for new, strive to survive as 
unit) 
+ Notes • SBU/Corporate relations 
2/2002  Corporate BSC workshop
with management 
 One (2 hr) workshop 
meeting defining the 
goals 
One (2 hr) meeting 
with SBU CEO setting 
measurements and 
targets for 2002 
Templates used, 
Presentation of
output 
 
• Portfolio aspects 
+ Notes 
• Responsibility on cross company 
issues 
• Short term long term 
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02-06 
/2002 
SBU A Strategy formation 
process 
Cross company
process containing 
two-stage approach. 
Stage one – 14 
geographical strategy 
analysis groups, 3 
segment analysis
groups, 5-overview 
subjects analysis. 
Strategy formation. 
 No recording of 
interviews. 
 + Notes 
Stage 2 : Integration 
(Geography/segment), 
business model and 
resource allocation 
model 
Templates used, 
Presentation of 
output 
• Linear process 
• How slight change in prediction 
assumptions could have massive 
impact on results 
• Communication of strategy 
internally vs. externally 
• Strategy outcome used for promoting 
organisational changes 
6/2002  Corporate Incentive plan
formulation 
 Support defining plan 
guidelines 
Strictly Confidential • Overcoming problematic scoring 
system to overcome stakeholders 
conflicting intrests (Scoring based on 
several levels) 
8/2002  SBU C BSC workshop
with management 
 One (2 hr) meeting 
setting goals 
One (2 hr) meeting 
defining 
measurements 
Two private meetings 
with SBU CEO  
 
Templates used, 
Presentation of
output 
 
• Long term planning effectiveness 
+ Notes 
• Stakeholders politics (between 
management SBU / corporate, 
SBU/RBU) 
• BSC strengths and weaknesses 
• Networking 
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8/2002 RBU A Meeting with RBU 
Manager 
1 hr meeting on the 
need to define goals 
and measurements 
Notes • Stakeholders politics (between 
management SBU / corporate, 
SBU/RBU) 
• Alignment of strategies between 
division and corporate 
• The use of goals and plans to 
communicate 
• Internal customer/supplier 
relationships 
• Compensation 
• Budget constraints 
9/2002 SBU A /
Corporate / 
RBU 
 Meeting on setting 
various goals and 
compensation 
Corporate VC Budget 
and Control, SBU A 
VC Sales – 2 hours on 
changes needed to 
support strategy 
Notes, Original plan 
derived from 
strategic plan 
• Budget Constraints – middle of the 
year 
• Contract constraints 
• Problems Implementing strategy 
• The one measurement optimising 
problem (turnover) 
9/2002  SBU A Out of the box 
Brainstorming 
workshop 
Full day, SBU
management + RBU 
managers 
 Templates used, 
Presentation of ideas 
and conclusions, 
notes, pictures 
• Stakeholders politics (between 
management SBU / corporate, 
SBU/RBU) 
• Types of Opportunities 
• Exploitation / Exploration 
• Process / reorganisation 
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• The search for magic opportunity 
10/2002  SBU A Presentation of 
Marketing Strategy 
Plan 
2 Hours Presentation, notes • Long term planning effectiveness  
• Implementation problems 
• High level vs Middle management 
perception and trust 
10/2002  Corporate Corporate Risk 
management Plan 
Preparation with CEO 
Assistant 
Presentation to Board 
Audit committee 
 
Presentation, notes • Opportunities vs Risks 
• World trend after Enron 
• Unexpected events with large 
impacts makes long term planning 
problematic 
10/2002   SBU A Business
Development 
Unit Workshop  
Full day work shop 
with BD Team (6 
people) on alliances 
Background 
material, notes 
• Types of alliances 
• Trust 
• Conflicting interest between partners 
• Conflicting interest between internal 
units 
• BD and Strategy 
• Personal relationships 
• Leveraging opportunities 
• The unexpected emergence of the JV 
that turned out to be 30% of 
revenues 
11-12 SBU A Specific Segment Several meetings with Analysis, Notes • Politics / Interests between 
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/2002 Strategic plan marketing and Sales 
middle managers 
Interview on past 
pattern of emergence 
with M 
The process was 
stopped half way 
marketing and Sales 
• Middle manager characteristics has 
major influence on strategy 
implementation 
• Sale support for efficient penetration 
• The story of a dreamer that insisted 
and eventually got the company a 
new market segment (40% of sales) 
12/2002  Corporate
SBU 
Strategy Forum
preparation 
meetings 
 Discussion on strategy 
formation process
needed, expectations 
etc. 
 
Presentations, 
document stating the 
forum given goals 
Meeting with VC SBU 
A (Form Chairman), 
CTO 
Notes 
• Different perceptions of definition of 
strategy 
• Different stakeholders interest from 
the forum 
• Problematic empowerment of forum 
 
12/2002  SBU C SBU market 
analysis for
Strategy workshop 
 
2 hours with SBU 
management to fill 
templates for the 
strategy forum 
Templates, 
presentations, notes 
• Internal Uncertainties as high as 
external 
• How will inputs from SBU be 
perceived / signalling to others 
• Effectiveness of SWOT analysis 
12/2002   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 1 
2 hours presentation of 
SBU + CTO current 
market/strategy 
analysis 
Templates, 
presentations, notes 
• Different perceived market trends 
• Uncertainties 
• Need for common language  
12/2002 Corporate  CTO Interview on 
f i
Discussion on strategy 
f i l i
Notes • Emerging process 
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strategy formation formation, complexity 
concepts, patterns of 
emergence in HiCo 
and life 
• Synergy 
• Exploration and Exploitation 
• Examples of emerging products 
12/2002 
 
Corporate  Strategy forum 
meeting 2 
2 hours discussion on 
expectations and
process  
 
Author presentation 
on suggested 
process, final 
outcome, notes 
• Intended,, Emergent, realized 
strategy 
• Need for new voices 
• Complexity concepts 
• Diversified team 
• Bottom up inputs 
• SWOT with major emphasis on 
opportunities 
12/2002 
 
SBU A Business 
Opportunities 
Brainstorming 
 Workshop 
3 hours, 
Brainstorming to
generate various
opportunities and later 
quantify them through 
group discussion 
 
 
Templates, 
Workshop process, 
Output presentation, 
Notes, pictures 
• Opportunity Sources 
• Resource allocation 
• Current Business vs New 
opportunities 
• Group dynamic in quantifying 
opportunities 
12/2002 
 
SBU C Business 
Opportunities 
Brainstorming 
3 hours, 
Brainstorming to
generate various
opportunities and later 
 
 
Templates, 
Workshop process, 
Output presentation, 
Notes, Pictures 
• Opportunity Sources 
• Resource allocation 
• Current Business vs New 
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 Workshop quantify them through 
group discussion 
opportunities 
• Group dynamic in quantifying 
opportunities 
12/2002   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 3 
2 hours presentation 
RBU/SBU SWOTs 
Emphasis on 
opportunities 
Templates, 
presentations, notes 
• RBU / SBU conflicts 
• Different perceived company 
position 
• Use of forum for politics   
01/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 4 
2 hours, 
Brainstorming to
generate various
opportunities and later 
quantify them through 
group discussion 
 
 
Templates, 
Workshop process, 
Output presentation, 
Notes 
• Opportunity Sources 
• Resource allocation 
• Current Business vs New 
opportunities 
• Group dynamic in quantifying 
opportunities 
01/2003  Corporate Cross company 
Team -Business 
Opportunities 
Brainstorming 
 Workshop 
Meeting One – 2 Hr 
getting to Know. 
Meeting Two – 
Brainstorming on
corporate level 
opportunities by 
splitting to small 
diversified teams 
 
Templates, 
Workshop process, 
Output presentation, 
Notes 
• Level of politics in middle 
management vs. top management 
• Motivation to work together 
• Call for changes 
01/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 5 
2 hours, workshop on 
synergy between units 
Templates, 
Workshop process, 
Output presentation, 
• Stakeholders interests 
• Shared Know-How 
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Notes • Shared Tangible Resources 
• Vertical integration 
• Pooled Negotiating power 
• Combined Business Creation 
• Coordinated Strategies 
 
• Corporate vs SBU/Business strategy 
•  
01/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 6 
Presentation and
discussion of 
diversified cross 
company team outputs 
and Strategy form 
members 
 Output presentation, 
Notes 
• Interaction of top with middle  / low 
managers 
 
•  
01/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 7 
Presentation and
discussion of SBU 
customer’s analysis 
(Type, Geography 
etc.) 2002 / future 
trend 
 Templates, Output 
presentation, Notes 
• Current customer base vs future  
• Easier to analyse the past then the 
future 
 
02/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 8 
Presentation and
discussion of SBU 
customer’s analysis 
(Type, Geography 
etc.) 2002 / future 
 Templates, Output 
presentation, Notes 
• Current customer base vs future  
• Easier to analyse the past then the 
future 
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trend 
02/2003 Corporate  CEO Assistant 
New version to 
BSC 
 
Assistance in defining 
corporate goals 
Presentation, Notes, 
summary output 
• Short term vs Long term 
• Enabler  
• Exploitation vs exploration 
• Compensation 
 
02/2003  Corporate
SBU  
Strategy forum sub 
team meeting 
Between Centre and 
SBU on “Parenting 
role” 
Notes, summary 
output 
• Current customer base vs future  
• Easier to analyse the past then the 
future 
• Stakeholders dynamic 
• Conflict interests 
• Different perception of roles 
• Patterns and History 
02/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 9 
Presentation and
discussion of future 
business arenas,
opportunities 
clustering 
 
 
Templates, Output 
presentation, Notes 
• Prioritising and clustering 
opportunities 
• Exploration vs Exploitation 
• Resource allocation 
• Alignment to strategy 
02/2003   Corporate Board Meeting 
Q4/2002 
Presentation of forum 
phase 1 outputs 
(Author not present) 
Presentation, Notes • Stack holders politics 
• Empowerment issues 
• Turbulence of environment 
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02/2003  SBU A BSC workshop 
with management 
2hr meeting setting 
goals  and defining 
measurements 
 
Templates used, 
Presentation of
output 
 
• Long term planning effectiveness 
+ Notes 
• Motivation and incentives 
• Stakeholders politics (between 
management SBU / corporate, 
SBU/RBU) 
• BSC strengths and weaknesses 
• Networking 
03/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 10 
Technology mapping Output presentation, 
Notes 
• Search for common language 
• Is a map setting a box 
• Is shared technology resource 
possible (cost vs flexibility) 
• Search for gaps and JV 
• Core technology 
• Emergent strategy 
03/2003  Corporate
Marketing  
Assistant in
building Marketing 
strategy 
 Platinum, Gold and 
regular customers 
(parallel effort to 
strategy forum) 
Draft Output  • Internal politics 
• Various non aligned strategies 
• Resource allocations 
• Short term vs long term 
• Focus vs opportunistic 
03/2003 Corporate Meeting with CTO Discussion on 
f i f l
Notes  • Forecasting 
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SBU  forecasting, formal vs 
non formal innovation, 
bottom up innovation 
(example),  
• Formal vs non formal innovation 
• Bottom up innovation (example) 
• Garbing opportunities 
03/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 11 
Technology mapping 
Cont. 
Output presentation, 
Notes 
• Uncertainties 
• Scope of strategy plan (time) 
• Resource allocation 
• Internal politics 
03/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 12 
Alternative business 
models and 
positioning 
Output presentation, 
Notes 
• Positing 
• Concessions (major stockholder 
missing) 
04/2003  Corporate
Business 
Development  
Out of the Box 
initiative 
Mapping and
clustering of out of 
SBU scope 
opportunities  
 Output  
Notes 
• Competing initiative 
• Stakeholders politics 
• Exploration vs exploitation 
• Networking 
04/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 13 
Planed limited
participation (SBUs) 
 Output presentation, 
Notes 
• SBU vs Corporate 
• How far can you go 
• Strategy as common interests 
05/2003   Corporate Board Meeting 
Q1/2003 
Presentation of forum 
phase 2 outputs 
Presentation, Notes • Stack holders politics 
• Empowerment issues 
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(Author not present) • Turbulence of environment 
 
05/2003  SBU A China Business 
Plan preparation 
Preparation of 5 years 
BP 
 
Templates used, 
Presentation 
+ Notes 
• Long term planning effectiveness 
• Stakeholders politics (between 
management SBU / corporate, 
SBU/RBU) 
• Turbulence (SARS) 
• Networking 
• BP as story telling 
06/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 14 
Discussion on board 
meeting 
Notes • Patches 
• Autonomous units 
08/2003   Corporate Strategy forum 
meeting 15 
Discussion on board 
meeting Q2/2003 is 
there still need for the 
forum? 
Notes • Strategy formation process never 
“die” they just “fade away” 
10/2003  SBU A Business plan 
presentation to
SBU Management 
 
Business plan
Preparation (2004 –
2008) with sales and 
marketing manager 
 Business plan,
Presentation 
 • Long term predictions process 
presents problems and trends 
 • Generating in short time a long term 
prediction incorporates intuition and 
assumptions with a probability that a 
longer and more intensive process 
will generate the same outcomes 
• Politics in how to present the plan 
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• Numbers on papers looks convincing 
even to those that know how they 
were truly generated 
10/2003  SBU A Discussion on 
strategy landscape  
Discussion with
marketing product 
development manager  
 Notes • Exploration and exploitation on the 
strategy landscape 
• Size of spread vs. resources 
• Strategy formation process how to 
launch, effect of stakeholders 
11/2003   SBU B Implementing
performance 
measurements to 
R&D 
Work meeting with 
SW manager of SBU 
B 
Risk management 
status, data base of 
measurements and 
reports, notes 
• Outsider who came to the company 
has trouble changing company 
culture 
• Measurements and status reports lets 
a manger empower more his 
employees 
• Control vs. non control 
12/2004  Central
service unit 
Strategy landscape 
workshop 
A self developed 
workshop 
incorporating Woods 
(98) definition of 
strategy + turbulence 
+opportunity and 
business patterns 
Documented process 
+ notes 
• Strategy landscape generating 
• Exploration / Exploitation 
•  Spread of resources vs strategy 
spread on landscape 
• Importance of flexible business 
process 
• Turbulence 
01/2004  SBU A Update of China 
BP 
Meeting with manger 
in charge china 
BP, Notes • Stakeholders internal effect 
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BP  operation • Alliances 
01/2004  SBU A Project A risk 
management 
workshop 
Marketing and R&D 
risks of the project, 
preparation +
workshop with cross 
company diversified 
team 
 
Filled templates, 
summary  ,notes 
• Effects of interests and culture of 
different past pre merger companies 
managers 
• The power of middle manager to 
informally stop project process 
01/2004  SBU B Project B risk 
management 
workshop 
Marketing and R&D 
risks of the project, 
preparation +
workshop with cross 
company diversified 
team 
 
Filled templates, 
summary, notes 
• Tense relationships between 
departments 
• On going back and forth shifting of 
resources 
• Constant changes in requirements 
• Gambling on future technologies 
02/2004  SBU A Complexity large 
cross company
event 
 
Large (180) cross 
company two days 
workshop outside the 
company premises – 
did not attend 
Output material, 
interviews with
various stockholders 
before and after 
 
• Emergent of ideas in an “open 
space” event 
• Different perspective of results 
• Day after effect 
• Employee empowerment 
02/2004  SBU A Gross margin 
improvement  
Half day event with 
management 
concluding a cross 
company process of 
several months 
Documents, notes • Hard to predict effect of cost 
reduction initiatives 
• Compensation of sales man effect on 
margins 
• Long term vs short term view of 
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stakeholders 
02/2004   Corporate Work meeting on
Goals and
compensation 
 
Periodical meeting
with CEO assistance 
concerning 2004 
Targets and 
competence plan 
 Notes • Unpredictable market turnaround 
effect on compensation and goals 
• Long term vs short in compensation 
• Scenario building integrated with 
goals to deal with uncertainty 
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Appendix B - Organisational Change 
Framework - Questionnaire 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
From Olson and Eoyang (2001, xli-xlvii) 
Instructions:  
• Select the one or two best answers to each question below.  If all choices are equally 
appealing, leave the item blank.   
• Darken the circle(s) to indicate which answers(s) you chose.   
• When you complete all questions, count the number of a’s, b’s, c’s, d’s you selected.  
• Record the numbers in the “totals” boxes at the end of each page. Then add all 
together and complete the profile on page XX. 
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 a b c d 
1. When I contract a new client, I: 
a. Guarantee specific outcomes. 
b. Shape client’s expectations for outcomes. 
c. Indicate what I expect as outcomes. 
d. Acknowledge that the outcomes will emerge over 
the span of the project. 
° ° ° ° 
2. When I begin a new project, I: 
a. Follow a clear step-by-step process. 
b. Begin with a clear plan, but am willing to change 
over time. 
c. Begin with a plan, but expect change 
d. Plan a first step and plan subsequent steps as I 
collect more information. 
° ° ° ° 
3. My intervention processes and procedures: 
a. Never Vary. 
b. Are standards, but I make customised changes. 
c. Usually follow similar patterns. 
d. Are designed to meet the unique needs of each 
client. 
° ° ° ° 
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4. I believe that I can predict the reaction of client 
organisation: 
a. All the time. 
b. Most of the time. 
c. Sometimes. 
d. Never. 
° ° ° ° 
5. When I plan intervention, I collect information from: 
a. Top Management. 
b. All Management. 
c. Key personal in selected departments. 
d. All levels across the organisations. 
° ° ° ° 
6. Individuals in the organisation should be valued for: 
a. Compliance with rules. 
b. Honesty about sources of success and failure 
c. Increasing their level of competence. 
d. Creating patterns. 
° ° ° ° 
7. I prefer to begin my interventions: 
a. At the top of the organisation. 
b. With a key decision maker. 
c. Where there is the most need for change. 
d. At any organisational level with any group. 
° ° ° ° 
8. A team is empowered by: 
a. A strong leader. 
b. Member interactions. 
c. Alliances with others. 
d. Autonomous individuals. 
° ° ° ° 
9. In effective organisations, decisions are based on: 
a. Individual preferences. 
b. Team/unit consensus. 
c. Team/unit rules. 
d. Cumulative experience of individuals.  
° ° ° ° 
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10. As a facilitator of change in an organisation, I: 
a. Give an expert advice on organisational change. 
b. Hold a mirror up to the organisation. 
c. Share insights about the organisation’s pattern 
behaviour. 
d. Learn and teach. 
° ° ° ° 
11. An effective change facilitator should be able to: 
a. Squeeze ambiguity out of a system. 
b. Explain why there is ambiguity in the system. 
c. Help people feel comfortable with ambiguous 
situations. 
d. Use uncertainty and ambiguity to increase 
organisational capacity. 
° ° ° ° 
12. I collect information about the success of an intervention: 
a. Only if the customer insists on it. 
b. At the end to provide a final report for the client. 
c. At the beginning, middle, and end. 
d. During every interaction with the organisation. 
° ° ° ° 
13. When I observe the organisation I look for: 
a. Roles that individual play. 
b. Power relation 
c. Personal interactions. 
d. Patterns of behaviour across the organisation. 
° ° ° ° 
14. A major factor in increasing the speed of change in an 
organisation is: 
a. Competitive energy. 
b. Collaboration. 
c. Mutual respect and trust. 
d. Learning about the process of change. 
° ° ° ° 
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15. When you are facilitating organisation change, you should 
begin with: 
a. The task that is most critical to the top managers. 
b. The simplest issues, so the group will build 
confidence over time. 
c. Actions most likely to succeed. 
d. The issues that   that are most accessible. 
° ° ° ° 
16. Organisation history is important because: 
a. It predicts the future. 
b. It gives information about potential resistance. 
c. It provides stories to use in encouraging change. 
d. It builds the capacity for future actions. 
° ° ° ° 
17.  Differences in an organisation: 
a. Distract from the focus of the work. 
b. Provide variety in problem identification and solving 
processes. 
c. Keep people engaged and interested. 
d. Provide the impetus for transformation. 
° ° ° ° 
18. A highly functioning organisation: 
a. Meets a set of pre-defined criteria. 
b. Reflects the vision of its CEO. 
c. Satisfies the needs of all its internal and external 
stakeholders. 
d. Fits into the niche formed by customers, 
competitors, and resources. 
° ° ° ° 
19. Change in the organisation is like: 
a. Tuning a machine. 
b. Freezing and unfreezing. 
c. Growth through developmental stages. 
d. Perpetual evolution. 
° ° ° ° 
20. I am a successful facilitator of change because: 
a. Know what will happen before it happens. 
b. Provide processes that are predictable. 
c. Am flexible in the face of adversity. 
d. Work with the patterns in the system. 
° ° ° ° 
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 Grand Totals     
PROFILE: 
Scoring instructions: In the table below, circle the number of responses you have in 
each category. Darken the space level you marked. The columns that result are the 
profile of your Organisational Change Framework. 
a b c d 
20 20 20 20 
19 19 19 19 
18 18 18 18 
17 17 17 17 
16 16 16 16 
15 15 15 15 
14 14 14 14 
13 13 13 13 
12 12 12 12 
11 11 11 11 
10 10 10 10 
9 9 9 9 
8 8 8 8 
7 7 7 7 
6 6 6 6 
5 5 5 5 
4 4 4 4 
3 3 3 3 
2 2 2 2 
1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
Traditional Change 
facilitation perspective 
  Complex adaptive 
system change 
perspective 
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INTERPRETATION: 
• There is no “best” profile.  The approach of a change agent must fit the expectations 
and needs of the client systems.  The behaviour listed in any of the alternatives, “a’ 
through “d”, may be appropriate, depending on the situation. 
• If your scores in the “a” and/or “b” columns are higher than your scores in the “c” 
and “d” columns, you may approach your work with a belief that organisation 
change is best accomplished by, clear, predictable means, using influences and 
position power to make change happen.  This may be very appropriate if control is 
needed to capitalise on what is working well in a particular situation. 
• Columns “c” and “d” represent a complex adaptive perspective about organisation 
change.  This perspective is important for an organisational unit when it needs to be 
flexible and creative.   A score in column change involve complex adaptive 
behaviour. However, a high score in Column “d” may not equate to conscious 
expertise in complexity. 
AUTHOR SELF ANALYSIS  
 Strategy formation process SBU  A  2002 
Strategy formation process 
Corporate 2003 
1 b d 
2 b c 
3 c d 
4 c c 
5 b c 
6 b c 
7 b c 
8 b b 
9 b c 
10 a a 
11 b c 
12 c d 
13 a a 
14 c d 
15 b b 
16 a c 
17 b b 
18 b b 
19 d c 
20 a c 
Count "a" 4 2 
Count "b" 11 4 
Count "c" 4 10 
Count "d" 1 4 
Count "a"+"b" 15 6 
Count "c"+"d" 5 14 
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Appendix C - Initial Background 
Survey – July, 2002  
 
 
 
 
The questionnaire was formed on June 2002 and distributed on July 2002.  Several 
interactions that included follow-ups and further explanations were conducted in August 
– September 2002.  All forms (except L5, M3) were returned by October 2002.  L5 was 
collected in April 2003.  The form was not collected for M3 however alternative sources 
such as the context analysis provided most of the background information. 
The contact person in each company gathered inputs after consulting with various 
managers. 
1. History/Background of the company 
• How your company started. 
• Milestones. 
• Please insert photos of your company – exterior look and work places. 
2. Products and services  
• Please insert photos. 
3. Market description, trends, challenges and competitors. 
4. The context of your company (number of employees etc.). 
• And some other detail that seems important, like for example the employee profile.  
Identify any important alliances/network with other companies. 
 203
Appendix C   Initial Background Survey 
What is your position in the supply chain (in relation to the end user of your 
product/service). 
5. Vision 
What the company sees in the future, and how the company sees it self in that future. 
6. How is business development done today and by what functions of the organisation? 
7. What are the Business development main future challenges? 
8. Description of strategy formulation/ Investment decision process. 
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Appendix D - MENI Questionnaire 
for Interviews  
 
 
 
 
WARM UP QUESTIONS  
Turbulence 
Questioned to: all GPs 
 
• Give an explanation about the turbulence matrix. 
• Question them about their position within the matrix (now and in future). 
• From which external areas does turbulence arise for their company?   
• What are the main indicators for a high level of turbulence in these environments? 
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SPECIFIC QUESTIONS REFERRING TO CERTAIN TOPICS 
Business Development 
Questioned to: all GPs 
• Ask them if they have any special processes or methods to deal with external shocks and changes in their business 
environments.  
Which parts of the companies are mainly involved in this? 
• Question them where they see the highest need for new methods or approaches. 
(e.g. strategic early warning systems, skill management, double loop learning applications)
Where do they see the limitations for companies to cope with external shocks? 
• Question them if they think that it is always advisable to strive for a high level of adaptability. 
(What are the risks of being adaptive?) 
 
Strategic Planning 
Questioned to: all GPs  
 
• Give an explanation about the strategy/management matrix. 
• Question them about their position within the strategy/management matrix today. 
• Ask them about the process of their strategy formation. 
• How do they balance emergent and planned (intended) strategy formation? 
• Question them about details concerning the role of management in their company today. 
• Question them about their future position within the strategy/management matrix. 
• Ask them about the reasons for the future position they aim at.  
• Does intended strategic planning still work in turbulent environments?  
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Networks 
Questioned to:  
 
• Question them about their position on the network scale (now and future trend). 
• Given the restrains in terms of time and resources, do they think that networking is a crucial factor for achieving 
adaptability? 
• For which purposes and in which areas does the company use networks?
In which areas or under which conditions is the use of networks not advisable? 
• What are their methods to support networking inside and outside their organisation, 
is it better to have a planned approach to networks or to let them emerge informally? 
• Do networks need a common strategy? (if yes, when?) How do approaches for the development of collective strategies in 
networks look like in their organisation? 
• What is the equivalent to a company culture in networks/virtual organisations? 
 
Organisation 
Questioned to:  
• On the organisational level, which are the aspects that the company considers as most important to achieve a high level 
of robustness?  
• Can self organisation be a good way to achieve robustness? 
(Robustness defined as the ability to cope with internal and external shocks in a sustainable way) 
• For companies that apply self-organisation: 
• To which level of the organisation should self organisation be applied with respect to enhancing adaptability? 
• What are the success factors and risks of self-organisation? 
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Performance Management 
Questioned to:   
• On which aspects should Performance Management concentrate in turbulent environments?  
• Are their experiences from the past still useful in today's turbulent environments? 
 
Complexity Studies 
Questioned to:  
• Ask them which tools / methodologies or approaches coming from the complexity theory were applied in their 
organisation?  
• Question them about their experiences with it ? (problems and benefits) 
CLOSING QUESTIONS 
Questioned to all GPs: 
• Ask them what will be the main future concerns of their company. 
• Question them how these will affect business development and strategy aspects in their company. 
• How will the organisational structure of their company change in future? 
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Appendix E - MENI Analysis 
Workshop  
 
 
 
 
MENI –Management role Environment Networking Importance 
Location and Time: 
• The workshop was conducted in Cranfield University, U.K., on September 2002. 
The workshop duration was about 4 hours. 
 
Tools:  
• Large hand drawn visual templates. The templates were hung on the wall. 
Step 1: 
 209
Appendix E   MENI Analysis Workshop 
• Industrial partners short presentation (background, business challenges, Industry 
etc.) 
Step 2: 
• Industrial partner qualitative positioning on three templates 
Step 3: 
• Discussion of current position and future trends. 
Remarks: The analysis was easily explained and the various dimension seemed to be 
well understood by participants. However the mapping was focused on current 
perception. This point might have been a little misunderstood by some. 
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Appendix F - Strategy Formation 
Analysis  
 
 
 
 
Preparation: Overview presentation, empty poster size template containing each 
company name, A4 empty templates. 
• Location and Time: The workshop was conducted in Fribourg, Switzerland, on Feb, 
2003.  
 
• Workshop process:  
• Part A: presentation of the overview concept using the specially 
prepared presentation + Q&A (45 min) 
• Part B: The empty A4 size templates were handed out to the 
managers. Each manager filled his company inputs (1 hr).
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• Part C: each company representative read out loud his outputs; data 
was recorded on the posters, short discussion were formed for 
clarifications or common problems of interest ( 2.5  hr) 
• Part D: Short conclusion 
• Overview presentation slides: 
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Appendix G - Context Analysis  
 
 
 
 
STORIES ABOUT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN [COMPANY’S NAME] 
Please describe some of your company’s stories referring to its current situation 
(referring to business/market/USP/innovation/customers/company culture), Tip: 
Conduct a dialogue (talk about the feeling, not just the facts) 
- Stories: How do you get orders? What is a typical way that products are 
developed? What is discussed currently on management / on employee level 
Tip: Structure the story by 
- What, Who, When/where, Why 
- How did you get from one point to the other 
- Lessons (hopefully) learnt 
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DESCRIPTION OF [COMPANY’S NAME]’S IDENTITY 
Please describe the things that make out the company's identity with respect to its 
dynamic abilities. This can be supported by referring to a metaphor (e.g. a fox, a bee-
hive, Real Madrid, ...).  
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF [COMPANY'S NAME] IDENTITY 
Give comments if needed. 
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT CONTEXT [COMPANY’S NAME] 
Collect the most important internal and external factors of the company; classify them 
according to turbulence drivers (i.e. factors that increase the turbulence the company is 
facing) and other important factors. Put these factors into the matrix. There should not 
be more than five factors per quadrant. 
Specify the factors (give sub-factors) and try to identify indicators for them  
(e.g. customers – customer structure – portion of turnover with specific customers). 
Please give comments on these factors (e.g. by showing relations to stories told above) 
to improve understanding for others. 
Factor Matrix today 
External Turbulence Driver 
 
Factor specified factor Indicator (X) 
 
Further External Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERNAL TURBULENCE DRIVER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FURTHER INTERNAL FACTORS 
Specify the indicators; do they mainly indicate the degree of complicatedness (C), the 
degree of dynamics (D) or do they just give a hint on the scale (S) of impact on the 
company. 
Mark the indicators that the company already tracks in blue.  
Mark the factors that stand for the threats and opportunities in the current situation in 
the appropriate colour. 
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If the matrix gets too confusing, make a copy of it to keep it clear and understandable. 
NEXT STEPS AND IMPACTS 
Please describe roughly which steps are planned concerning business development 
(strategy and organisation) within the next 1-2 years.  
NEXT STEPS 
Try to forecast by sense making, on which factors this will have an impact. (What will 
the factor matrix look like when steps are taken? Will the turbulence drivers change?) 
Try to forecast in the next matrix, the future factor matrix, what the future scenario 
could look like. 
FUTURE FACTOR MATRIX  
Future Factor Matrix 
External Turbulence Driver 
 
Factor specified factor 
 
Further External Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERNAL TURBULENCE DRIVER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FURTHER INTERNAL FACTORS 
Please give comments if needed. 
CHANGE OF IDENTITY 
Indicate the most important factors with respect to the past, present and possible future 
identity of the company and the reasons that made these factors change (e.g. why did 
the company change from hierarchical decision processes to flat ones?). 
Please give comments if needed. 
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Past Identity Reason for change Present Identity 
-  
-   
-   
-   
-  
 -  
-   
-   
-   
-  
 
Present Identity Reason for change Future Identity 
-  
-   
-   
-   
-  
 -  
-   
-   
-   
-  
PROFILE 
Please mark the current X and future Y positions of the company on the scales beneath 
and add comments about the reasons for change. 
strong/                                                weak/ 
control                                          no control
PerfM
Strgyexploitation                                 exploration
navigator                                          enabler  Mngt
certainty                                      turbulence
(forecasting) uncertainty
proactive                                                    reactive Mngt
rigidity                                        adabtability Orga
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Appendix H - Industry Structure 
Analysis 
 
 
 
 
The industry analysis workshop was used for data collection in HiCo action research 
and in L5 case study. In HiCo data collection was conducted in three units, in two 
through a workshop (using a wall size template) with several senior managers an in one 
through an interview with a senior manager. In L5 it was collected as an interview with 
the R&D manger. 
YOUR INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
NEW 
ENTRANTS
SUPPLIERS
TECHNOLOGIES
PRODUCTS/SERVICES CHAN
NELS
TRENDS
CHALLENGES
KEY MARKETS
SUBSTITUTES
PLAYERS
 
Based on grove Industry structure template (www.grove.com): 
Suppliers are the actual organisations or types of organisations that provide the 
component parts or services needed to create industry’s products/services. 
New Entrants describe new competitors or industry substitutes likely to have an impact 
on the industry. 
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Technologies address critical technologies, including proprietary and current 
innovations that impact industry players. 
Industry players are significant players in the industry or the kinds of organisations 
that represent the major forms of competition. 
Substitutes are alternative ways of satisfying the underlying customer needs. 
Key markets are customers of the industry’s products/services. If there are individual 
buyers that dominate the market, they should be identified.  Otherwise, it is probably 
most useful to describe the market by key segments. 
Channels identify the means by which the industry’s products/services are delivered to 
the ultimate customer (such as resellers, direct, OEM’s, etc.). 
Technologies address critical technologies, including propriety and current innovations 
that impact industry players. 
Challenges describe obstacles to success that industry players are likely to encounter. 
Trends identify significant patterns or changes that are important in analysing the 
industry. 
Workshop stages: 
1. Introduction. 
2. Definition of the industry (frame). 
3. Identification of key players, new entrants and substitutes. 
4. Characterizations of Key Markets/Customers. 
5. Description of upstream suppliers and technologies. 
6. Examination of products, services and channels. 
7. Trends and challenges mapping. 
8. Knowledge gaps identification. 
9. Open discussion. 
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